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MARITIME TRANSPORT PROPERTIES AND 
COMPETITION LAW ISSUES: 
PARTIAL FUNCTION COOPERATION AGREEMENTS IN LINER 
AND TRAMP SHIPPING 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
The thesis deals with selected competition issues that occur within 
the dynamic and high-risk market of shipping, examining competition 
law issues in liner consortia and tramp pools through an EU 
Competition Law prism. These partial function joint ventures are the 
predominant form of alliances in the maritime sector. Liner trade is 
primarily organised in consortia, while pools are the most common 
form of tramp shipping alliance. 
 
The thesis' synthetic and analytic research incorporates the 
methodology and structure used in its competition law bibliography, 
while the legal analysis is informed with sources from microeconomics 
and maritime economics.  
 
The issues that are examined in relation to shipping include the four 
main areas of competition law: the relevant market, indicators of 
dominance, compliance of the alliance agreements with Article 101 
TFEU and abusive conducts by dominant undertakings under Article 
102 TFEU. 
 
The development of the above areas aims to demonstrate the 
interaction of sector particularities with competition law as a whole. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Background  
 
Approximately 90 percent of the international trade in goods is 
currently carried out by sea1, despite the development of other means 
of transport. When it comes to transport, it is maritime transport 
which undisputedly provides the principal means of carriage of 
goods.2   
 
Globalisation means that the sea transport will continue to play 
pivotal role in trade particularly in the European Union.3 No other 
continent has such long shoreline in relation to its total surface area 
to serve its trade. Also, the concentration of ports in the European 
Union is the highest in the world; moreover, the EU-controlled 
commercial fleet is by far the largest in the world. Liner and tramp 
shipping are, without doubt, the most important means of 
transportation used for international trade.  
 
Two-thirds of world trade (in terms of weight), and one-third (in terms 
of value) is carried by ocean borne vessels (notably through bulk and 
                                       
1  International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Report, ‘International Shipping, 
Carrier of World Trade’, IMO publication, (2005)] 
 <http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18900/IntSh
ippingFlyerfinal.pdf> [accessed 02 June 2009] p. 1. The International Maritime 
Organisation is a specialised agency of the United Nations with 168 Member States 
and three Associate Members. The IMO’s primary purpose is to develop and 
maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping and its remit today 
includes safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, 
maritime security and the efficiency of shipping. 
2  There are more than 45,000 merchant ships trading internationally today, 
transporting every kind of cargo. The world fleet is registered in over 150 nations, 
and manned by over one and a quarter million seafarers of virtually every 
nationality. IMO Report, ‘International Shipping, Carrier of World Trade’, op. cit p. 1 
3  ‘Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the role of local and regional 
authorities within the new Baltic sea strategy’, OJ [2009] C200 /06 
 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:200:0023:0030:EN:PDF> 
 [accessed 02 June 2009] Paragraph 49 
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liner carriers). This does not necessarily mean that liner and bulk 
(shipping) sectors are two distinct independent entities. They consist 
of several sub-sectors and specialised sub-markets. Thus, to call it a 
unitary industry would be misleading: it is usual to distinguish a 
number of widely differing services and sub-markets which exist 
within it.4  
There are basic differences as well as similarities between the two 
sectors of liner and bulk shipping.  
 
The most important difference is that liner service is a scheduled 
service where container vessels call certain ports according to a given 
frequency, while bulk vessels trade around the globe in pursuit of 
profitable freight in a dynamic but unpredictable pattern. Another 
difference relates to the design of the vessels: liner vessels have the 
capacity to transport large and variable numbers of goods in parcels 
or cargo units, while tramp vessels carry bulk dry or liquid cargo (oil, 
ore). Moreover, goods moved in liner services are high-value ones, i.e. 
either manufactured or semi-manufactured goods. Substantially 
different also are the contractual terms accompanying liner transport 
vis-à-vis tramp shipping: in the former mode of transportation, the 
relationship between shippers and carriers is regulated by standard 
printed forms of contracts (e.g. bills of lading or similar documents) 
whose terms and conditions are directly prepared by carriers without 
any negotiation with their contractual counterparts, except as regards 
tariffs. In tramp shipping, the trader normally charters and pays a 
negotiated rate for the whole ship, either for a voyage or for a period of 
time.5 Another significant difference between the sectors is the degree 
                                       
4  The maritime transport covers several trades as well as produces 
subsequent services. According to UNCTAD 2004 reports (chapters 1 and 4) the 
broader maritime industry with the actual transport operation, the financial 
services, the insurance, administrative, IT sector, and the technical management 
sector employs about three million people in the European Union alone. See: 
UNCTAD REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT, 2004 [UNCTAD/RMT/2004] Source:  
 <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2004_en.pdf> [accessed 3 April 2006] 
5 Tramp (or spot) vessel services are defined in Article1§3 (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 
4056/86 as the transport of goods in bulk or in break bulk in a vessel chartered 
11 
 
of cooperation that exists inside them. Cooperation among liner 
shipowners has always been structural6; the predominant form of 
alliance in liner shipping has been the conference, global alliance, full 
function merger or the consortium. The quest for cooperation among 
competing shipping lines has for a long time been explained using 
sophisticated economic theories; that approach lasted for decades and 
still continues to fascinate some scholars. In contrast, tramp shipping 
synergy is a phenomenon of the last decade or so, and is expressed 
mainly by tramp pools or other forms of alliances on which legal and 
economic research is relatively limited. 
 
Yet all these services are provided on local and international scales, 
calling either in liner transnational routes or random ports (i.e. the 
spot market), as is the case with liner and tramp shipping 
respectively. In this context, maritime transport is justly called a 
unique globalised sector. Several questions arise regarding the 
properties of this sector with reference to its globalised nature. For 
instance, it is a common knowledge that there is a connection 
between the global character of a business like shipping and its 
competitiveness; yet this feature also constitutes a difficulty in 
defining relevant markets in the context of competition law. On the 
one hand, numerous studies from the field of the maritime economics 
have adequately analysed the subject and the properties of the ocean 
borne transport. On the other hand, it has been generally accepted 
                                                                                                             
wholly or partly to one or more shippers on the basis of a voyage or timecharter or 
any other form of contract for non-regularly scheduled or non-advertised sailings 
where the freight rates are freely negotiated case by case in accordance with the 
conditions of supply and demand. It is mostly the unscheduled transport of one 
single commodity which fills a vessel. The Commission has identified a series of 
characteristics specific to specialised transport which render it distinct from liner 
services and tramp vessel services. They involve the provision of regular services for 
a particular cargo type. The service is usually provided on the basis of contracts of 
affreightment using specialised vessels technically adapted and/or built to transport 
specific cargo. See: Commission Decision 94/980/EC of 19 October 1994 in Case 
IV/34.446, Trans-Atlantic Agreement (OJ [1994] 376) (hereinafter the TAA decision), 
paras 47-49. See also: Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92, applying 
the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member 
States (maritime cabotage) [OJ 1992 L 364]. 
6  Munari Francesco, see infra § 26 
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that globalisation plays an important role, especially when considering 
competitiveness; yet, it is also accepted that the shipping sector is a 
complex and dynamic market where parameters, practices and 
behaviours are sector specific and not limited to its globalised nature. 
This has been more or less recognised in every jurisdiction. The global 
character of shipping is considered the central element of the 
business from which the other features derive (e.g. dynamic, unstable, 
competitive etc). Hence, the special uniform practice of conferencing 
has been established worldwide, offering protection in liner 
conferences by any major maritime countries. Conference members 
meet, fix and agree on schedules and rates, in order to rationalise the 
capacity and the frequency of services offered to their customers; rates 
are publicly available. Likewise, contractual relationships with 
shippers are identical for all conference shipowners, so that shippers 
enjoy the same terms and conditions of carriage independently from 
the liner that they use on the trade served by the conference. These 
contractual conditions may provide the trades with freight stability 
contributing to the stability of transport costs, but they may also 
restrict competition further, as it happens when shippers are granted 
rebates on tariffs if they grant exclusivity to the conference members. 
This kind of arrangement has been called a loyalty agreement and 
occurred frequently in the past. 
 
For a long time, scholars explained the need for shipowners to avoid 
competition among themselves using economic theories: in particular, 
it was maintained that liner shipping demonstrates peculiarities that 
cannot cope with a competitive market model since, inter alia, (a) fixed 
costs are proportionately much higher than variable costs, (b) entering 
and exiting a given market (i.e. a liner service) is not easy and entails 
substantial shifting costs, (c) the unit of supply in the liner shipping 
market (i.e. the vessel) does not correspond to, and is much bigger 
than, the unit of demand (i.e. the parcel or cargo unit), this making it 
quite awkward for the carrier to constantly adapt its offer in order to 
13 
 
match the fluctuations of demand. The above reasons stood as an 
obstacle to conceptualising the application of the perfect competition 
model in the liner sector: hence, it was a matter of common sense to 
state that if liner carriers were to compete among themselves for 
pricing, this would produce “rate wars” and a “destructive 
competition” whose consequences would undermine the stability of 
trade.7 
 
Nonetheless, by 2000, the conference system had naturally and 
gradually met its demise, especially in the United States of America 
and Europe. Owners started to appreciate mergers or independent 
commercial practice more than the conference system, which had 
been bureaucratic and demanding, as it needed constant cooperation 
and supporting administrative mechanisms. In March 2003, the 
OECD published a Report8 on Competition in Shipping which severely 
criticized the need for conferences to have antitrust exemption. In 
light of these developments, the EU Commission decided to re-
examine Regulation 4056/86 that granted block exemption to liner 
conferences. 
 
The Commission adopted a three stage approach: the first being a 
consultation paper in March 2003,9 followed by a White Paper 
published in October 2004,10 and thereafter, a legislative proposal for 
a Council regulation to repeal the conference exemption on 14 
                                       
7  The matter of destructive completion assumption is addressed by relatively 
all scholars. Indicatively, see §§ 12, 21  - 33 
8  OECD, “Competition Policy in Liner Shipping”, Final Report [16/4/2002], 
sections 2.4 and 2.5. The OECD report recommended that member countries 
seriously consider removing antitrust exemptions for price fixing and rate 
discussions. Exemptions for other operational arrangements may be retained so 
long as these do not result in excessive market power 
9  See Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on the review of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty to maritime transport’, 27 March 2003 
10 See Commission, ‘White Paper on the review of Regulation 4056/86, applying the 
EC competition rules to maritime transport’, COM (2004) 675  
14 
 
December 2005.11  The proposal to repeal the block exemption was 
thus the result of a thorough three-year process of consultation, 
review and studies. The Commission findings were that the exemption 
did not fulfil the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) which were 
necessary for it to continue, these being: 
- concrete benefits resulting from price fixing and capacity 
regulation are identified; 
- a fair share of the proved benefits are passed on to consumers; 
- the indispensability of price fixing and capacity regulation for 
the provision of reliable services; and 
- competition is not eliminated on a substantial part of the 
market. 
 
Following these recommendations, the EU has been the first 
jurisdiction to put an end to the possibility of the liner carriers to meet 
in conferences, fix prices and regulate capacities with effect from 
October 2008.12 
                                       
11  See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation repealing Regulation 
(EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 
86 to maritime transport, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 as regards the 
extension of its scope to include cabotage and international tramp services’, COM 
(2005) 651 
12  Council Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006, of 25 September 2006, repealing 
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport, and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003 as regards the extension of its scope to include cabotage and 
international tramp services, OJ L 269/1 [28/9/2006] 
See related articles:  Fruhling Pierre, Whiddington Charles, Cassels John  and Decat 
Elisabeth, "The application of European competition law in the transport sector", 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1(2) [2010], pp. 144-154; Phang 
Sock-Yong, "Competition law and the international transport sectors", Competition 
Law Review [2009] Volume 5 issue 2, pp. 193-213; Munari Francesco, "Liner 
shipping and antitrust after the repeal of Regulation 4056/86.", Lloyd's Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly [2009] 1(Feb), pp. 42-56; Neocleous Panayiotis and 
Stamatiou Costas, "The new era of EC competition law in the shipping industry", 
International Company and Commercial Law Review, [2009, 20(1)], pp 1-9; Baughen 
Simon, "European Union Maritime Law",  Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly  2010, 3(Aug) Supp (International Maritime and Commercial Law Yearbook 
2010), pp. 122-127; Chuah Jason, "Liner conferences in the EU and the proposed 
review of EC Regulation 4056/86", Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
[2005] part 2 (May), pp. 207-233. Marquez Terry, "Shipping, Competition, and 
Dumping: The European Community's Liner Shipping Regulations", Tulane Maritime 
Law Journal, Volume 23 [1998-1999] pp. 139-182. Marquez (p. 142), from the 
position of an American observer provides a clear and simple explanation as to what 
15 
 
 
Currently in 2012, we see a paradox: With the exception of the EU, all 
maritime countries preserve the conference system and assume that 
conferences can provide a solution against destructive competition 
that could start among liner companies and thus overheat the sector.  
These legislative and judicial developments on EU Competition law 
and the greater EU Maritime Policy are creating a new territory – so 
that we may be speaking of a ‘territorialité communautaire’13, or 
better, a ‘Euro-territoriality’14 that could create, at least temporarily, 
questions and possibly frictions with the outside. 
 
The different jurisdictional and legislative approach by the EU, in 
contrast to global lex mercatoria,15 stimulate research interest. Price 
fixing in freight rates is now prohibited in the EU and directly caught 
by article 101 of the TFEU. Despite the abolition of conferences, 
alliances (in the form of consortia and pools) continue to exist. 
Maritime transport synergies are well established and cover 
substantial portions of global trade. Obviously, the jurisdictional 
approach by the EU did not target shipping alliances; in reality it is 
                                                                                                             
are the motives that drive legislative initiatives in the EU. His argument is political 
and legal: In accordance with the article 2 of the Treaty of Rome (1957), 
harmonisation and uniformity with the principles of the EU Union constitutes a 
good basis for legislative reform. He claims that as part of the customs union, the 
Member States are to "abolish internal tariffs and erect a common external tariff."To 
this end, the EC may enact laws which are binding on the Member States. This 
uniformity provides a stable legal environment in which business may be conducted, 
as well as the certainty required for cross-border investment and international 
services such as maritime transport. Though he published his article in 1999, the 
content remains valid. See also commentary Analysis on the Liner Consortia 
Commission Regulation 870/95 by Clough Mark, "The devil and the deep blue sea 
(EC competition law and liner shipping consortia)", European Competition Law 
Review, Volume 16 [1995] pp. 417-427. 
13  Bergé Jean-Sylvestre, ‘The Community Framework for Cross-Border 
Intellectual Property and Information Technology Litigation’ in Nuyts A., Hatzimihail 
N, Szychowska K (eds.), International Litigation in Intellectual Property and 
Information Technology  [Kluwer Law International 2008] pp. 49 -60 
14  Hatzimihail Nikitas, “Concluding Remarks: Territoriality, International 
Governance and Cross-Border Litigation of Intellectual Property Claims”, in Nuyts 
A., Hatzimihail N, Szychowska K (eds.), International Litigation in Intellectual 
Property and Information Technology  [Kluwer Law International 2008] p. 308 
15  See: Hatzimihail Nikitas, "The Many Lives - And Faces - Of Lex Mercatoria: 
History as Genealogy in International Business Law", Law and Contemporary 
Problems [2008] Vol. 71 (3) pp. 169-190 
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generally acknowledged that alliances in shipping are beneficial to the 
general economy, providing that competition remains effective. It is 
also evident that the key issue behind this reform by the EU has been 
the shielding of the economy against any increase in the freight rates 
that could jeopardise global trade stability. As mentioned in the 
UNCTAD 2011 Report on Maritime Transport,16 transport costs are 
key determinants of a country’s trade competitiveness. Excessive 
shipping costs are considered a major barrier to trade, often 
surpassing the cost of customs duties.17 In this context, 
understanding the determinants of freight rates and transport costs 
and how such costs influence trade flows, volume, patterns and 
structure is crucial. Relevant determinants of competition within a 
market (as expressed by the freight rates) can be considered the 
transport costs, which include, inter alia, distance, competition in 
shipping and port services, economies of scale, trade imbalance, 
capital costs of infrastructure, and type and value of goods.18 These 
are parameters that undoubtedly influence the maritime sector. My 
view is that these parameters could also be deemed characteristic of 
the sector; inherent properties that have to be taken into account. In 
my research I decided to take into consideration some of the above-
mentioned factors and incorporate them into my competition law 
analysis; I consider them as properties of the subject matter.  
 
II. Thematic and Research Question 
 
Against this background, this thesis investigates the competition law 
issues in liner shipping consortia and tramp shipping pools. In light of 
the recent changes in the EU competition law regime in shipping, 
                                       
16  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Review Of 
Maritime Transport 2011”, UNCTAD/RMT/2011 United Nations Publication [2011] p. 
64 
17  Ibid. p. 64 
18  Ibid. p. 64 
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which repealed the block exemption in liner conferences, I discuss 
specific factors of the maritime sector in order to establish compliance 
of a partial function (limited) horizontal co-operation agreement in 
shipping, i.e. the liner consortia and tramp pools, with articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. In particular: 
“What are the competition law issues in partial function (limited) 
cooperation agreements in Liner and Tramp Maritime Transport? Which 
sector-specific factors and particularities affect (predominantly EU) 
competition law? 
 
Schematically, the structure of the thesis is the following: 
First, I describe the sector specific parameters and I relate them to 
shipping synergy, i.e. the partial function consortia and pools that do 
not directly fall within the EC Merger Regulation. 
Then I identify cases that fall foul of articles 101 and 102 TFEU: I 
discuss the nature of the joint venture agreement as whole, and I 
examine particular distortions in competition as result of 
consolidation and market power of consortia and pools.  
 
Competition law issues in shipping alliances require the examination 
of four constituent areas: the relevant market, indicators of 
dominance, compliance of the alliance agreements with Article 101 
TFEU and abusive conduct by dominant undertakings (i.e. the 
organized categories of abusing conduct). The development of all the 
above areas has been necessary as I intend to demonstrate 
particularities of maritime industry and their influence on competition 
law areas. Should I have focused in one category or subject e.g. Article 
101 or 102 TFEU, I could not have confirmed this result. In addition 
to the traditional analysis, I explore some of the properties of the 
sector and their influence on some of the above mentioned factors. In 
particular, I take into account factors like economies of scale, the 
geographic and time parameters which determine the relevant market, 
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the fixed and average costs, the capital access and costs in order to 
determine dominance and market power. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis it is also necessary to follow a strategy 
with regard to the subject of law, and inevitably observe several 
limitations.  
Hence, I believe that the choice of competition law has been the most 
efficient for the following reasons: First, it provides the research with a 
centre of gravity. Second, it allows me to highlight, in the best possible 
manner, those sector specific properties that play a significant role in 
the industry. Finally, the findings provide the basis for further 
research in related fields of law, such as international law (e.g. 
extraterritoriality of EU Competition law in idiosyncratic and global 
industries), transport law (the consequences of alliances in air, 
maritime and multimodal transport), and interdisciplinary research 
with the involvement of economics and systems theory. Third, the 
choice of liner and tramp loose consortia, i.e. the partial function 
forms of cooperation that are currently predominant in shipping is 
made based on the criterion that liner consortia are a kind of 
successor to the liner conferences and the tramp shipping pools are 
the most common form of synergy in tramp shipping. 
 
Having said the above, my research focuses on investigating the 
following topics: 
 
- The special EU competition law issues that arise in ocean borne 
liner shipping services19 carried out by liner maritime firms that 
                                       
19  According to Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (currently 101 
TFEU) of the EC Treaty to Maritime Transport Services [OJ 2008 C 245/2] para 11, 
a “liner shipping involves the transport of cargo, chiefly by container, on a regular 
basis to ports of a particular geographic route, generally known as a trade. Other 
general features of liner shipping are that time tables and sailing dates are 
advertised in advance and services are available to any transport user”. Liner 
services play a central part in the global trading network, carrying about 60 per cent 
of the value of goods shipped by sea. They provide fast, frequent and reliable 
transport for almost any cargo to almost any foreign destination at a predictable 
19 
 
chiefly use container vessels whether or not they act 
independently, or through partial function (limited) co-operation 
agreements, i.e. the liner consortia; 
- The special EU competition law issues that arise in ocean borne 
tramp bulk shipping services20 – carried out by independent 
companies or through partial function joint ventures, the most 
predominant of which are the tramp shipping pools. 
- The special properties of the maritime service, which play an 
important role in the effective competition of the industry, that 
are either common in both sectors (liner and tramp) or 
particular to certain of them and affect the competition law 
analysis. 
 
                                                                                                             
charge. On this basis a shipper can work out profits and cash flow and make the 
necessary delivery arrangements with confidence. If the destination was not Europe, 
but Iceland, Kenya or India, the procedure would be much the same: the shipper 
could ship wine on a regular service at a fixed tariff that may increase with inflation 
but will not go through the wild peaks and troughs encountered in the charter 
market. It is an important business for the world economy as well as the shipping 
industry. 
 In the “Maritime Transport Study” the United Nations identified 32 maritime 
coastal regions and 1,024 potential liner routes (trades) between these areas. The 
industry generally divides the trade routes into three major categories - East-West / 
North-South and Intra-Regional. Spot and liner shipping serve these routes as 
analysed by the following six trades: 
 The Trans-Pacific Trade, the North Atlantic Trade, (ii) the Western Europe to 
the Far East Trade, (iii) the Round the World Services, (iv) the North-South Routes, 
(v) the Marginal Liner services and (vi) the Intra-regional Trades and Feeder services. 
Ibid. pp. 338, 366-372 
20  In the majority of circumstances the shippers prefer to leave independent 
shipowners to take the shipping risk and to rely on hiring ships from the market 
when they are needed. There are many industries, notably agricultural cargoes such 
as grain and sugar, where shippers never know how many cargoes they will have in 
future or how many ships will he needed. So the shippers go to the freight market 
and hire transport when they need it. This is briefly the definition of “Spot” or else 
“Tramp” Shipping. In this context, the risk is dual sided and it is based on the 
demand – supply principle. In the first case the shippers may secure cheap freight if 
there is abundance of available vessels. In the second case the shippers may pay 
expensive freight if there is limited offer of available vessels. Yet, in both situations, 
ships are always available. In Spot shipping shipowners take the bigger share of the 
entrepreneurial risk in view of the investment they have committed and its return 
(ROI). Thus, shipowners trading on the spot market make their living by taking a 
“shipping risk”. They back their judgement that the ships they buy will be in 
demand and provide a worthwhile return on capital. With so much at stake, it is no 
surprise that maritime spot shipping occupies much the same position as game 
theory mathematics. Stopford, (1997) p. 40. 
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On the whole, several research purposes are met within the thesis, 
such as: 
 Evaluation of the effectiveness of the existing legal tools to 
define a relevant shipping (liner and tramp sector) market 
 Compliance of the cooperation agreements with the article 101 
TFEU and description of the anti-competitive practices of liner 
consortia and tramp pools 
 Assessment of the market power indicators 
 Alternative ways to deal with problems related to market 
definition. 
 
 
III. Motivation 
 
The motivation to research on this topic has been based on 
professional criteria. From an academic point of view, the motivation 
arose to research the interaction between specific and idiosyncratic 
industries, like shipping with the EU Competition Law. Secondly, I 
examined the topic having acquired substantial experience as a 
maritime lawyer and shipbroker; this helped me as I was sufficiently 
subject-informed, understanding sector specific particularities. 
 
III. Methodological Approach and Research 
Aims 
 
I examine the matter from a legal doctrinal perspective of competition 
law incorporating the methodology and structure of competition law 
bibliography. In addition, I research into the available bibliography 
that refers to economic functions of the industry. I have chosen to 
investigate on multiple fields as the study of competition law is 
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interdisciplinary in nature. Nonetheless, this has been a challenging 
task as for many years (2000-2007) there has not been specialised 
bibliographical information. That changed in 2007 with the 
publication of important works by Luis Ortiz Blanco (2007)21, Alla 
Pozdnakova (2008)22 Antonis Antapassis, Lia Athanassiou and Erik 
Røsæg (2009)23, Philip Wareham (2010)24, Jason Chuah (2005-2009)25 
Francesco Munari (2005-2012)26, Christopher Townley (2011)27. For 
the fundamental competition law analysis I was based, but not 
limited, on the works of Richard Whish28, Richard Whish & David 
Bailey29, Christopher Bellamy & Graham Child30.    
 
Thus I extended the research further by informing legal analysis with 
sources from microeconomics and maritime economics, like 
                                       
21  Blanco Luis Ortiz, Shipping Conferences under the EC Antitrust Law: 
Criticism of a Legal Paradox [Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2007] 
22  Pozdnakova Alla, Liner Shipping and Competition Law, [Kluwer Law 
International BV, Netherlands, 2008] 
23  Antapassis Antonis, Athanassiou Lia, Røsæg Erik (eds), Competition and 
Regulation in Shipping and Shipping Related Industries [Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 
and Boston 2009] 
24  Wareham Philip (ed), Competition Law and Shipping: The EMLO Guide to 
EU Competition Law in the Shipping and Port Industries [Cameron May, London, 
2010] 
25  Chuah Jason, "Liner conferences in the EU and the proposed review of EC 
Regulation 4056/86", Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly [2005] part 2 
(May), pp. 207-233. See also: Chuah Jason, “The Commission Guidelines on The 
Application to Maritime Transport Services Of EC Treaty Rules on Restrictive 
Business Practice”, Journal of International Maritime Law [2008] 14. See also: Chuah 
Jason “The New Liner Shipping Consortia Block Exemption Comes Into Force” 
Journal of International Maritime Law [2009] .  
26  Munari Francesco, "Liner shipping and antitrust after the repeal of 
Regulation 4056/86.", Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly [2009] 1(Feb), 
pp. 42-56. See also: Munari Francesco, "Competition Law in Liner Shipping", in 
Basedow Jürgen, Magnus Ulrich, Wolfrum Rüdiger, Dutta Anatol (editors), The 
Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs 2009 & 2010 [Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg 2012]. 
27  Townley, Chris, “The Relevant Market: an acceptable limit to competition 
analysis?” European Competition Law Review, 10, [2011] pp. 493-495. See also: 
Townley Chris, “The Liner Shipping Block Exemptions in European Law: Has the 
Tide Turned?”, World Competition Volume 27(1) [2004] pp. 107-153. See also: 
Townley Chris (Townley 2011 b), “Inter-generational Impacts in Competition 
Analysis: Remembering Those Not Yet Born”, European Competition Law Review, 
[2011 Issue 11] pp. 580-590 
28  Whish Richard, Competition law [Oxford University Press 2004] 
29  Which Richard, Bailey David, Competition Law [Oxford University Press 
2012] 
30  Bellamy (Sir) Christopher, Child Graham, Roth Peter (ed) European 
Community Law of Competition [Sweet & Maxwell; 5th Revised edition 2001] 
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Stopford31, Grammenos32 and studies from the maritime economics 
also contribute to the thesis. I also include special sector specific 
scholarly Reports in the Maritime Sector; indicatively I mention as 
exampled the Fearnley Consultants Report on Tramp Shipping33, 
OECD and UNCTAD Reviews on Maritime Transport. 
 
In this context, qualitative data have been used in order to exhibit the 
properties of the maritime system, its functions, and its interaction 
with competition law in relation to synergistic activity of shipping 
companies. This has been necessary as the maritime sector is 
particularly idiosyncratic and requires profound global understanding 
of the way it is structured and operates, so that research will have 
valid and verifiable objectives and findings. 
 
There have been of course some challenges:  
- First and foremost, the current legislation and case law have 
been limited only to liner shipping conferences and have not 
produced any cases related to tramp shipping pools.  
- Secondly, there are no reported cases of market consolidation 
by any tramp shipping pool. In fact, market data confirms the 
case law and legislative guidelines for the competitiveness 
assumption of the industry. In 2008, when the Guidelines on 
the application of competition rules to maritime transport 
services (henceforth the “Guidelines”) mentioned: 
“market shares provide useful first indications of the 
market structure and of the competitive importance of the 
parties and their competitors. The Commission interprets 
                                       
31  Stopford Martin, Maritime Economics [London: Routledge, 2nd Edition, 
1997] and (3rd edition 2009) 
32  Grammenos Costas, Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business [Lloyds 
List Publications 2010 2nd edition] 
33  Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm, Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services [‘EU Report 
COMP/2006/D2/002’ 
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market shares in the light of the market conditions on a 
case-by-case basis”.34  
In my view, the wording “case by case” simply substantiates the 
competitiveness assumption of the shipping markets. 
 
In particular I employ the following methods of qualitative research35: 
 
I set selection criteria based on resources of Competition Law, 
Maritime Competition Law and Maritime Economics. Competition Law 
cases that refer to transport are given priority. Likewise maritime 
economics are given priority and are used in order to exhibit the 
properties of the maritime transport sector; 
 
Through synthetic thinking I have examined the legal framework of 
competition law in order to define the elements that have to be taken 
into account in a shipping market. The intention here is to present the 
properties of a certain shipping sector and their effect on the relevant 
market. We hence start from the basis of “what”, “where”, “when” 
(quantitative data) and we expand to “why” and “how” (qualitative 
investigation) of decision making for the purpose of discovering 
underlying meanings and patterns of relationships. As mentioned, in 
principle the thesis is theoretically-driven research that employs legal 
research in conjunction with economic findings. 
 
Overall, I have employed a combination of analysis and synthetic 
thinking to explain market behaviour and the properties of maritime 
transport, and in the conclusion we make the necessary suggestions. 
                                       
34  OJ C245/02 26.9.2008 Guidelines on application of the article 81 of the EC 
Treaty to maritime transport services. See: Para 33 “Market shares provide useful 
first indications of the market structure and of the competitive importance of the 
parties and their competitors. The Commission interprets market shares in the light 
of the market conditions on a case-by-case basis. In liner shipping, volume and/or 
capacity data have been identified as the basis for calculating market shares in 
several Commission decisions and Court judgments”. 
35  Patton, Michael Quinn, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods 
(California: Sage Publications, 3rd Edition, 2002) p. 4 and McConville Michael,  Chui 
Wing Hong, Research Methods for Law (Edinburg University Press 2007) pp. 22-32 
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In a sense, we do not reduce our research to analysing only legal 
relations as they derive from, or relate to, the existing legal framework, 
as we deem that it may not be inclusive enough to cover shipping 
markets’ phenomena. Instead, we demonstrate from the larger whole - 
from perceiving shipping with the traditional thinking as two main 
markets (liner and tramp) - the key properties of the sector (the 
submarkets and their divisions) and shipping particularities in light of 
which we reconsidered the main research hypothesis. Analysis and 
synthesis are complementary: neither replaces the other. We 
incorporate both.  
 
This methodology coherently drives the argumentation and returns to 
the original hypothesis-assumption: Shipping, either regulated or 
deregulated, is always subject to structural dynamic volatility (the 
phenomenon), and that is what guarantees efficient global 
competition; moreover, both ways of transport (liner, and notably 
tramp) have self-regulating market properties as a product of this 
phenomenon. In addition, analysis of relevant markets, as well as 
market power indicators, has shown that shipping is basically an 
open market, thus the special conditions prevailing in the relevant 
market may need to be aggregated with other – preferably 
neighbouring – markets in order to validly assess the legitimacy of the 
behaviour. 
 
The need to research on this subject consolidated over time once I 
confirmed that the dynamic element of the shipping market is central 
to any interpretation of competition law issues in the market. In 
particular, besides the main and collateral outcomes of this research, 
my research produces two significant proposals:  
- First, I promote the idea that shipping is organised in multiple 
interconnected and relevant markets depending on the degree of 
linearity in the service (Liner vis-a-vis tramp) and the presence 
of the joint venture in multiple markets. The nature of the 
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dynamic element comprises many constituent concepts, such as 
the risk, time, cost, and capital; the majority of them are 
regarded by competition law as barriers to entry. I agree with 
this view, moreover I deem them as inherent barriers, not only 
to entry, but also to operate; in turn I consider that it is this 
dynamic instability that guarantees the effective 
competitiveness of the sector. 
- Second I support that aggregating across markets is an 
appropriate choice in order to determine the true ambit of the 
relevant markets and the benefits to the consumer. This 
aggregation has wide applicability, especially in open markets 
like tramp shipping. 
 
The European Union current regulation regime abolished the block 
exemption on liner conferences and clarified that tramp shipping law 
is subject to competition. This thesis examines whether the purpose of 
these legislative initiatives is accomplished and to what extent. 
 
IV. Structure of the Chapters 
 
 
The structure of my work has been organised in the following manner: 
I first examine the aforementioned competition law issues in liner 
shipping and in liner shipping consortia, mainly from an EU 
competition law perspective; this has been accomplished in two 
Chapters: the first analyses matters regarding the relevant market, 
the second analyses issues related to Article 101 and 102 TFEU. In 
the final Chapter, I review the nature of the maritime tramp sector 
and refer only to those matters that I consider relevant, given that 
these issues have been analysed in Chapters One and Two they are 
applicable also to tramp shipping. 
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In particular: 
 
The thesis is based on the existing legal regime of competition law that 
relates to the articles 101 & 102 TFEU, and I investigate the majority 
of competition law that applies to Maritime Transport. 
 
In order to achieve this, I structure the work in three parts. I 
schematically present the three chapters below: 
 
Within the First Chapter, I establish the theoretical premises of the 
thesis that apply to liner and tramp shipping; in particular I discuss 
the way liner shipping consortia operate. Moreover I examine the 
concept of the relevant market revisiting the service and geographic 
criteria from the combined perspective of the maritime industry and 
competition law. 
 
In Chapter Two I build on the above premise and analyse the liner 
shipping consortium agreement per se under the Article 101 TFEU. In 
particular, I analyse the structure of liner shipping consortia and 
assess the special legal issues. Then I discuss the matter of market 
definition in liner shipping by analysing the relevant product 
geographic and temporal market.  
 
I discuss issues of market power and abuse of dominance by liner 
consortia. I start my analysis with the elements that are fundamental 
to shipping, i.e. the cost structure, economies of scale and access to 
capital that comprise its dynamic feature characteristics. Then I 
critically evaluate the effectiveness of the market share as criterion for 
dominance and market power.36 With reference to the findings of 
Chapter One, I critically assess the narrow character of the 
geographical elements of the product market and I examine whether it 
                                       
36  In comparison to the traditional market shares analysis, either by the 
increase business volume or by means of synergies. 
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is possible to aggregate a consortium’s market share across markets. 
Whereas market definition and critical market share are plausible to 
be calculated within strict geographical or product defined markets, 
for shipping (and especially for tramp shipping) such an exercise is 
notably difficult due to the constant mobility of the incumbent vessels 
that are not restricted to geographical zones.  
 
However, I support that aggregation would require additional 
resources from many disciplines to be properly articulated, mainly 
due to the open and globalised nature of the industry. Alternatively, a 
reasonable approach would have been to examine a specific market in 
a period specific context and thus evaluate the certain market 
conditions at a given time. However, such an approach would produce 
results associated only to de lege lata, and would limit a synthetic and 
global approach. In my analysis I found that there may be grounds to 
correlate the temporary element of the market with the inherent 
volatility and/or the maritime market cycles.   
 
Within the Third Chapter, I examine the issue of market power 
incurred by tramp shipping pools. I use the findings and the analyses 
conducted in Chapters One and Two, and focus on the special 
particularities of the tramp maritime sector that have not been 
mentioned earlier. I attempt to preserve the same thematic structure, 
but I prefer to refer only to those specific issues that are relevant to 
the tramp maritime sector, as the majority of the legal issues are 
common between the two sectors. 
 
I use the findings that are common to liner shipping and investigate 
the sector’s specific conditions that could constitute abuse in the 
dominant position. Again, I evaluate the legal tools available for the 
definition of the relevant market and the critical market share 
necessary for establishing dominance of the tramp pool. Whereas the 
absence of case law confirms the competitiveness assumption of 
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tramp shipping, it also produces a natural difficulty in practically 
assessing an anti-competitive behaviour. Since there are not any 
reported cases of violation (either by a single firm or by a pool) in any 
jurisdiction, I transfer in an analogous manner the available 
references of liner shipping to the tramp sector; I then expand my 
analysis and draw separate conclusions for tramp shipping. For our 
analysis we used sector specific, liner shipping (analogue) and general 
competition bibliographical references, analogue case law and 
economic data from maritime economics and independent analysts.  
 
Overall, we confirmed that - given also the absence of tramp sector 
specific case law- that the sector is highly competitive. Especially I 
would say that the spot maritime transport may be uniquely 
competitive compared to other sectors of the economy. While tramp 
pools make the market gradually more defined and fragmented, the 
competitive assumption is preserved. Subsequently, market power 
cannot be established under constant fleet movements (nomadic and 
opportunistic) and at irregular intervals in time (sporadic). Hence the 
sector creates a natural difficulty for any analysis that aims to assess 
possible anti-competitive behaviour. Concepts like relevant market 
and/or market share acquire a sui generis meaning, in view of the 
globalised nature of the market. Though shipping pools, being a 
concentration, limit the immensity of the “open” relevant market, we 
find it difficult to effectively address anti-competitive behaviour based 
on 102 TFEU.  
 
This difficulty in defining the market, the critical share, as well as 
other determinants (marginal cost) can be circumvented if we follow a 
sui generis approach so to include as well the “relevant neighbouring 
markets” and then to aggregate the market shares of the incumbent 
pool members across. Aggregation across markets so far is a concept 
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that is limited to the consumer benefits under 101(3) TFEU.37 I have 
been obliged to borrow the use of the aggregation of benefits and to 
adapt to as tool for the definition of the relevant market and the 
critical market share in tramp shipping, as I believe it deals better 
with the nature of the tramp shipping as global and “tramp” (an 
undertaking that is nomadically only established in a certain 
economic zone) in contrast to the existing traditional approach of the 
narrow market adopted by the EC Competition law. I deem that this 
option assists us better in evaluating whether a pool can actually 
distort the competition in a relevant temporal period and in a roaming 
manner.  
 
 
Finally, I conclude our research findings by presenting our outcomes 
and the motives for future research.  
                                       
37  See related discussion paper of the Office of Fair Trade (OFT), “Article 101(3) 
– A Discussion of Narrow  Versus Broad Definition of Benefits”,  Discussion note for 
OFT breakfast roundtable [2010] 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/events/Article101(3)-discussionnote.pdf> 
accessed 10th March 2012 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Today’s market conditions may present opportunities for liner 
companies to buy vessels cheaply, strengthen their operations and 
spread risk through consolidation. In this chapter we examine the 
substantive anti-trust issues the liner shipping alliances may face. 
The key issue for determination is whether such transactions will 
significantly impede effective competition in any EU market, or any 
neighbouring or overseas market in which the party is active. With 
reference to the Limitations of Research Section38, I define “liner 
consortium” as a flexible type of synergy, a type of “partial function” 
joint venture that aims to produce economic benefits for its incumbent 
members39. In contrast to “full function joint ventures”, a consortium 
– in the context of the present thesis - is not subject to the EC Merger 
Regulation (MR)40, as they are structured in a non-firm and flexible 
form of partnership; whereas the core of basic incumbents may be 
limited, the number of co-operating third carriers with the consortium 
can be substantial and take various forms. However, we have to 
observe that a shipping joint venture (liner consortium or a tramp 
                                       
38  See infra p. 282 
39  The term "consortium" is covered within Commission Regulation (EC) No 
823/2000 of 19 April 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping 
companies (consortia). It means an agreement between two or more vessel-operating 
carriers which provide international liner shipping services exclusively for the 
carriage of cargo, chiefly by container, relating to one or more trades, and the object 
of which is to bring about co-operation in the joint operation of a maritime transport 
service, and which improves the service that would be offered individually by each of 
its members in the absence of the consortium, in order to rationalise their 
operations by means of technical, operational and/or commercial arrangements, 
with the exception of price fixing. 
40  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [OJ 2004 L 24] pp. 
1-22 
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pool) may constitute a concentration falling with the Merger 
Regulation, as it follows from Article 1 of the Regulation that it applies 
to all concentrations with a Community dimension.41 I define liner 
consortia as partial function joint ventures that do not perform on a 
lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, 
hence do not constitute a concentration within the meaning of 
paragraph 1(b) of the MR. 
The element of co-operation has been a usual business option among 
liner freighters that form alliances in order to rationalise the supply of 
service.  
Global alliances have emerged in the past years as a response which 
allows medium-sized shipping lines to compete globally with those few 
lines which are able to offer independent liner services on all trades:  
They are a product of globalisation within a market that, in fact, has 
witnessed a profound merger and acquisition development over the 
past twenty years and currently shows impressive levels of 
concentration worldwide.42 For many years, liner conferences 
coexisted with consortia, and sometimes with global alliances: when 
these two sets of agreements were contemporaneously in place, liner 
conferences concentrated on tariffs, whereas consortia focused on 
technical matters: indeed, antitrust concern for consortia is certainly 
less than that for conferences; this is the reason why, as I present 
below, conferences have been finally banned in the EU, whereas 
consortia are still practiced in the liner shipping sector. 
 
More recently, when antitrust laws lead to the gradual demise of the 
conference system, other forms of cooperation among liner shipowners 
developed:  
The so-called consortium agreements, or consortia, i.e. agreements 
whose objective is that of rationalising capacity on container trade and 
                                       
41  Kolstad Olav, ‘Cooperate or Merge? Structural changes and full function 
joint ventures in the shipping industry’, in Antapassis Antonis, Athanassiou Lia, 
Røsæg Erik (ed/s.), op. cit. p. 118 
42  Munari Francesco (2012) op.cit § 26 
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offering joint liner services organised by two or more shipping lines on 
the same route. In a consortium, pooled vessels are normally 
identical, and cross-slot charters are executed with a view to reserving 
for each member of the consortium a fixed portion of the capacity of 
all vessels used in the service. 
 
Liner consortia involve transport chiefly of containerships as well as 
special wet and dry cargo vessels, i.e. Gas carriers or PCT carriers. 
The service is provided on the basis of advertised timetables to ports 
on a particular geographic route (the trade). These co-operative 
agreements in liner shipping are not quite the same as “conventional” 
joint ventures that are created by a limited number of undertakings. 
In fact, providing shippers with the frequency of sailings they require 
in a particular trade constantly remains a problem, as many lines 
cannot afford a large enough fleet to offer, say, a sailing on the same 
day every week. The business solution these lines provide is achieved 
by the formation of joint services; so that each line provides an agreed 
number of ships and then has a proportion of container (cargo) slots 
in every sailing, regardless of which incumbent’s ship it happens to 
be. For instance, there are cases whereby some consortium members 
may not contribute a vessel but, as members, still take a share of the 
cargo slots available on each ship. Various types of joint ventures 
(including consortia) always emerge and disband according to the 
changes in the strength of the lines involved, whereas the principle of 
co-operation is now an integral business strategy of the container 
services. In any event, the purpose of the consortium is the 
rationalisation (i.e. control) of the supply of and efficient cargo slots 
capacity management43. To this point we have to make clear that not 
                                       
43  The concept of “cargo slot” refers to the available space that is allocated 
within a vessel and is subject to the management of supply; something that is 
different from the concept of the “port slot”. The latter refers to the special 
agreements of docking time purchase negotiated between liner companies 
(individually or being in a consortium) and the service port authority for loading and 
discharging. Whereas port slot management and possession has significant 
competition law relevance, it exceeds the scope of the current thesis and it is a 
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all co-operative agreements between liners can be classified as liner 
shipping consortia. In fact, since synergy can take many forms, we 
have to distinguish between liner consortia and the other types of joint 
ventures between liners. In any case, these agreements must comply 
with all four criteria of Article 101(3) individually to benefit from the 
exemption rule of an individual basis.  
 
In general, carriers negotiate with each other customised co-operation 
agreements that best fit their operations. On many occasions we may 
observe cases of anti-competitive behaviour by carriers and this is the 
subject of analysis in this chapter. On the one hand, these joint 
undertakings have as their key target the rationalisation of service 
and aim to control the supply through joint maritime cargo services. 
On the other hand, consolidation of a carrier’s market position on 
certain routes may result in significant market power that could 
distort competition.  
 
1.1.1 Block Exemption on Liner Shipping 
Consortia 
 
Despite the above competition law concerns, the EU recognises the 
beneficial role of the liner consortia to EU trade, mainly due to the 
tacit acknowledgement that joint ventures may in fact produce 
efficiencies and improvements outweighing possible anti-competitive 
effects.  In general terms, EU Competition Law accepts that partial 
function joint ventures among liner companies, with the purpose of 
rationalisation of service, do produce quality in maritime transport 
services. It is on these grounds that liner consortia are being granted 
Block Exemption, by virtue of Commission Regulation (EC) 
                                                                                                             
subject for future research (see Concluding Remarks). Nonetheless, we accept that 
port slots do constitute a reliable indicator of market power within a certain trade. 
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906/200944, from the EU competition law rules. The adoption of 
Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia), i.e. 
the “Consortia Regulation”, will be in effect until the 25th April 2015. 
Whether it shall it be renewed cannot be predicted with any certainty. 
Exemptions in liner consortia have been preserved, in contrast to the 
liner conferences that have been abolished in the EU.45 
 
The new exemption will last until April 2015. Under these new 
perspectives, however, one can reasonably assume that consortia will 
be legitimated beyond this term, unless radical market developments 
take place (such as a huge market concentration in the liner shipping 
sector which makes joint liner services no longer necessary). 
  
Apart from consortia, is there any room to manoeuvre left for shipping 
lines to enter into cooperative agreements? Munari (2012)46 holds that 
liner consortia (as protected as well by the block exemption) and 
similar horizontal agreements among undertakings are always very 
difficult to justify under competition law. 
 
However paradoxical the measure of a block exemption might have 
been, the EU legislation recently (2009) renewed this exemption from 
Community competition rules provided that the companies concerned 
                                       
44  Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 of 28 September 2009 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia) [OJ 
L 256, 29.9.2009], p. 31–34 
45  Article 5 of the Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 stipulates: “For the purpose of 
establishing and running a joint service, an essential feature inherent in consortia is 
the ability to make capacity adjustments in response to fluctuations in supply and 
demand. By contrast, unjustified limitation of capacity and sales as well as the joint 
fixing of freight rates or market and customer allocation are unlikely to bring any 
efficiency. Therefore, the exemption provided for in this Regulation should not apply 
to consortium agreements that involve such activities, irrespective of the market 
power of the parties.” 
46  Munari Francesco (2012) op. cit. §26 p. 22 
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must not foreclose competitors in a substantial part of the trades in 
question. 
 
Article 3 of the Regulation47 provides that the following activities of a 
consortium are subject to exemption: 
i. the joint operation of liner shipping services including any of the 
following activities: 
a. the coordination and/or joint fixing of sailing timetables 
and the determination of ports of call; 
b.  the exchange, sale or cross-chartering of space or slots 
on vessels; 
c. the pooling of vessels and/or port installations; 
d. the use of one or more joint operations offices; 
e. the provision of containers, chassis and other equipment 
and/or the rental, leasing or purchase contracts for such 
equipment; 
ii. capacity adjustments in response to fluctuations in supply and 
demand; 
iii. the joint operation or use of port terminals and related services 
(such as lighterage between vessels or stevedoring services); 
any other activity ancillary to those referred to in points i (a), i 
(b) and i (c) which is necessary for their implementation, such 
as: 
the use of a computerised data exchange system; 
iv. an obligation on members of a consortium to use in the relevant 
market or markets vessels allocated to the consortium and to 
refrain from chartering space on vessels belonging to third 
parties; 
v. an obligation on members of a consortium not to assign or 
charter space to other vessel-operating carriers in the relevant 
market or markets except with the prior consent of the other 
members of the consortium. 
                                       
47  Consortia Regulation (2009) op. cit §  
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In addition to the conditions above, the Regulation imposes in Article 
4 core restrictions stipulating that the exemption provided for in 
Article 3 shall not apply to a consortium which, directly or indirectly, 
in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of 
the parties, has as its object: 
i. the fixing of prices when selling liner shipping services to third 
parties (distinguishing thus the concept of conferences from 
that of consortia); 
ii. the limitation of capacity or sales except for the capacity 
adjustments referred to in Article 3 (see above (i)(b)); 
the allocation of markets or customers. 
 
Consortia Regulation 906/200948 clearly provides that a consortium 
must observe certain obligations and conditions. In fact the conditions 
set by EU Competition law are summarised as follows: (i) 
proportionate measures in scope and in duration, (ii) legitimate 
benefits, and (iii) beneficial effect on competition. In particular: 
i) The existence of effective competition in terms of price and 
services provided; 
                                       
48  For legislative analysis see:  Pozdnakova Alla, "New liner consortia block 
exemption: a legislative commentary", European Competition Law Review, [2010] pp. 
415-420, in particular pp. 419-410.  I Quote: “The block exemption no longer 
contains a list of obligations to be fulfilled by the consortia. The Commission first 
proposed retaining the obligation for a consortium to consult transport users in the 
draft exemption, but decided to drop it, probably because market information 
revealed that in practice such consultations do not take place. Instead, 
consultations concerning the commercial terms of the service take place on an 
individual basis and, moreover, as some transport users pointed out, shippers' 
councils rarely have the resources and information to engage in discussions with the 
consortium as a whole. Article 8 of the draft Regulation that imposed on a 
consortium an obligation to demonstrate, at the request of the Commission or the 
national competition authority of a Member State, compliance with the conditions 
and obligations attached to the block exemption has also been omitted. 
Lastly, the Regulation does not any longer expressly provide for a right of the 
Commission or national competition authorities to withdraw the block exemption in 
individual cases of non-compliance with the criteria of art.81(3). In principle, a 
provision to this end in the consortia block-exemption regulation is abundant, as 
the right to withdraw block exemption where co-operation turns out to be 
incompatible with art.81(3) is already envisaged elsewhere.” 
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ii) A market share of under thirty per cent (30%) – in each market 
– calculated by reference to the volume of goods carried when it 
operates within a conference, or under thirty five per cent (35%) 
when it operates outside a consortium; 
iii) To allow their members a degree of independence, such as the 
right to offer their own arrangements and services, to withdraw 
from the consortium without financial penalty and to engage in 
independent marketing; 
iv) They must not cause detriment to Community ports, users or 
carriers; 
v) To demonstrate to the Commission that they consult their users 
on important matters and that the conditions of their maritime 
transport services are made available to users at reasonable 
cost. 
 
1.1.2 Overview of Chapter One 
 
In view of the above, the essence of the said block exemption not only 
stipulates significant conditions that need to be observed by the 
consortia but sets out also the framework under which a co-operation 
can be classified as a consortium and thus be eligible to be granted an 
exemption. Accordingly, a consortium needs to show that it complies 
with the aforementioned conditions subject to proof to the contrary; 
hence it does not need to demonstrate direct compliance with Article 
101(3) – that is the scope of the exemption ultimately. 
  
First, I analyse the specific economic properties of the maritime 
industry and the way these influence the interpretation of the 
competition law. Moreover I examine the concept of the relevant 
market revisiting the service and geographic criteria from the 
combined perspective of the maritime industry and competition law. 
Briefly the Chapter is structured into the following sections: 
38 
 
 
i) Presentation of the properties of the maritime sector; 
ii) Presentation of maritime markets subsequent to the 
undertaking’s operation; 
iii) Examination of the current legal regime on liner consortia; 
iv) Analysis of the relevant service and geographic market and 
analysis of the subsequent markets in shipping. ; 
v) Analysis of the stability, temporal and dynamic elements in 
shipping.  
 
1.2 Economic Analysis of the Relevant 
Market 
 
The particularity of the shipping sector includes an element that by 
itself contributes to the high levels of competition: the inherent 
instability of the markets. As is proven by maritime economics, the 
market is being constantly re-arranged in partially regular and 
irregular periods. The former appear periodically in a cyclical form 
known as the maritime cycles,49 normalising, in a sense, dynamic and 
irregular phases of volatility. I deem that the market cycles represent 
a temporal and essential dimension to market definition with 
reference to time50. It is also confirmed that the said cycles correlate to 
the peaks and troughs of the global economy; moreover, they affect 
shipping in a greater degree in terms of the investment, planning and 
operation strategy required by the players. In particular, the temporal 
element appears in two ways: in liner shipping it is manifested in 
much longer periods than the usual seasonable trends (e.g. summer 
or winter), in alignment with the usual trends of the market, also 
known as cycles; and in tramp shipping, in addition to the above, we 
                                       
49  Stopford (2009) pp. 37-74 and 253-284 
50  Dabbah (2004) p. 52 
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also observe a seasonal element especially in bulk transport of 
resources (agricultural products, minerals etc). 
 
In reality the cycles contribute to the instability of the sector and their 
effects become more intense due to substantial capital and cash 
reserve requirements, as well as the sunk costs involved. In this 
business context, the liner companies must be productive, allocative 
and dynamically efficient. Thus, all liner companies in a perfectly 
competitive market must arrange: (a) freight rates at the lowest 
possible cost (productive efficiency), (b) the right combination of 
vessels to be engaged in a consortium and subsequently the perfect 
knowledge of types of cargos (patronage) and consumers (shippers), so 
as to have the truthful confluence of market signals (allocative 
efficiency), and (c) an optimal degree of innovation, as well as the 
diffusion of technological advances over time that will allow them to 
have better, faster and more economical vessels (dynamic efficiency)51. 
The problem arises when liner consortia that already hold a dominant 
position in the market take advantage of market instability in order to 
distort competition and thus influence supply in their favour. 
 
 
Liner alliances are becoming increasingly common and, as mentioned 
already, are part of the general business strategy of a shipping 
company. Generally speaking, joint ventures are arrangements among 
enterprises which have as a specific business goal the integration of 
part of their operation with a view to rationalise supply of service – a 
fact that produces an effect on demand. The principal structure of the 
consortium consists of members, usually called “parents”, who jointly 
trade and regulate the competitive relationships with each other and 
third parties. The effect of such co-operation is not always clear and 
                                       
51  See analysis about efficiencies by Dabbah (2004) pp. 5-7 
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must be analysed on a case-by-case basis. 52 As Munari (2012)53 well 
notices, even when Regulation 4056/86 entered into force, the 
relevant case-law soon demonstrated that the antitrust immunity of 
liner conferences was never intended as a catch-all immunity: the EU 
competition policy did choose a case-by-case approach and was 
always ready to lift such an immunity as soon as (a) the degree of 
competition on a given route decreased below acceptable levels, or (b) 
members of a liner conference tried to implement restrictions of 
competition beyond the conditions allowed by Regulation No. 
4056/86. 
 
In this section I examine the agreement to set up and operate a joint 
venture per se and as whole in terms of its object and impact on the 
market. Accordingly, I identify the factors indicating possible 
restrictions on competition in the market among parent members as 
well as between the parent and third parties - within the meaning of 
Article 101(1) TFEU.  
 
Pozdnakova (2008)54 presents the principles that have to be observed 
in order to assure that competition shall not be restricted by the co-
operation agreements; both among the parent members and the third 
parties: 
                                       
52  In the Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [OJ 
2004/C 101/08] para 22 it is stipulated: “...In other words, an examination of the 
facts underlying the agreement and the specific circumstances in which it operates 
may be required before it can be concluded whether a particular restriction 
constitutes a restriction of competition by object. The way in which an agreement is 
actually implemented may reveal a restriction by object even whereby the formal 
agreement does not contain an express provision to that effect”. See also: European 
Night Services Joined Case No T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 European Night 
Services Ltd (ENS), Eurostar (UK) Ltd, formerly European Passenger Services Ltd 
(EPS), Union internationale des chemins de fer (UIC), NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen 
(NS) and Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF) vs Commission [1998] 
ECR II-31141, CMLR 718, § 136. The CFI emphasised: “... it must be borne in mind 
that in assessing an agreement under article 81(1) of the Treaty, account should be 
taken of the actual conditions in which it functions, in particular the economic 
context, in which the undertakings operate the products or service covered by the 
agreement and the actual structure of the market concerned”. 
53 Munari Francesco (2012) op. cit. § 26 p. 15 
54  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit pp.161-195 
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i. Joint service agreement may not only be restrictive of the 
actual competition but of potential competition as well55;  
ii. Freedom of competition, internally and towards third 
members, must be preserved; 
iii. Market power can be judged by the accumulation of market 
share in connection to the capacity of economic strength56. 
In principle, joint ventures may not need to have market 
power in order to be efficient and produce the benefits 
envisaged by the parties; resource pooling – in the form of 
capital capacity – may provide them with significant power as 
shipping is a capital intensive industry. 
 
Even if it is established that a competition consortium does not 
prevent internal competition between the participating carriers, it may 
still have negative effects on external competition existing or to be 
developed in the market. In particular, Pozdnakova (2008)57 describes 
the following indicators: 
 
i) It is necessary to assess the relevant market before and after a 
joint venture is created; 
ii) It is necessary to assess the remaining degree of competition 
after the joint venture is created, as a joint venture can alter the 
market by making it appreciably more difficult for third parties 
to enter to compete. It is thus quite possible for independent 
carriers to face a firm market consolidation, which may oblige 
                                       
55  “...actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the relevant 
market negative effects on prices, output , innovation or the variety or quality of 
service can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability”. See: Case No T-
112/99 Métropole télévision , Suez Lyonnaise des eaux, France Telecom and 
Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) vs Commission [2002] All ER EC 1, [2001] ECR II-
2459,  [2001] 5 CLMR 33§76 and 77 
56  Pozdnakova (2008), op. cit. page 165. 
57  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. page 171. 
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them to align their market policies with those of the joint 
venture rather than to compete with it58; 
iii) The probability of negative impact on external competition 
depends on the structural conditions of the market, the market 
power of the joint venture and, as one of the surrogates for 
market power, the share which the liner joint venture holds on 
the relevant market59; 
iv) Anti-competitive implications become more serious as a result of 
indirect co-operation created by the co-ordination among several 
joint ventures and individual companies. These so called 
‘networks’ are in fact different arrangements between the 
competing companies (either being within the consortium or 
acting independently) that occur across several markets. In this 
context, the existence of networks of joint ventures is likely to 
lead to an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, even though 
individual joint venture agreements do not as such restrict 
competition.60 The globalised61 nature of shipping encourages 
structures of this kind that are very difficult to be investigated 
by competition authorities. 
 
1.2.1 The Subsequent Markets of Shipping 
Undertaking- The Four Interdependent 
markets 
 
Defining the relevant market is not an end in itself, but it undoubtedly 
provides the basis for assessing market power and other constraints 
on competition. A persistent problem in the literature on the maritime 
                                       
58  In Eirpage the Commission held: “... the fact that potential competitors are 
faced by a joint venture ... may have a deterrent effect on potential market entrants 
and thus further restrict competition”.  See: Eirpage, [OJ 1991] L 306/22 para 12. 
59  European Night Services, op. cit. para 149 
60  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 173 
61  On globalisation and competition see Dabbah Maher, International and 
Comparative Competition Law [Cambridge University Press, 2010] pp. 92-97 
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industry is to define the boundaries of the market vis-à-vis the 
products (cargoes), the geographic area (trading ocean zones and/or 
liner trades), and consumers (consignees or shippers) in relation to a 
specific time frame that is not stable – the market is cyclical (based on 
the pattern of 7 to 12 years) and depends on various external factors.  
Paragraph 13 of the Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant 
Markets62 stipulates that firms are subject to three main sources of 
competitive constraints: demand substitutability (DS); supply 
substitutability (SS); and potential competition.63 On the one hand, a 
broader market under Article 102 may mean that a defendant is found 
not to have a dominant position. On the other hand, a narrow market 
may mean that the consortium in question may not have any areas of 
horizontal overlap64, with the consequence that it would not be 
considered as creating or strengthening a dominant position. 
Obviously, the broader the definition of the relevant market, the less 
possible it is that the examined behaviour will create concerns under 
competition law.65 
 
                                       
62  Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law OJ [1997] C 372 
63  Paragraph 13 of the Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market 
stipulates: ‘Firms are subject to three main sources of competitive constraints: 
demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential 
competition…Basically, the exercise of market definition consists in identifying the 
effective alternative sources of supply for the customers of the undertakings 
involved, both in terms of products/services and geographic location of suppliers’. 
See: Commission Notice of December 1997 on the definition of the relevant market 
for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ [1997] C372 /5, OJ [1997] C 
372/5, [1998] 4 CMLR 177; see also the UK Office for Fair Trading (OFT)’s 
Guidelines for Market Definition and Mergers: assessment guidance (OFT 403) and 
(OFT 516) [Electronic Versions] . 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/enterprise_act/oft516.pdf> 
[accessed 18 April 2009]. It is worth mentioning that between 1999 and 2002 the 
Commission received around 1250 Merger notifications. 
64  ICI & Continental Solvents vs Commission, Cases 6 and 7/73, [1974] 1 
CMLR 309]. United Brands vs Commission (United Brands), Case 27/76, [1978] 
ECR 207, 1 CMLR 429. Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV vs 
Commission, Case 322/81 [1983] ECR 3461, 1 CMLR 282. 
65  Athanassiou Lia, ‘Competition in Liner and Tramp Maritime Transport 
Services: Uniform Regulation, Divergent Application?’ in Antapassis Antonis, 
Athanassiou Lia, Røsæg Erik (eds) (2009) op.cit. p.81 
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The issue of definition of the relevant market is dealt with extensively 
in EU law, especially as regards supply substitutability, though 
various concerns arise from time to time – from interested parties. 
Hence, the Community institutions proceed in defining the product 
and geographic markets with the use of geographic criteria when 
studying both the product and the geographic market. The 
methodology of examining Demand Substitutability (DS) has been the 
core of any market definition.66 The Commission was required to 
investigate the characteristics of the products in question which made 
them particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need and limited the 
extent to which they were interchangeable with other products. For 
shipping, however, the rule of case by case basis is of paramount 
importance, as an analysis may, from one point of view, find the 
necessary homogeneity in the service market in question; on the other 
hand, competition may still be effective despite competitive restraints. 
So, each case must be analysed according to the specifics of the 
market and the players’ position in the market, and balancing the 
direct effects on competition and other objective justifications is often 
essential. First and foremost, I distinguish between the maritime 
transport market per se (as it is expressed by the freight market) and 
the subsequent markets that are associated to the vessel as an 
enterprise and asset67. 
 
 
The management team of a shipping company constantly monitors 
four major fields: The newbuilding market, where the company orders 
the ships, the freight market, where ships are chartered, the sale and 
purchase market for used vessels and the demolition where it finally 
can dispose of the vessels for scrap metal. 
                                       
66  Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co Inc. vs Commission , 
ECJ Case 6-72 R  (Continental Can Co) [1973 ECR p. 00215] 
67  The Sale and Purchase (S&P) of second hand vessels, the Newbuilding and 
the Demolition Markets. In addition I include the Capital market as shipping is a 
capital intensive industry. 
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As affected by the markets mentioned above, the ship operator is 
subject to management and operational challenges, which if overcome 
will ensure the quality of service, the duration and the strategic 
planning of the company. From a customer’s and an EC Competition 
point of view, shipping is an undertaking that provides a service. From 
the shipowner’s point of view, however, shipping is a business which 
obliges the entrepreneur to effectively trade in all four aforementioned 
shipping markets. A shipping company has to monitor its activities as 
they are closely interrelated with events in the four markets. So here 
we have a contrast between traditional competition law and ocean 
economics68 that ultimately affects the legal interpretation of the 
shipping phenomena.  For a ship-operator, a market is the whole of 
the combination of the four parallel markets; for competition law, the 
product market relates to the service per se i.e. the transport, and that 
affects the subsequent cases of abuse, such as excessive and 
exclusionary pricing – though issues related to costs and investments 
required are used in the legal analysis. However, with regard to 
dominance and the relevant market share EC Competition law suffices 
to take into account the market presence (share wise) and whether 
this dominance has been abused by practices that fall within Article 
102 TFEU. 
Beyond the scope of the traditional legal interpretation, I consider that 
there is a notable distinction about what shipowners (on the one 
hand) and jurists (on the other) deem to be actual dominance over a 
market. Moreover, jurists are also divided between those who have 
competition law backgrounds and those with maritime law 
backgrounds. Perhaps for a shipping company, the pursuit of 
business dominance may not be an objective; businesses are more 
inclined to pursue stability than expansionism. For jurists, a 
significant market share accompanied by “evidence” of abuse may call 
                                       
68  Button Kenneth, "Is There an "Economics of Oceans?" Ocean Yearbook, 
Volume 14 [2000] pp. 16-37; in particular for maritime transport see pp.17-24. See 
also: Button Kenneth, "The Importance of the "Core in Explaining Shipping 
Alliances", Ocean Year Book 328, Volume 16 [2002] pp. 328-353 
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for investigation. The definition of the product and the extent of a 
geographic market also remain unclear for most of the shipowners. 
Competition law methodology organises markets, for the purpose of 
analysis, with certain produce and geographic criteria. For example, 
the authorities intervene: (i) when the market becomes substantially 
narrow, (ii) when a consortium concentrates its efforts in order to 
dominate on certain trades, using abusive practices that distort 
competition by object or effect. Abusive practices and business wars 
are sometimes preferred (as a business strategy) over the increase of 
effectiveness and quality through, for instance, the rationalisation of 
service. Hence, it is necessary to consider these strategies in the 
context of harsh and chaotic (from a systemic point of view) business 
environment as shipping, where only the powerful and prudent can 
survive. As it is known shipping is an exceptionally dynamic business, 
reserved for those that can not only operate efficiently but can survive 
daily competition. 
In order to address this issue above, I believe that the case-by-case 
approach, followed by the EU Authorities, is indeed a panacea for 
shipping and for similar industries that are risk and cash intensive. In 
shipping, for example, all four aforementioned markets (subsequent to 
the product market) are cash intensive. Moreover, shipping is a 
business that offers services that must be provided within a specific 
time period; one cannot do otherwise but place its economics in the 
realm of the supply and demand principle in a certain time frame. On 
those grounds, the ideal conditions for providing services and having a 
predictable yield is when the market presents a stable equilibrium 
between demand for transport and vessel availability. Supply and 
demand, hence, play an important role in regulating the income of the 
shipping companies, i.e. the freight rates.69 Thus, the four markets, 
                                       
69  For example: In the case that there are still available ships in the market 
and the trade does not grow, the expensive newbuildings will become nothing more 
than an unfortunate investment, a enormous sunk cost, for the entrepreneurs and 
the financial institutions that financed the project. Should there be an oversupply of 
vessels in the particular market, the freight rates may again subside. Eventually, the 
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freight, sale and purchase, newbuilding and demolition, are the main 
reason for the effectiveness of competition. Below I briefly present the 
four Markets: 
 
1.2.1.2 The Freight Market 
 
The contract of affreightment starts when the shipper buys the 
services of the shipping company, with a voyage charter, at a fixed 
price per metric ton of cargo. Alternatively, with a timecharter, the 
ship is hired by the day.70 The familiarities of this ‘marketplace’ with a 
commodity exchange are obvious to any lawyer and manager who 
specialises in maritime law and carriage of goods by sea. The 
completion of the maritime service is nothing else but the safe and 
timely transportation of goods or passengers. Moreover, the freight 
market is the source of the main income for the companies, and the 
only guarantee for their survival. Steady cash flow is not always 
possible, and because of this the operational and managerial 
departments of the shipping companies are focusing particularly in 
securing ‘charter’. The volatility in the market is connected with the 
fluctuations of world trade, as the freight market is correlated with 
global trade patterns of growth and recession.71 The chart below 
presents the correlation patterns between sea trade and the world 
GDP. 
                                                                                                             
vessels will remain docked, waiting for the market (cycle) to change and for the 
demand to rise again. Consequently, unpaid shipping mortgages force the creditors 
to cover their losses by liquidating an undervalued asset. In case the shipowner 
makes the effort to resume activity, it would be necessary to restore his business – 
trading name and to re-structure the enterprise, since literally there are only few 
who are competent and skilled enough in order to achieve it. The above described 
market dynamic is present in both liner and tramp shipping whereas in tramp 
shipping these phenomena are more intensified. 
70  Wilson John F, Carriage of Goods by Sea, [Pearson Longman 2008 6th 
Edition, Harlow-Essex] pp. 3-7 
71  Apud. Stopford (2009), op. cit, p. 140 in figure 4.2, page 140  
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As we see from figure 1, the turnovers and variances of the supply and 
demand equilibrium have a direct impact on freight rates. ‘Highs’ and 
‘troughs’ in terms of income, i.e. freight rates, is a common 
phenomenon, synchronised with the fluctuations of world GDP. 
Moreover, it shows clearly that sea trade is very vulnerable to world 
economic crises of the type noted in the chart. Though the figure 
depicts well the fluctuations within a time framework it is difficult to 
precisely identify the exact period of temporal patterns. It is usually 5-
12 years between peaks and troughs; maritime economics, however, 
have been unable to establish prediction models that exceed a one 
year period.  
 
1.2.1.3 The Sale and Purchase Market 
 
The ship’s sale and purchase market (hereinafter S&P market) is a 
sizeable commodity market due to the fact that the assets of the 
company could always change their value; either appreciating or 
depreciating following the trend of the freight market. The S&P market 
Figure 1 Comparison between world GDP and freight rates 
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is derivative of the main transport undertaking. It is important 
however to consider its influence in order to establish reliable 
indicators for abuses that relate to limitation of investment.72 As 
aforementioned, any vessel, apart from being the business lever for 
the maritime companies, is also a commercial asset. Thus the 
variations in supply and demand determine also the value of the 
assets of the market company, affecting all financial operations and 
especially mortgages and loans. On the one hand, bankers and other 
lenders are very interested in the market-value of the ships because 
the mortgage on the hull is the primary collateral for their loans. On 
the other hand, brokers, shipowners or even bankers attempt to 
predict the variations in the S&P market in order to profitably trade 
their assets (i.e. the vessels). 
From the shipping company’s point of view, any fluctuation in the 
price of their assets has a direct impact, not only on credit availability 
(and consequently the issue of cash-flow), but also on share price. 
Obviously, selling a ship when the market cycle is low can turn out to 
be not beneficial enough. However, as mentioned above, this decision 
could be made on the grounds of serious cash flow problems. 
Given that the price of a vessel is influenced by its capacity to provide 
income for the company, any disability of the vessel has a direct 
impact on the freight rates. When freight rates are low, and liquidity is 
possibly limited, the seller (who can be a shipowner or a banker who 
foreclosed on his client and took possession of the ship) might be 
forced to sell the ship in order to pay off debts. From the buyer’s point 
of view this may appear as an opportunity to make a profit out of 
speculating on the S&P market. 
The S&P market defines shipping not only as a pure corporate 
business, where serious companies draw a twenty year project and 
follow it, but as a highly speculative and volatile market, where a spot 
                                       
72  See infra sections “2.2.1.7.1 Capacity Changes and Adjustments in Relation 
to Time” p.128 and “2.1.2.2 Limitations of Technical Development and Investment” 
p. 76 
50 
 
small sized bulk carrier company can be as much more successful 
than an established PLC73. The essential part of this market is that it 
is correlated primarily with the freight rates. When the freight rates 
are high, it means that there is a great demand for services, that even 
an older vessel can be utilized; sometimes a second hand vessel of the 
same tonnage may worth  more than a newbuilding, as several 
additional factors determine its price, e.g. draft, breadth, canal design 
(panamax, suezmax), fuel consumption, construction quality, 
equipments and engines etc.. 
As freight rates are the primary influence on a ship’s prices, ‘peaks’ 
and ‘troughs’ in the freight market cycle are transmitted into the sale 
and purchase market. The relationship is very close, especially as the 
market moves downwards. We will depict the issue of the S&P market 
by presenting three tables that exhibit the volatility of the price in the 
value of ships. 
 
In this figure two 
facts are 
presented:74  
First, it depicts the 
relative 
synchronisation of 
the submarkets and 
their segments.  
Second, it shows the 
relatively high volatility of the market over a thirty year period.  
                                       
73  While corporate players may seem to occupy a better position in dealing with 
crisis than small and medium spot shipping companies, this conception is not true; 
the key point to success in the shipping business is often the ability to infiltrate and 
penetrate into demanding and competitive markets. Making a better bid (in this 
context, an offer of lower rates than that of the competitors), where high freight rates 
are absolutely essential for the continuity of the medium-big shipping firms, 
burdened with loans in the form of bonds, secures the life of smaller shipping 
companies and may place competitors in difficult situations. 
74  Stopford, 2009, op. cit, p. 202, apud. Clarkson Research Services Ltd. 
Figure 2 Comparative vessel price cycles for Bulk Carriers (BC) 
and  Motor Tankers (MT). 
51 
 
It is worth noticing the cyclic behaviour of the market and the 
dramatic increases of price that in some cases reach seven hundred 
per cent (700%) within four years (note between 1986-1990 the price 
of 280,000 dwt tankers). The phenomenon of synchronisation is 
observed in the same intensity among various categories of vessels, as 
they follow the linear trend over the X axis (depicting years). Cyclic 
behaviour overlaps the usual twenty five year lifespan of a vessel, a 
fact that undoubtedly affects the financial situation and planning of a 
shipping company. Within the following graph we illustrate the 
deviation from the linear trend value, fitted by regression, in a 
Panamax (65,000-80,000 dwt) bulk carrier from 1976-2004. 
Figure 3 Deviation from the market price of a Panamax BC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we see from this figure75, the linear regression trend estimation 
between 1977 to 2006 shows noticeable deviations; in three cases 
these deviations are extreme, e.g. we see that the deviation within only 
two years, between 1981-1983 was 140 per cent and progressed even 
more sharply (150 per cent overall, if we calculate 1983). By the same 
token, between 2002 and 2006 we see an astounding 160 per cent 
deviation; this trend continue even further in 2007. The reason that is 
                                       
75  Stopford, (2009), op. cit, p. 203, apud. Clarkson Research Services Ltd. 
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responsible for this dynamic linear trend is the volatility of the 
freights. In the figure below we examine the correlation of a second 
price vessel with freight rates. 
Figure 4 Correlation of second hand price vessels and freight rates 
 
 
With this figure I support that, in the 30 year period shown, 
correlation between the one year timecharter and the price of a five 
year panamax bulk carrier was 0.73, suggesting that 73 per cent of 
the variation in prices can be explained by earnings. Yet again, despite 
the volatility of the freight rates, we observe the synchronisation effect 
throughout the examined period.76 Thus, after careful consideration of 
the above statistical data, I observe a clear correlation between freight 
rates and a vessel’s value. It is also presumed that there is a six to 
twelve month response time between the two markets.  
Hence I argue that the S&P market is composed of the same 
ingredients as the freight market: high volatility and high speculation. 
In addition to the factor of the freight rates, the age of the ship has to 
                                       
76  Kavussanos Manolis G., “The dynamics of time-varying volatilities in 
different size second-hand ship prices of the dry-cargo sector” Applied Economics v 
29 [April 1997] p.433-444 
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be taken into consideration.77 In addition, the methodology of 
calculating the residual value of the ship follows the same pattern.  
In this context, the shipowner is always faced with the following 
issues:  
i) The market value of the vessel in the future;  
ii) The ability to secure finance due to managerial reasons 
(atomicity, shipowner’s personal age, size of its existing fleet);  
iii) The choices between ordering a new vessel or selecting a used 
one, based on the market situation78. 
 
In view of the business dilemmas mentioned above, there are two 
ways of calculating the residual value of the assets of the maritime 
company; an exercise that is important in order to establish the 
parameter of market dominance: 
 
The first way, as applied by economists, is to take into consideration 
annual inflation, and the age depreciation and deduct them from the 
linear trend of the annual three-year cycle prices of the newbuilding 
market; plus the book value. Taking all the above into consideration 
one can re-adjust the ship’s book value to meet market trends. 
The second method is based on the assumption that the ship usually 
has a 25-30 year life span. It also has residual scrap value, which 
again is subject to volatility. Nonetheless, it represents an easily 
assessed variable, as scrap prices are more predictable and the 
demand for good quality steel is never lower than expectations. Thus, 
by dividing the aforementioned aggregation with the addition of the 
scrap price per year, one can conclude what will be the future price of 
                                       
77  It is implied that after the standard depreciation after 5-10 years of 
operation, depending on the vessel of the ship from the trend line, the whole ship’s 
value is estimated after the evaluation certificate from the special brokers. 
78  The questions above are not relevant to the management of a shipping 
company, but they have a serious impact with regard to the establishment of the 
dominance position (see chapters three and four). 
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the vessel. However, as the figures above indicate, one has to take 
control of the market cycles; thus, the overall amount is subject to 70 
per cent variation if the most extreme price movements are taken into 
account.  
 
1.2.1.4 The Newbuilding and the Demolition Markets 
 
The newbuilding and demolition markets are the two other fields of 
variances to be taken into consideration for our study. The market 
mechanisms work in the same manner. In contrast to the 
manufacturing industrial sector, where products follow a stable price 
trend, a newbuilding price is as volatile as the freight rates price, thus 
creating more uncertainty about the future ROI. Surprisingly, the 
newbuilding market follows the same methodology that allows the 
particular market to readjust prices in accordance to the law of supply 
and demand, but the newbuilding market is not part of shipping cash 
flow. This feature undoubtedly contributes to the overall volatility of 
the sector. Thus, it could be suggested that the risk of financing and 
investment in shipping would be more predictable if the newbuilding 
market was not subject to the laws of the market. One may hold the 
residual value as constant, over which one will be able not only to 
forecast the risk of the investment, but to assess the asset value of the 
shipping company. 
Nevertheless, I once more observe a clear correlation in the figures 
between the demolition prices and the trend of the newbuildings, 
although the two markets are not subject to the same supply and 
demand variances79, as the demolition market appears again to 
function with different methodology. The prices are determined by 
                                       
79  Stopford (2007) op. cit  p 212. 
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negotiation and depend on the availability of ships for scrapping and 
the demand for scrapped metal80.  
1.2.2 The Problems of the Relevant Service 
Market 
 
The “relevant product market comprises all those products and/or 
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and 
their intended use”.81 In order to define the product market – 
especially in long distance trades – the Commission studied the 
substitutability of other types of transport and the substitutability of 
the services offered on those and other routes (i.e. the geographic 
substitutability).  
To begin with, we have to distinguish between ocean-borne shipping 
and intra-European short sea transport. In the latter, substitutability 
can be easily achieved by other modes (e.g. inland waterways, rail, 
road, air).82 For the purposes of the thesis we examine only the ocean 
borne shipping that includes EU catchment areas.83 
  
The basis of this methodology exists in the Commission’s Notice of 
December 199784  and was followed in TACA85 (1998) (in different 
                                       
80  For example, in the Indian Subcontinent and Southeast Asia, where most of 
the demolition yards are currently located, much of the scrap metal is used by the 
local steel market, though availability of scrapping facilities is sometimes a 
consideration. In virtue of the market forces, prices can be very volatile, fluctuating 
from a trough of $100/lwt in the 1980’s, to $200 / lwt in the 1990’s and $650 in the 
2008 with an immediate drop to $260 in the 2009. The price also varies from ship to 
ship, depending on its suitability for scrapping and on how it is equipped. 
81  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law [OJ C 372 of 9.12.1997]. This definition is also adopted 
in the special Competition Maritime Guidelines (2008). See: on the application of 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport services [OJ 2008/C 245/02] para 
17. 
82  Voionmaa Tapani, ‘Competition Law and Short Sea Shipping including some 
anomalies along the line’, in Wareham (2010) op. cit. p175 
83  See Delimitations Section in Conclusion p.281 
84  EU Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the purposes 
of Community Competition Law [1997] C372/5-13 
85  TACA Decision (1998) paras 60-75. 
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order and different focus) and several other decisions noted in Blanco 
(2007)86. Paragraph 20 of the aforementioned EU Commission Notice 
explains situations whereby ‘Supply Substitutability’ (SS) is relevant: 
“...whereby a supplier is able to switch production to other products 
and market them in the short term without incurring significant costs, 
signifying thus the importance of SS in connection with potential 
competition”. The above acquires significant importance in the effort to 
identify the key players and actual market size. Regardless of whether 
there is any competition among scheduled / non-scheduled shipping 
or other modes, a narrower product market (limited to a particular 
type of product transported by sea) would reduce competitive factors, 
while a wider one would allow the opposite. The same would apply for 
the service provided by certain vessels, should one want to take into 
account the carrying capacity rather than the demand for a certain 
type of transport service (e.g. bulk cargo, cars, containers). For 
example, if we conclude a narrow market interpretation, the transport 
of perishable goods could be limited to reefer containers or include 
transport in conventional reefer vessels. 
 
The resolution arrives from Community decisions rather than the 
published guidelines of the EU Commission that appear from time to 
time. For instance, the EU Commission, within its Guidelines for 
Maritime Transport (2008)87, defines the relevant market as follows: 
The relevant product market comprises all those products and/or 
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and 
their intended use. 
 
Obviously the above Guidelines, however recent they may be, cover a 
substantial area; in my opinion, they also leave many grey areas 
untouched. Firstly, the Guidelines assume that there is sufficient 
                                       
86  Blanco (2007) ibid. pp. 432-443 
87  EU Commission’s Guidelines (2008) on the application of Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty to maritime transport services, op. cit. para 17 
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guidance on the definition of "the relevant market" from case law. 
Undoubtedly the current jurisprudence consistently defines the 
market narrowly; Chuah88 notes this, in addition to pointing out that 
there is no adequate case law for the tramp sector. Secondly, I believe 
that there is a general inconsistency in the geographical definition of 
the market, as concepts such as homogeneity, substitution and 
potential competition do not bind well in liner shipping; however, they 
constitute useful tools for defining market power in tramp shipping. I 
discuss this matter infra in the section referring to the aggregation 
across markets. Overall, I believe that the Maritime Guideliness do not 
significantly contribute89 or add any pioneering  information to the 
existing interpretation, especially to shipping professionals; yet the 
Guidelines will be updated every 5 years. As mentioned above, the 
competent EU institutions endorsed long ago (since 1998) the option 
of the product definition of the market by limiting the market to the 
liners. Despite the recent Guidelines (2008), product definition in liner 
shipping has not changed much in recent years. In fact, one could 
claim that it has not changed at all, despite the “agonising” efforts of 
the liner cartels to reverse this interpretation that became a trend.  
Accordingly, EU Courts90 clearly rejected the argument that the 
service market is wider than the routes in which the liners operate, 
“as there is in the majority of cases there is no substitutability by tramp 
vessels and other transport modes”. The Commission has held91 in 
various cases that tramp operators compete marginally with liners; in 
contrast, the latter are able to fully compete with tramp vessels.  
 
                                       
88  Chuah Jason, (2008) op. cit §25 p. 365 
89  Fergus Randolph, "The European Commission's draft guidelines - a 
promising starting-point or a missed opportunity?", Shipping & Transport 
International [2008] 7(1) pp. 11-13. 
90 Atlantic Container Line and Others vs Commission (TAA judgment) CFI [2002 
ECR II-875] para 273. See also Atlantic Container Line AB and Others vs Commission 
(TACA Judgment ) [2003 ECR II-3275] para 809. 
91  TAA Decision (1994) op.cit. paras 34, 47-49. See also: Maersk/POLN 
Commission decision, Case COMP/M.3829 [OJ 2005 C207/8] para 13 
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Likewise the practice of the Commission, as also stated within the 
Maritime Guidelines,92 tends to narrow the market as much as 
possible, examining whenever appropriate if the market can be limited 
to a particular type of product e.g. perishable goods transported in 
reefer containers or conventional reefer vessels. 
 
While it is possible in exceptional circumstances for some substitution 
to take place between break bulk and container transport,93 there 
appears to be no lasting change from container use towards bulk. For 
the vast majority of categories of goods and users of containerized 
goods, break bulk does not offer a reasonable alternative to 
containerized liner shipping.94 Once the cargo becomes regularly 
containerised, it is unlikely to be transported ever again as non-
containerised cargo. To this day, containerised liner shipping is, 
therefore, mainly subject to one way substitutability.95 In general, 
liner companies can attract bulk or neo-bulk goods due to 
discrimination with respect to  type of cargo, and the cross-subsidies 
between expensive and cheap goods. 
 
It is my view, however, that the presumption of non-substitutability 
between tramp and liner sectors may not be entirely true; a condition 
as such can be properly evaluated in a given time context and not as 
doctrine. I analyse the matter further supra.96  Moreover I observe a 
paradox, especially when one measures interchangeability from the 
supply side of the market. For example, in Continental Can Co.97, the 
ECJ criticised the Commission for not taking into account the point 
                                       
92  Maritime Guidelines (2008) op. cit. para 19 
93  TACA decision,  op. cit. Para 71 
94  TAA ibid. para 273 and TACA Judgment of 30.9.2003, CFI, Joined Cases T-191/98, T-
212/98, T-213/98 and T-214/9 [2003 ECR p. II-3275] para 809. As regards the substitutability 
between break-bulk and container, there is no lasting change from container vessels towards 
bulk/break bulk. This is only one way substitutability: once cargo becomes regularly containerised 
it is unlikely to be transported again as non-containerised cargo. 
95  TAA ibid. para 281. Also see: MAERSK/PONL,  op. cit. para 13 
96  Infra p. 151 et seq 
97  Supra § 66 
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that producers of other types of cans could amend their method of 
production to compete with Continental Can without much difficulty.98 
I will try to develop the above argument as follows:  
In a similar situation in shipping, one can claim that – provided a 
liner market is not closed to actual and potential competition (absence 
of restrictions and barriers to entry) – nothing impedes bulk carriers 
to change their operations from spot to liner shipping; thus expanding 
to liner shipping operations. Perhaps the reason for not doing so could 
be that potential competitors have developed a special and workable 
modus operandi which they prefer not to change for entering the liner 
market. In other words, they prefer not to compete based on their own 
choice and initiative. This is an important factor that has to be 
included as an indicator of potential competition within a market. 
But, I believe that is not the case, for two reasons:  
 
-  First, the market is not similar, not to mention homogeneous, in 
terms of product; 
-  Second, the business strategy and operational details and setting 
are significantly different between liner and spot shipping; hence, not 
only are the products not interchangeable, but the producers cannot 
substitute the demand, due to known reasons that relate to the 
nature of the business: capital, economies of scale and special 
innovation99 are required.  
 
 
 
 
                                       
98  Ibid. para 36 
99  As innovation in shipping (pronoun)we can deem the special business 
strategy that a company has to improvise in order to be successful. The innovative 
element is that this strategy has to change and adapt in the constantly dynamic 
environment of shipping. 
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1.2.3 The Problems of the Relevant Geographic 
Market 
 
The “relevant geographical market comprises the area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand for 
products or services, in which the conditions of competition are 
sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are 
appreciably different in those areas”.100 As far as the geographic 
element of the liner shipping services, the relevant geographic market 
consists of the area wherein the services are marketed, generally 
certain and predetermined ports at each end of the service, 
determined by the ports' overlapping catchment areas (alongside 
loading and discharging). In fact, the definition of the geographic 
market is largely implicit in the definition of the product market from 
the geographic point of view: a transport service towards a given 
destination is geographically substitutable by another transport 
service towards the same destination whereby users obtain similar 
transport conditions in both cases101. This means two things, in 
practice: First, as far as the European end of the service is concerned, 
ports in Northern Europe and/or in the Mediterranean are 
geographically relevant. 
Second, as far as the service that originates from Europe is concerned, 
we understand that there is no direct interchangeability among all 
European ports; the shipping services from the Mediterranean are 
only marginally substitutable for those from Northern European ports, 
identifying Northern Europe and Southern Europe as two separate 
markets. Nonetheless, it would be myopic to limit the application of 
EU competition only to intra-EU trades. In reality, liner transport is a 
cross-continental business. 
                                       
100  Commission notice on the definition of relevant market (1997) op. cit. para 9 
101  Blanco (2007) op.cit. p. 443 
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If we understand shipping as an international business, and not just 
as an intra-European affair, 102 we have to take into account an 
additional factor besides location. While the global freight for 
transport depends on freight rates between two certain port points, it 
also relies upon the homogeneity of the demand side. As far as the 
former is concerned we can say that it is a factor that affects the 
stability of the market. 
 
As far as the latter is concerned, Blanco (2007)103 analyses the 
geographic relevance of the market and concludes that container 
transport defines not only the product market but also the same 
geographic market whereby users demand homogeneous supply of 
transport service. Yet, an issue arises with reference to the factors 
that determine supply and demand substitutability: the question of 
whether it is the users (consumers) that define the type of the demand 
(thus making the carriers supply what the consumer requires), or it is 
the liner carriers that impose a product (the transport service) to the 
market to limit alternative options, needs to be resolved. As far as we 
know the Commission understands the geographic context of the 
market as subsequent to the geographical boundaries and criteria 
that define the product market. 
 
In view of the above, I assume a negative argument about given supply 
substitutability criteria and I assume that it is possible to have limited 
supply in liner shipping as container vessels cannot accommodate all 
                                       
102  See: CEWAL I Decision, Commission Decision 93/82/EEC, 1992, [OJ 1993 
L 34], paragraph 90, as confirmed by the Court of First Instance in Compagnie 
Maritime Belge and Others vs. Commission Joined Cases T-24/93 to T-26/93 and T-
28/93, [1996] ECR II-1201, para 205. See also the Trans-Atlantic Agreement (TAA 
decision), Commission Decision 94/980/EC in Case IV/34.446, OJ [1994] L 376, 
paras 288-296, as confirmed by the TAA judgment, Atlantic Container Line and 
Others vs. Commission Judgment of the CFI, in Case T-395/94,, paragraphs 72-74. 
See also Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA Decision), Commission Decision 
1999/243/EC 1998), OJ [1999] L 95, paras 386-396. See also (Revised TACA) 
Commission Decision 2003/68/EC, Case COMP/37.396, OJ [2003] L 26, para 73 
103  Blanco (2007) ibid. p. 443 
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possible locations. In a similar example to the airline industry, 
demand comes from various organised groups or individual 
customers; however, with airlines, flight travel can be achieved within 
certain airports’ limitations. The possibility of having numerous 
airports presupposes an ideal substitutability in terms of supply, but 
is problematic in terms of its viability of service. So, if we inflate the 
argument, in a comparable situation where liner vessels stand for 
schedule airlines and tramp vessel for charters we understand that 
charter planes serve a particular purpose, i.e. to accommodate high 
seasonable demand. It is evident that scheduled flights are being 
substituted by charter flights. Likewise, I support then that the tramp 
is an established - and not temporal - substitute for liner shipping 
with a possibility of increasing its penetration to the liner business, 
through either a time charterparty of long duration or by building a 
persisting presence in a certain short-distance market. I discuss this 
issue further .104 
 
In any event, the EU accepts that the objective of a competition 
analysis should be to identify whether the actual competitors of the 
undertakings involved have EU based business and/or operation, and 
if they are capable of constraining competition in the relevant 
geographic market that has at least EU significance. This geographic 
significance is defined by the catchment ports; the existence of at least 
one is enough. Guidance on this issue can be found in the 
Commission Notice on the definition of the Relevant Market for the 
purposes of Community competition law105 and on the EU 
Commission, within its Guidelines for Maritime Transport (2008).106 
Paragraph 17 of the Guidelines states:  
 
                                       
104  Infra p. 126 
105  OJ [1997] C372, para 5 
106  EU Commission’s Guidelines (2008) on the application of Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty to maritime transport services, op. cit. para 17 
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“The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of 
products or services, in which the conditions of competition are 
sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are 
appreciably different in those areas. A carrier (or carriers) cannot have a 
significant impact on the prevailing conditions of the market if 
customers are in a position to switch easily to other service providers.”  
 
The above definition confirms the TAA, TACA and P&O/Royal 
Nedlloyd107, EATA108 and FETTSCA109 decisions and judgments, 
whereby the Commission found that the European geographic market 
in containerised shipping between European and American trades was 
defined by the actual catchment areas in ports of Northern Europe.  
 
Blanco (2007)110 correctly denotes that, in the P&O/Royal Nedlloyd 
case, the Commission talked about the geographical aspect of the 
service rather than the “relevant geographic market”. Nevertheless, the 
Commission’s argumentation is linked to the concept of container 
catchment areas of ports. This signifies a link between geographic 
criteria of the product market with the geographic relevant market. In  
the EATA and FETTCSA cases, the Commission focuses more on the 
product related market, while it has not mentioned the geographic one 
whatsoever. 
 
                                       
107  Peninsula & Oriental (P&O) Royal Nedlloyd. Commission, Decision Case No 
IV/M.831 -P&O / Royal Nedlloyd [OJ 1997 C110] para 35 
108  Europe Asia Trades Agreement (EATA), Commission Decision, relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (Case No IV/35.134 
Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement) [OJ 199 L 95/1] para 519 
109  TAA (1994) paras 67-68, P&O/Royal Nedlloyd (1996) paras 34-38 and TACA 
Decision (1998) paras 60-75 and 519, EATA (1999) para 38, FETTCSA para 55.  
110  Blanco (2007) p.443 
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The EU assumed jurisdiction only for the EU related area and not for 
the whole of the trade, thus avoiding issues of extraterritoriality.111 
Yet, there is doubt if the decision to narrow the market only by 
reference to the European service catchment ports does actually deal 
with the concept of international transport per se. Container vessel is 
an homogeneous market but this does not necessarily apply for the 
break-bulk liner service; however, both are committed to a certain 
quality and timely service. In practice, a narrow geographic 
interpretation affects interchangeability. The methodology followedin 
shipping market definition presents practical economic weaknesses, 
though it is legally rigid. I argue that it is paradoxical to merely 
regulate one aspect of an ocean borne undertaking that contradicts 
the international character of shipping. The risk here is that shipping 
companies may focus more on the niche markets than the 
overregulated EU ports. An analysis of a product market that takes 
into account only the point of catchment may cause unintended 
consequences. It may be useful to consider additional factorsin our 
analysis of the joint venture agreement, such as the potential (future) 
availability of service in the form of available tonnage, i.e. carrying 
capacity at a given time; a fact that can be affected by changes in the 
supply demand equilibrium.  
The problem today remains unresolved. In contrast to the analysis 
conducted by all parties regarding the product market, the dominant 
opinion regarding the geographic market accepts the narrow character 
that is framed within the limits of a certain trade. The position is 
followed by Blanco (2007)112 and Pozdnakova (2008)113, who accept a 
narrow and well defined relevant geographical element and move 
                                       
111  Malgorzata Nesterowicz Anna, "The Mid-Atlantic View of the Antitrust 
Regulations of Ocean Shipping", University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 
[2004-2005] pp.45-88. Malgorzata denotes that the in a similar way, United States 
gives itself the power to apply its laws to the activities of other governments  as long  
as the  other government's activity prejudices U.S. carriers.  U.S. law applies to any 
agreement, even in a foreign-to-foreign  trade,  if the  trade  has a direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. 
112  ibid p.443 et seq. 
113  Pozdnakova (2008) raises several issues in her chapter pp 251-269 about 
market dominance. 
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forward with their analysis on market power of shipping cartels based 
on the EU precedents. I believe, however, that a narrow geographic 
market definition has to be examined on case-by-case basis, as I deem 
the liner consortium a strategic position of vessels (the rationalisation 
of service) in a global context, and not in a certain area. 
 
My view is that a liner consortium is present in a market not only 
because it may be profitable, but because it does not want to abandon 
its market share and its port slot. A similar phenomenon exists in air 
transport where some routes produce significantly more revenue for 
an airline than others, but the aggregated revenue of annual use is a 
result of all routes that a company operates. An airline company that 
sells flights to several destinations cross-subsidises losses on flights to 
unpopular destinations with revenue from profitable routes. A 
classical example is the so called “bankers’ shuttles” flights from 
London, Heathrow and Frankfurt airports, respectively, to JFK.114 The 
long-haul “business class tickets” on intercontinental routes are 
profitable enough to finance the other peripheral operations of British 
Airways115 and Lufthansa. While they possess market dominance in 
Heathrow and Frankfurt airports respectively, this enables them to 
suppress revenues in other scheduled routes and preserve their 
clientele. It makes business sense to offer a wide range of routes so 
that the passengers are attracted to an airline because of its breadth 
of coverage.116 Cross-subsidisation allows the provision of wide 
services; without it, the service could not be maintained. 
 
                                       
114  See: Commission Decision 1999 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780 — Virgin/British Airways) [OJ 2000 L30/1] paras 39-
41. See also: Commission notice concerning the alliance between Lufthansa, SAS 
and United Airlines (cases COMP/D-2/36.201, 36.076, 36.078 — procedure under 
Article 85 (ex 89) EC) [OJ 2002 C 181/2] para 7 
115  Bloomberg Report "British Airways Predicts Business-Class-Only Profit 
(Update2)" by Steve Rothwell and Beth Mellor - September 29, 2009 “The London-
based airline, Europe’s third-largest, has historically made almost all of its profit 
from first- and business-class travel”. 
116  Monti Giorgio, EC Competition Law [Cambridge University Press, 2007] p. 
479 
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This practice of cross-subsidising ultimately allows dominant firms to 
build a cash reserve for further investments and finance losses in 
certain markets through profits obtained from others.117 The economic 
concept of cross subsidies from one market to another has been 
analysed in Deutsche Post118 and has significant importance for liner 
and tramp shipping; a topic that is analysed above and in Chapter 
Three119. Cross subsidies mean that some routes may be of great 
significance for a consortium  to finance its operation from revenues 
obtained through other routes. Therefore a geographic market 
analysis could take into account this variable profitability indicator 
and correlate it with cross financing. We analyse the concept of cross 
subsidies below. 
 
1.2.3.1 The Concepts of Cross Subsidies and Aggregation in 
Shipping 
1.2.3.1.1 Cross Subsidies 
 
In Deutsche Post120 the Commission analysed the concept of cross 
subsidies. The monopoly postal service (Deutsche Post) offered its 
commercial parcel service at below-cost price with the aim of ousting 
competitors from the market. In this way, Deutsche Post covered the 
resultant losses with the aid of profits made in the reserved area. 
From an economic point of view, cross-subsidization occurs where the 
                                       
117  See the comments of Virgin Atlantic regarding the alliance between British 
Airways (BA) and American Airlines (AA) in the press release: “Regulators Need To 
Stop This Game Of Monopoly” whereby it states: “...BA made £883 million in pre-tax 
profits. The year before, it made £611 million. It has huge cash reserves of £2 
billion”. 
 <www.virgin-
atlantic.com/en/gb/allaboutus/pressoffice/pressreleases/news/regulatorsneedtost
opthisgame.jsp> accessed 10th May 2012. 
118  Deutsche Post AG - Interception of cross-border mail, (DEUTCSHE POST) 
Commission Decision, Case COMP/35.141, [2001 L 125/27]. The case concerned an 
undertaking, the German Post Office, a monopolist in one market, which abused its 
position in another related market. 
119  Supra p. 66 and Infra p. 233 
120  Deutsche Post AG op. cit. supra 
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earnings from a given service do not suffice to cover the incremental 
costs of providing that service, and where there is another service or 
bundle of services with earnings which exceed the stand-alone costs. 
Cross subsidies do not constitute a violation ad hoc unless they are 
used to eliminate competition. This means that the dominant 
undertaking attempts to hinder competition by cross-subsidising 
commercial services through other services.  
 
Similar phenomena exist in shipping. Incumbents may cross-
subsidise routes outside the relevant market. Incumbents may have 
part of their fleet committed in the consortium or in a pool in which 
they enjoy relative stability, and operate the rest of their fleet in an 
independent manner. The existence of cross subsidies means that the 
undertaking in question is active in multiple markets, while the degree 
of their homogeneity and the proximity and the structure of the 
relationship determines whether the dominant undertaking aggregates 
business benefits across them. 
 
1.2.3.1.2 From the Aggregation of Benefits to the Aggregation of Multiple 
Markets 
 
Here, I attempt to establish a theoretical basis for the argument of 
aggregation across multiple markets, by borrowing elements from 
existing legislation and theory.  
I usethe wording from the block exemption 906/2009. Its preamble 
makes it clear that in order to assess market share, an account 
should be taken not only of direct trade between the ports served by a 
consortium but also of any competition from other liner services 
sailing from ports, which may be substituted for those served by the 
consortium and more controversially, of other modes of transport.121 It 
thus expands the geographic definition of the market not only among 
                                       
121  Chuah Jason, “The New Liner Shipping Consortia Block Exemption Comes 
Into Force” Journal of International Maritime Law [2009]  
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the relevant catchment areas, but also to neighbouring ones, taking 
into account potential substitutability from competitor lines or 
terminals. 
 
As far as the aggregation of benefits across markets is concerned, I 
note that since maritime transport serves and supports multiple 
industries that relate with in a subsequent manner with the transport 
undertaking, there is undoubtedly a spill over of benefits. In fact, the 
maritime production output works as a real growth accelerator for the 
economy that it serves.122 I support my argument on the findings of 
Townley (2011)123 who considers three advantages of aggregating 
across markets: it enhances consumer welfare, it is closer to the 
exercise that companies themselves conduct and it encourages a more 
holistic appreciation of agreements. 
  
1.2.4 De Minimis 
 
The Consortia Regulation block exemption, as is commonly the case in 
block exemption regulations, only applies to consortia which do not 
exceed a given market share threshold in the market where they 
operate. Regulation No 823/2000124 set a threshold of 30% for 
consortia that operate within a liner conference and 35% for all other 
ones. After the end of the liner conference system to and from Europe, 
                                       
122  Haralambides calculated that in the case of the U.S. merchant marine it was 
estimated that each US dollar increase in the final demand for shipping services 
produces $2.5 USD of extra output in the U.S. economy. Of course, this percentage 
varies according to the case. See: Haralambides, H. ‘The Economic Impact of 
Shipping on the National Economy’, International Conference on Shipping, Ports 
and Logistics Services: Solutions for Global Issues, organised by The International 
Association of Maritime Economists, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, [1996], p. 16, < 
 http://www.maritimeeconomics.com/downloads/papers/HH_EIS%20Vanco
uver.pdf> [accessed03 July 2002] 
123  Townley, Chris, “The Relevant Market: an acceptable limit to competition 
analysis?” European Competition Law Review, 10, [2011] pp. 493-495 
124  Commission Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 of 19 April 2000 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia) [OJ 
L 100 , 20/04/2000] pp. 24 - 30 
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the new uniform market share threshold of the Consortia Regulation 
is 30% for all consortia and thus represents a reduction of the upper 
limit. In practice, this reduction will not affect the majority of existing 
consortia currently covered by Regulation No 823/2000, as most 
consortia have already been subject to the lower 30% market share 
threshold in the past — since their members operated until recently 
within a conference.125 
 
 
                                       
125  Prisker Antje, 'Commission adopts new block exemption regulation for liner 
shipping consortia' European Commission Competition Publications [2010 n.1] pp. 8-
12. In particular see p.10 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2010_1_4.pdf> 
accessed in 3rd June 2012 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
In Chapter Two, I analyse the following issues: 
 
First, I examine whether a joint venture agreement per se is likely to 
restrict competition.  I accordingly examine the agreement to set up 
and operate a joint venture, as a whole, in terms of its object and 
impact on the market. Moreover, I discuss the specific restraints 
which can be envisaged in the framework of liner and shipping joint 
ventures. 
Second, I investigate the effects on competition of the subsequent 
clauses a consortium agreement produces. Accordingly, I examine the 
concept of dominant position in liner shipping by defining the critical 
degree of market power that amounts to a dominant position within 
the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.  I also present cases where a 
dominant position can be held by a group of carriers; accordingly I 
discuss cases and criteria that amount to abuse. 
 
 
2.1 Consortia Agreements under Article 101 
TFEU 
 
Once a “partial function joint venture”'s impact on competition has 
been established, it is important to analyse the specific clauses of the 
agreement that may create specific restrictions caught by Article 101. 
As mentioned already, partial function joint ventures are flexible 
agreements between parents and incumbents; moreover different 
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agreements exist among them. Pozdnakova (2008) lists the key 
practical implications of the agreement: 126 
First, the common aspect of liner is the common use of fleet, 
equipment and facilities; 
Second, the rationalisation of operations aims to ensure 
effective route coverage and even participation of member 
carriers in the service earnings; 
Third, liner joint ventures may find it necessary to develop a 
joint commercial policy and assume the sales and advertising 
functions of their individual participants; 
Fourth, the admission policy to their membership, their 
competitive relations with parent carriers and third party policy; 
Fifth, an effect on carriers’ competitive behaviour is unlikely if 
they have only a small proportion of their total vessels and costs 
in common. 
 
2.1.1  Rationalisation Agreements 
 
Before I proceed with my analysis, it is useful to distinguish between 
the general rationalisation agreements and those that are specific to 
shipping consortia. On the one hand the former are directly caught by 
Article 101(1)(b), which prohibits agreements to “limit or control 
production, markets, technical development, or investment”, and 
therefore are handled as negative practices by object. Their purpose is 
to limit cargo and sailing allocation and capacity, respectively. On the 
other hand, consortia are de facto special agreements delimiting the 
substantive and geographical scope of the joint venture. The co-
operation agreement may provide for sailing patterns, ports to be 
called, vessel itineraries, the number, frequency and character of 
sailings and ports, transit times, as well as sharing revenues and 
                                       
126  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 176 
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losses127. In this context, the consortium rationalisation agreement 
aims to regulate supply in a certain trade, by properly allocating 
vessels and delimiting the routes in order to achieve stability128. In a 
sense, rationalisation equals an a priori delimitation of services129, 
hence they do not fall within prohibitions of Article 101 directly; on 
the contrary, they contribute to allocative efficiency and leave space 
for competitors. 
However, a problem arises when the rationalisation agreements 
change their scope from geographic to product limitations. 
Pozdnakova (2008)130 refers to this matter in view of the Horizontal 
Guidelines; for the rationalisation measures to fall outside Article 
101(1), it is necessary to ensure that the agreements that restrict 
competition are objectively necessary and proportionate to the 
objectives pursued by co-operation. Thus, if the capacity agreements 
aim to determine which routes should be operated by which carrier; 
restrict members to offer capacity on the relevant market outside the 
venture context; or, ultimately prohibit members to re-enter routes 
from which they have withdrawn, these agreements are caught by 
Article 101 as they limit production and potential competition, 
respectively. See also supra131 (Irish Beef case, Baltic Max and 
Minibulk Feeder cases). 
 
                                       
127  See: Grand Alliance Agreement II, [FMC no 011602-012-MC] article 5, 
<www2.fmc.gov/agreement_lib/011602-012-MC.pdf> accessed March 2012. 
 See also the New World Alliance, [FMC 011960-007] article 2, 
<http://www2.fmc.gov/agreement_lib/011960-007.pdf>accessed in March 2012 
128  Usually rationalisation agreements contain a clause explaining the 
geographic scope of cooperation. 
129  Pozdnakova (2008) p. 184 
130  Pozdnakova (2008) p. 185 
131 See supra §§ 326, 330, 334  respectively ,   
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2.1.2 Cargo space, fleet, investment and 
equipment sharing 
 
The agreements can be categorised as deep-sea vessel agreements or 
individual cargo service contracts132. They can accordingly be 
materialised either in the form of clauses within a consortium 
agreement or embedded in a separate agreement - one common use of 
cargo space and fleet includes vessel sharing, cargo space and slot 
sharing arrangements, cross chartering agreements, as well as 
agreements that resolve matters about the standards of equipment 
that would be used by the members of the consortium. Though the 
scope of the cargo / fleet sharing involves cargo slot sharing, these 
agreements often move further to regulate investment decisions, 
contribution of capital, advertising, use of trade names.133 Moreover, it 
is not uncommon for the consortium to extend its operation beyond 
the scope of maritime transport by regulating matters of inland 
transport. Sometimes, the agreement exceeds the flexible horizontal 
nature of co-operation creating progressively a vertical undertaking of 
multimodal transport.134 The task of competition analysis is to 
quantify to what degree these agreements cause restrictions to 
competition and to identify cartel behaviour. 
 
 
 
                                       
132  Ward Ezekiel, "Collaboration in Liner Shipping under Article 81 EC 
Agreements between liner shipping undertakings following the repeal of Regulation 
4056/86", Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law Yearbook  [2008] pp. 1-103. In 
particular see pp: 62-75 
133  All the agreements with USA geographic relevance can be found in the 
website of the US Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) under section of 
<www2.fmc.gov/agreements/type_npage.aspx> [accessed 20/3/2011]. See also 
Pozdnakova (2008) p. 177 
134  Maersk/Sea-Land [OJ 1999/C 259/10] para 39. See also FEFC OJ [1994 
L378/17] whereby the Commission decided to  prohibit the members of  the Far 
Eastern Freight Conference from fixing prices for the inland transport of 
containerised cargo. 
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2.1.2.1 Vessel sharing 
 
The assessment of whether or not an agreement has as its object the 
restriction of competition is based on a number of factors, including 
the content of the agreement and the objective aims pursued by it. 
Evidence of subjective intent on the part of the parties to restrict 
competition is a relevant factor but not a necessary condition. Co-
operation between liner shipping companies to supply a transport 
service or develop a new service does not on its own merit authorise 
the parties to raise rate levels, limit output, share markets or 
otherwise affect shippers or the competitive structure of the market135. 
 
First, I distinguish between agreements among incumbents and those 
between the consortium and independents. Both may be responsible 
for distorting competition; however, I believe that the latter type of 
agreement is more susceptible to violate competition rules (I analyse 
the issue below).136 Second, I distinguish between vessel sharing and 
artificial vessel withdrawal. This does not mean that the two concepts 
are not interlinked; in practice, vessel withdrawal can be achieved as 
an indirect consequence (intended or unintended) of a vessel sharing 
practice. When consortium members attempt to control the supply by 
making special agreements with independents it is clearly a case of a 
cartel that is caught under Article 101. 
 
For example, I refer to the prohibition of vessel sharing agreements 
(VSA) between a conference and independent liners, in particular as 
been investigated in “EATA”137, TAA138 and TACA139 decisions. The 
                                       
135  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 180 
136  Infra pp 115 and 121 et seq. 
137  European Asian Trades Agreement [OJ L 193, 1999]. See also EU 
Commission XXIXth Report on Competition Policy [1999] para 99 
138  Trans-Atlantic Agreement (TAA), Commission Decision 94/980/EC [OJ L 
376, 1994] p.1. See also EU Commission’s XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 
[1999] para 99 
139  Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA Decision), Case IV/35.134 
(Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement) [OJ 1999 L95/1] 
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common objective among the above consortia has been to increase 
prices by establishing a capacity management programme concerning 
scheduled maritime transport services for the carriage of 
containerised cargo. The purpose of the EATA was to increase prices 
by establishing a capacity management programme concerning 
scheduled maritime transport services for the carriage of 
containerised cargo from northern Europe to the Far East.140, while in 
TAA141 and TACA142 the issues were the maintenance of excess 
capacity and the artificial raising of freight rates.  
 
Thus EU competition law is very sceptical towards capacity controls. 
In the XXIXth Report on Competition Policy (1999)143 it is clearly 
stated that “...capacity control can only bring benefits if there was a 
real withdrawal of inefficient or outdated capacity so as to bring about 
a reduction of costs, leading to price reductions for shippers”. It 
distinguishes between “artificial” and “real” withdrawal of vessels and 
cargo slots. According to this view an artificial capacity control is 
forbidden under Article 101(1)(a)&(b) as their object is to prevent 
competition and limit the production; consequently becoming a 
deterrent to further investment: Withdrawing vessels from the market 
is a way of keeping freight rates high in response to fluctuations in 
supply and demand.144 This practice aims moreover to control 
investment that can be achieved in the sector—since supply is 
regulated, there is no need for newbuildings or modern vessels to 
enter the market. Obviously, such agreements affect shippers directly 
because they are deprived of available supply options; they are looking 
for a modern and reliable fleet.  
 
                                       
140  A capacity management programme is an agreement under which the 
parties agree not to use a proportion of the space on their vessels for the carriage of 
goods in a particular trade. 
141  TAA (1994) para 96 
142  TACA Decision paras 363-364 
143  Op. cit. para 100 
144  Supra p. 128, I discuss the matter of capacity adjustments. 
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It is worth mentioning that specific restraints undertaken by carriers 
or their conduct can indicate whether a probability exists for spill-over 
effects. An agreement may have an effect in another relevant market 
than the one covered by the agreement or an alliance in question. The 
matter is mainly analysed under Article 2(4) of the EC Merger 
Regulation145, and provides us with a useful explanation, though it 
does not have direct application to horizontal partial function shipping 
consortia. 
2.1.2.2 Limitations of Technical Development and 
Investment 
 
By regulating the amount of investment and standards of assets used 
in the framework of co-operation, liner consortia can restrict 
competition in a serious way that will amount to restriction by object. 
These restrictions of technical development can be realised by 
agreements that control either the finance for the acquisition of 
vessels or acquisition restrictions per se. In view of the above I will 
analyse two issues: First, I will identify the actual scope of the 
agreements that restrict competition. Second, based on the analysis of 
innovation that I conduct on the relevant product market146, I will try 
to establish that the concept of innovation, as used in the R&D sector, 
is also transferable into shipping contexts. I will thus examine 
whether the argument about investments can be used in shipping in 
the same way as it is used in R&D related industries. I see the matter 
from both aspects: delimiting competition in order to avoid investment 
costs and organising joint investment funds in order to be ahead of 
competitors. 
                                       
145  EC Merger Regulation op. cit. article 2(4): “...To the extent that the creation 
of a joint venture constituting a concentration pursuant to Article 3 has as its object 
or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain 
independent, such coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of 
Article 81(1) and (3) of the Treaty, with a view to establishing whether or not the 
operation is compatible with the common market”. 
146  See supra p. 55 
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The matter of restricting the competition in order to avoid R&D and 
innovation commitments may be a secondary product of a greater 
strategy. A better ship is a faster and more economical tool that 
creates quality of service; at the same time, a service of such kind is 
costly. Obviously, consortia agreements that have as their purpose the 
restriction of competition, subsequently allowing them to limit their 
investment, will amount to restriction by object. This directly affects 
both actual and potential competition147, since when the market turns 
from dynamic to stable, the dominant firms enjoy a lazy oligopoly. 
During the period of liner conferences, many examples of lazy 
competition (effective, but not actual) were observed between the 
conferences and the independents. This matter is analysed below.148  
There is also the chance that highly integrated consortia may consider 
joint investments for acquiring vessels and equipment necessary. This 
may bring competitors into a disadvantageous position as joint 
decision, as such, would reduce their capacity to enter the market due 
to the high risk of investment and sunk costs. The competitors must 
always maintain a substantial cash reserve to deal with operating 
costs if they attempt to substantially reconfigure their fleet between 
routes. In any event, competitors need to make capital investment in 
addition to finding long timecharters in order to reduce costs, 
maintain quality and ensure continuity of supply149. 
The matter of the creation of barriers to entry by means of innovation 
is dealt within the Guidelines on Horizontal agreements150. In 
addition, the subject is dealt with in the EU Merger Control Regime151 
that applies to shipping as any other industry – though partial 
function maritime consortia do not classify as mergers - they provide 
us with useful analysis vis-à-vis potential competition with regard to 
                                       
147  European Night Services op. cit. para 136 
148  Infra p. 170 et seq 
149  AIRTOURS  PLC vs Commission, (AIRTOURS), Case T-342/99 (2002) ECR II-
2585  para 18(a) 
150  Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [OJ 2004/C 
31/03] paras 70 and 71 
151  Regulation 139/2004 applies to all sectors of the economy 
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investment and R&D factors on the occasion of merger. Thus, 
especially in shipping, a predominantly capital intensive market, 
whereby economies of scale152 do matter, investment and financial 
resources manipulation by a consortium inevitably become indicators 
of dominance153 and upgrade to a restriction by object.  
 
Thus, potential entrants may encounter barriers to entry in the form 
of risks and costs which have an impact on the profitability of such an 
undertaking. A restriction of competition is thereby achieved once the 
consortium makes any third party investment inefficient, as any 
sponsoring may not guarantee the desired return of investment154. 
Pozdnakova (2008)155, Green and Ruttley (1993)156 refer to this 
condition and agree on the fact that consortia agreements that aim to 
restrict competition through joint investment policies do infringe 
competition law by object. 
2.1.3 Joint Commercial Policy  
 
                                       
152  BPB Industries PLC and British Gypsum Ltd vs Commission [1993] ECR II-
389 
153  Dabbah (2004) op. cit. p330-331 referring to United Brands [1978 ECR 207] 
paras 122-124 
154  Since the competitors will be enjoying the necessary liquidity to proceed to 
frequent investments. Ultimately any benefits of such could also be reaped by its 
competitors. See: Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers op. cit. para 
67. A similar situation exists with spill-over inefficiencies that exist in the R&D 
industry, for example: a firm which has invested in innovation is not able to fully 
exploit its profit potential, because complementary firms have taken advantage of 
these investments without expending any costs. In this case, the software producers 
in the downstream market might gain profit at the expense of the upstream 
innovative firm. Likewise, in shipping, the cost-benefit on investments (through the 
pool financial resources) that the consortium members may enjoy could significantly 
discourage independent competitors from investing. The benefit for the consortium 
in question here would be triple: (a) full advantage of capital access and economy of 
scale, (b) discouragement of potential competition, (c) increased market share 
obtained by the impairment of the remaining independents. See: Maydell Patrick, 
Fina Siegfried (ed.) and Vogl Roland (ed.), “Non-horizontal Mergers under the EC 
Merger Regulation” European Union Law, Stanford – Vienna, Transatlantic 
Technology Law Forum Working Papers [2012 No. 3] p. 70 
155  Op. cit. p.180 
156  Green, N., and Ruttley P. “The consortia block exemption” [1993] European 
Transport Law p. 487 
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Consortia may also need to jointly develop policy with regard to their 
customers and competitors. A consortium may decide to develop an 
independent identity towards its customs or any third parties to 
market its services. A joint commercial policy157 may consist of joint 
sales and (e.g. rate agreements /price fixing policy to shippers), joint 
advertising policy or even joint purchasing services from third parties 
(e.g. chandlery and bunkering).  
 
Rate agreements are always part of antitrust prohibitions158. EU 
Courts, after some years of empirical observation, hold that 
profitability is possible for liner ship-owners even when price 
competition takes place159. For example, Munari (2012)160 and 
Townley (2004)161 generally agree with the repeal of the block 
exemption in liner conferences: they deem that the ability to fix prices 
does not help to produce efficiencies. 
 
General co-ordination does not fall within Article 101 TFEU. However, 
whether this practice is indicative of a price fixing cartel shall be 
examined by the facts of each case, something that is also generally 
accepted. I also here observe an inconsistency: the outright 
prohibition of 101 TFEU seems to contradict the case-by-case basis 
standard as introduced by the Maritime Guidelines.162 Since the 
abolition of the liner conferences, price fixing in shipping is strictly 
prohibited and falls under Article 101. Thus, price collusion in 
shipping consortia may arise if the members authorise one 
                                       
157  See: Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [OJ 
2011/C 11/01] §6. “...Commercialisation agreements involve co-operation between 
competitors in the selling, distribution or promotion of their substitute products. At one 
end of the spectrum, joint selling agreements may lead to a joint determination of all 
commercial aspects related to the sale of the product, including price. At the other end, 
there are more limited agreements that only address one specific commercialisation 
function, such as distribution, after-sales service, or advertising”. 
158  Munari Francesco (2012) op. cit. § 26  
159  Atlantic Container Line (TAA)[2002] ECR, II-875, § 261 
160  Munari Francesco (2012) op.cit. § 26 p. 20 
161  Townley Chris (2004) op. cit. p. 126 
162  Op. cit. § 34 
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representative to negotiate the prices on their behalf, rather than 
generally organising commercial policy matters. This kind of 
representation becomes price fixing, in effect; conversely, consortia 
members have to maintain their individual identities and remain free 
to advertise their respective services separately.163. 
 
As regards the issue of joint advertising policy and how this may affect 
the joint commercial policy, there is a large body of economic 
literature about the extent to which advertising, reputation and 
goodwill may operate as barriers to entry. There can be also 
economies of scale in advertising, and advertising expenditures will 
usually be sunk costs.164 Within the Horizontal Guidelines it is clearly 
mentioned that: “...However, commonality of commercialisation costs 
increases the risk of a collusive outcome if the commercialisation 
agreement concerns products, which entail costly commercialisation, for 
example, high distribution or marketing costs. Consequently, joint 
advertising or joint promotion agreements can also give rise to 
restrictive effects on competition if those costs constitute a significant 
cost factor”.165 In Nestle/Perrier and United Brands, the EC considered 
that advertising and promotion had enhanced United Brands’ large 
market share, because it had ‘induced the customer to show a 
preference for' branded Chiquita bananas despite a large price 
differential with unlabelled and differently labelled bananas”.166 
In shipping, however, price leadership is the most decisive factor for 
selection (in combination with quality) rather than advertising. Yet, a 
common advertising policy may deprive or significantly discourage the 
shipper to differentiate between services; by the same token, if this 
                                       
163 See Pozdnakova (2008) p 188. See also: Herman Amos, Shipping Conferences 
[Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983] pp 140-143 
164  Nestle/Perrier [OJ L356/1 1992]. See also United Brands op. cit. See also: 
Jones, Alison, Sufrin Brenda, EC Competition Law [Oxford University Press, 3rd 
Edition 2007], p 419 
165  Op. cit. para 243 
166 United Brands (1978) op.cit. para 91 
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advertising is combined with a centralised sale of agreed co-ordinated 
tariff rates, it is likely to have a negative effect on competition167.  
 
2.1.4 Membership  
 
2.1.4.1 Membership Duration and Conditions 
 
The usual practice of liner consortia is to impose certain conditions on 
membership in order to protect their interests and committed 
investments against opportunistic and speculative members. 
Moreover, a consortium agreement may also contain clauses that 
restrict parent companies’ ability to compete in the same fields that 
are also assigned to the joint venture168. Agreements on membership 
are not expressly mentioned in the wording of Article 101(1) TFEU 
though conditions of entry and exit may distort competition. This 
means that when a restriction related to membership exists, it can 
only be considered in light of the main agreement and on the main 
subjects that those restrictions aim to protect.  In Gottrup-Klim169 the 
Court assessed whether the penalties about membership for non-
compliance with the statutes are proportionate to the objective they 
pursue. For instance, if the amount of investment required is 
considerable (moreover the expected ROI is distant), it is possible for 
the agreement to impose such conditions as to enable the members to 
achieve these results. The critical criterion is the proportionality of 
penalties and/or exclusions to the objective the consortium pursues. 
                                       
167  See: Pozdnakova (2008) ibid pp 188-189. See also the Horizontal Guidelines 
op. cit. para 244 whereby: “In most commercialisation agreements, some degree of 
information exchange is required in order to implement the agreement. It is 
therefore necessary to verify whether the information exchange can give rise to a 
collusive outcome with regard to the parties’ activities within and outside the co-
operation. Any negative effects arising from the exchange of information will not be 
assessed separately but in the light of the overall effects of the agreement”. 
168  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 190 
169  Gøttrup-Klim e.a. Grovvareforeninger vs Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab 
AmbA (Gottrup Klim), Reference for a preliminary ruling [1994 ECR I-5641] para 36.  
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Accordingly, entry and exit conditions (in the form of a grace period or 
initial entry periods) do not constitute a breach, provided that such 
restrictions have a definite and proportional duration170 that can last 
as long as there is a proper return of benefits to the carriers that 
participate in the consortium. 
 
In European Night Services171, the CFI considered whether special 
conditions on membership - if connected with particularly high 
investment requirements – could constitute a reason for exemption 
from (ex) Article 85. The Court held that, should there be any grounds 
for exemption, the amount of investment constitutes a significant 
factor for duration of exemption from Article 101(3). Thus, if the 
restraints are directly related and cannot disassociate from the 
creation of a legitimate joint venture they will be compatible with the 
provisions of Article 101(1), as they do not have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.  
 
2.1.4.2 Non-Competition Clause among Consortium 
Members 
 
                                       
170  In Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening [1992] ECR II-1931, paras 74-75 the CFI 
held: “...what would be the state of competition if the clause did not exist? In order 
to have a beneficial effect on competition, the aim pursued by the introduction of the 
clause must itself contribute to free competition. In addition, the no-competition 
clause itself must be necessary and proportionate to the achievement of that aim.” 
Similarly, in Métropole Télévision (M6), Suez - Lyonnaise des Eaux, France Télécom 
and Télévision Française 1 SA [2001] ECR II-2459, paras 106-107 the CFI also held 
that: “...the condition that a restriction be necessary implies a two-fold examination. It 
is necessary to establish, first, whether the restriction is objectively necessary for the 
implementation of the main operation and, second, whether it is proportionate to it.” 
171  European Night Services op. cit. para 230: “...Court considers that the 
duration of an exemption granted under Article 85(3) of the Treaty...must be 
sufficient to enable the beneficiaries to achieve the benefits justifying such 
exemption, namely, in the present case, the contribution to economic progress and 
the benefits to consumers provided by the introduction of new high-quality 
transport services...moreover, such progress and benefits cannot be achieved 
without considerable investment, the length of time required to ensure a proper 
return on that investment is necessarily an essential factor to be taken into account 
when determining the duration of an exemption”. 
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The criterion of proportionate restriction with regard to the expected 
legitimate benefits is therefore of paramount importance. Thus, an 
agreement may contain proportional measures that must have an 
overall beneficial effect on competition. These measures have to 
ensure return of the original investment and/or the legitimate benefits 
envisaged by the participants. A non-competition clause by a 
consortium prevents competition among parent shipowners and 
outright infringes Article 101. Clyde and Reitzes172 confirm that the 
level of freight rates is significantly lower on routes where conference 
members are free to negotiate service contracts directly with shippers. 
 
For example, in Remia173 the ECJ held that in order to have a 
beneficial effect on competition, such clauses must be necessary to 
the transfer of the undertaking concerned and their duration and 
scope must be strictly limited to that purpose provided that such 
conditions are ancillary to the main agreement and lawfully serve the 
purpose of this agreement. 
This of course contradicts with the core of the intent that motivates 
owners to form a joint venture. In practice, the carriers join efforts not 
only when they wish to rationalise service, but in order avoid excessive 
competitive pressure from other shipowners; otherwise they would not 
have invested effort into forming a venture, if they were strong and 
well established. From the theoretical and judicial point of view, 
however, in order for the non-internal competition restriction to be 
                                       
172  Clyde, Paul S., Reitzes James D., “The Effectiveness of Collusion Under 
Antitrust Immunity, The Case of Liner Shipping Conference”, Bureau of Economics 
Staff Report Federal Trade Commission Washington, D.C., [2005] pp. 34-40. After 
careful analysis of the samples there has been an increase in freight rates only for 
high value commodities. Even when firms apparently wield market power (i.e., set 
price above marginal cost), there may still be a cost-based explanation for the 
positive relationship between market concentration and price. As applied to ocean 
shipping, it is likely that there are some fixed (but, not sunk) costs involved in 
serving a given route. If those costs were to rise, some carriers would exit the route. 
Consequently, both market concentration and freight rates would increase, but the 
rate increase might only be sufficient to allow firms to again cover their fixed costs. 
Thus, the exercise of market power by individual firms does not necessarily imply 
that those firms earn profits beyond the normal level. 
173  Remia Bv And Nv Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia vs Commission, Case 42/84 
[ECR 1985 p 2545] para 20 
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legitimate it has to be strictly necessary, in scope and in duration, 
with the objectives of the venture.174 
 
2.1.5 Restrictions Imposed to Deter Losses of 
Benefits 
 
A joint venture agreement may contain clauses that prohibit 
competitors to use assets or facilities for their purposes. This refusal 
of supply is, in such a case, directed not against either incumbents or 
independent competitors that wish to use for their own benefit the 
legitimate advantages of the venture. It is an action against the so-
called “free riders” that wish to reap trading benefits at the expense of 
the joint venture. 
 
Restrictions of such kind may not automatically constitute an 
infringement of Article 101 ad hoc. It is the exclusive right of the 
owners and possessors of assets in question to manage them in an 
exclusive manner. The matters of refusal to supply and essential 
facilities were analysed originally in 1995 within Magill175, as well as 
in 1998 and 2004 in three other cases (European Night Services176 – 
case with transport significance – and in Oscar Bronner177 and in IMS 
Health178). The EC courts list the conditions designed to prevent the 
restrictions of competition by parent undertakings that are in 
possession of infrastructure, products or services which are necessary 
                                       
174  The matter is addressed by Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p 194 
175  Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) 
vs. Commission (“Magill”) [1995] ECR I-743 para 56 
176  ENS op.cit paras 168, 190, 200-212 et seq. 
177  Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG vs. Mediaprint Zeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag 
GmbH & Co KG [1998] ECR I-7791 paras 41 and 45.   
178  IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG vs. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004]  ECR 
I0000 paras 51-52 whereby is was held: “...it is for the national court to examine, if 
appropriate, in light of the facts before it, whether the refusal of the request for a 
licence is justified by objective considerations”.. 
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or essential and/or indispensable179 for entry to the relevant market, 
and thus not interchangeable180. 
 
First, if the aforementioned restrictions are not ancillary, they may 
intend to limit market size by object. Second, should the assets 
controlled be limited and available only to the consortia members, 
they are considered to be “essential” and “indispensable” for effective 
competition. In such a case, if competitors are deprived from the use 
of such necessary and essential conditions, actual and potential 
competition is thus distorted. Here, the case shows that these 
restrictions affect actual and potential competition making 
competitors unable to either penetrate a market - or continue working 
in the relevant market.  
 
Hovenkamp (2007)181 asserts three more parameters which need to be 
taken into account: 
i) If a network joint venture's exclusion policy is to be justified by 
claimed free riding, the claim must be substantiated. This 
means that the defendant must be able to assert the nature of 
the free riding and provide evidence to support the assertion. 
ii) claimed “free riding” must be distinguished from simple 
competition or product interchangeability, which is both 
ubiquitous and desirable. 
iii) merely taking advantage of economies of scale or scope are not 
free riding, for they reduce no one's investment incentives182. 
                                       
179  Oscar Bronner op. cit. para 45. See also:  IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG vs. 
NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004]  ECR I0000 paras 51-52 whereby is was held: 
“...it is for the national court to examine, if appropriate, in light of the facts before it, 
whether the refusal of the request for a licence is justified by objective 
considerations”.. 
180  European Night Services op. cit. paras 151, 209, 212, 215 and 221  
181  Hovenkamp Herbert “Exclusivity Rules in Network Joint Ventures” Federal 
Trade Commission Office of Policy and Planning, [2007] available on the website of 
the FTC <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/hovenkmp.shtm> accessed May 2012. See 
also: Hovenkamp Herbert, “Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy” Columbia 
Business Law Review [1995]. 
182  Hovenkamp (ibid. 2007] uses the example of joint use of envelopes by two 
different companies, Visa and Diners, that had a common retailer, Citibank. In a 
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iv)  once properly defined free riding is found, it must be controlled 
by the least harmful alternative. 
 
2.2 Liner Consortia and Market Power 
 
At the heart of EU competition law is the view that market power 
offers a helpful preliminary filter to identify sources of competition 
problems. In shipping, and notably in tramp shipping, the matter of 
market power remains elusive as there are still debates regarding the 
boundaries of the "relevant market". There are several ways to think 
about market power, as Monti (2007)183 presents four theoretical 
approaches: the first equates market power with the ability to increase 
prices (i.e. the neoclassical approach); the second equates market 
power with commercial power; the third sees market power as the 
ability to exclude rivals, so as to gain the power to increase price; 
while the fourth sees market power as a kind of formal jurisdiction 
test.184  
The ability to increase prices draws upon economic considerations.  
To a shipping consortium, market power means the ability to price 
profitably above the competitive level185. In order to achieve such 
                                                                                                             
similar example in shipping business, if a shipper uses the services of an 
independent competitor or a consortium member who also retains share of his 
business outside the consortium, who in turn uses the cargo slot of a consortium as 
a basis for independent inland services, then this does not constitute a free riding; 
whereas the independent takes advantage of the economy of scale provided by the 
joint venture. It may be that the independent/or said consortium member passes 
part of its cost reduction on to joint venture by “stealing” market share from the 
potential clients of the venture. None of this would be free riding, because one would 
anticipate that the consortium sales would increase, overall, since they now charter 
the space in question to the independent to serve clients that the consortium does 
not currently have. The cost reduction works both ways: that is, the cost reduction 
benefits both the consortium (as they may access clientele they do not have) as a 
whole and the independent as a whole. 
183  Monti (2007) op. cit. p. 126 
184  Monti Giorgio, “The Concept of Dominance in article 82”, European 
Competition Journal [2006 v2 (special issue)] p. 31 
185  Cartlon D.W. and Perloff J.M., Modern Industrial Organization [Harper 
Collins, New York, 2nd edition 1994] p. 8 
87 
 
results, it may try to reduce its output and increase its prices when its 
power is both significant and durable186. 
Market power is also a relative concept: the greater the power, the 
more harm the firm can inflict. Certain infringements are penalised 
only when the firm in question has significant market power, while 
other kinds of infringements (like anticompetitive distribution 
agreements) may be penalised even if the firm has less market power, 
provided it is able to cause harm to competitors or consumers.187 
Different thresholds of market power apply depending on the 
infringement in question; the anticompetitive risk is increased with 
higher levels of market power.188 A second way of defining market 
power is to enquire whether the firm has greater commercial power 
than others in the market. We can use this example in tramp 
shipping, especially during opportunistic negotiations of prices and 
terms. The matter is analysed infra189. 
The third, usually labelled “post Chicago”, holds that a firm has 
market power when it is able to devise strategies that can harm rivals 
and so give it the power to raise prices and reduce output in the 
future. This approach is wider than the neo-classical, but it has the 
same aim: to penalise firms whose strategies have undesirable 
economic effects, such as the harm to competitors.  
A fourth approach is to interpret market power as a jurisdictional 
concept.190 This has been applied in Article 101; for example, the 
Commission has stipulated that certain types of agreements are lawful 
provided the parties’ market shares are below the threshold.  
 
2.2.1 Indicators of Dominance and Power 
 
                                       
186  Werden G, “Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis”, Antirust Law Journal 
[1998 issue 66] pp 373-383. 
187  Monti (2007) op. cit p. 126 
188  CEWAL (2000) op. cit. para 137 
189  Infra  p. 239 et seq. 
190  Monti (2007) op. cit p. 127 
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An agreement on joint determination of commercial aspects may not 
be assessed without reference to market power in terms of both 
supply and demand in combination with market structure191. Market 
power in liner shipping is the ability, by a single firm or collectively, to 
raise the level of tariff rates and affect the range and quality of 
shipping services supplied to shippers (such as prices, schedule and 
innovation) for a significant period192. Evidences of market power can 
be assessed in the industry by various indicators, e.g. high fixed costs, 
high concentration, price transparency, collusion and tariff rates 
significantly higher that the marginal cost of production. The collective 
nature of market power allows liner shipping companies to reach a 
substantial degree of dominance without acquiring sufficient market 
shares individually, as well as to share losses of revenue incurred as a 
result of rate decreases. On this matter, the DG Competition of the 
Commission193 noted: 
 
“An example of such an exceptional situation is where companies in a 
collective dominant position apply a clear strategy to collectively exclude 
or discipline a competitor by selectively undercutting the competitor and 
thereby putting pressure on its margins, while collectively sharing the 
loss of revenues... If in such an exceptional case it can be shown that 
there is a clear strategy to exclude or discipline including the 
mechanism to share the sacrifice in lost revenues between the 
collectively dominant companies and that there are negative effects on 
competition in the market or that there is a high likelihood that such 
effects will materialize, then also selective price cuts above average 
total costs will be assessed as predatory”. 
 
The ‘special responsibility’ of a company with a substantial degree of 
dominance is particularly strict. In CEWAL I, the ECJ drew attention 
                                       
191  Athanassiou (2009) in Antapassis Antonis, Athanassiou Lia, Røsæg Erik 
(eds) op. cit. p. 90 
192  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p 251 
193  Discussion Paper on exclusionary practices, para 128.  See infra §511 
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to the fact that the conduct at issue was ‘that of a conference having a 
share of over ninety per cent of the market in question and only one 
competitor’, which had recently entered the market with a marginal 
share194. A carrier (or group of carriers) that is powerful by virtue of 
having a near-monopoly in a market may not be allowed to further 
impair the structure of existing competition by engaging in price 
competition with a new entrant in markets where no competition 
exists at all, even in response to aggressive price competition. 
 
In principle the Commission correlates market shares with market 
power, it also takes into account other factors (that will be analysed 
below). This correlation does not have fixed criteria and is considered 
on a case by case basis. Authors like Chuah (2005),195 Blanco 
(2007)196, Giles (2010)197 and Nazzini (2011)198, criticise the 
Commission for inconsistency in its evaluation of concentration in 
liner shipping.  
 
In order to provide clarity and predictability to stakeholders as to how 
the Commission will apply the competition rules, the special Maritime 
Competition Guidelines (2008)199 followed a public consultation in 
                                       
194   CEWAL I, op. cit. para 119. 
195  Chuah (2005) op cit § 12 p. 208 
196  Blanco Luis Ortiz (2007) op. cit. pp. 362, 473. 
197  Giles Ian, "Competition law starts to bite", Maritime Risk International, 
Volume 24, [2010-2011] pp. 10-11. Giles, in view of responses to the Norton Rose 
transport survey 2010, examines investigation procedure and discusses potential 
pitfalls in the management of shipping pools and the practice of slow steaming to 
reduce excess capacity. Advises large organisations to introduce training and 
implement a policy of transparency about relations with competitors. See also: 
Norton Rose  Group (Law Firm), "Transport Survey, the Way Ahead" Third Report 
[2010] pp. 39-40 
198  Nazzini Renato (2011) op. cit §  205 
199  Maritime Competition Guidelines op. cit. The Commission decided to limit 
the validity of the Guidelines to a period of five years – until 2013 – pointing out that 
the Maritime Guidelines overlap with a number of other Commission guidelines 
generally applicable to all industry sectors. In part, such general guidelines are now 
more up-to-date than the Maritime Guidelines. Letting the Maritime Guidelines 
lapse would, in the Commission’s view, increase clarity and legal certainty and 
result in simplification via the elimination of unnecessary duplication. In a further 
indication that the long-standing “special” treatment of maritime transport has come 
to an end, the Commission states that “all the legal materials necessary to conduct 
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2007. In practice, the issue of market power in liner shipping derives 
from the assessment of several factors other than the market share, 
which, taken separately, are not necessarily deterministic. Basically, 
the formula for liner shipping market power contains three elements: 
the market share, market demand elasticity, and supply elasticity of 
competing firms. 200 I believe that the demand and supply conditions 
in liner shipping affecting the degree of a carrier’s market power have 
to be assessed in light of the economic and structural condition of the 
liner market. For this purpose it is also of paramount importance to 
take into account other also parameters that are sector specific such 
as:  
- Market Share 
- Cost Structure 
- Economies of Scale 
- Access to Capital 
- Risk and 
- Time.  
These conditions, which will be analysed below, determine the 
capacity of competitors to countervail each others’ market power and 
the constraints that, if imposed, distort actual and potential 
competition. 
2.2.1.1 Cost Structure and Economies of Scale 
 
The EU Courts and the Commission often classify cost structure and 
economies of scale as barriers to entry and exit from the market. The 
ECJ201 stated in several cases (United Brands202, Hoffmann Roche203 
                                                                                                             
antitrust self-assessments in the maritime transport sector today can be found in 
those general guidelines.” 
200  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 258 
201  In fact, during the administrative procedure, the applicants (TACA) produced 
various articles from the specialist press stating that APL and COSCO intended to 
enter the market in the short term. This however did not constitute a convincing 
argument, as the Court’s ratio was in favour of potential competition; should 
consolidation of market share (through joint ventures) become a defence mechanism 
against potential market share loss proves the (successful or unsuccessful) effort  of 
the alliance to discourage potential competition. The CFI said: “...the fact that a 
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and BPB Industries204) that large capital investments and economies of 
scale are considered as barriers to entry.  The matter is subject to 
debate among jurists and economists, thus it cannot be fully 
addressed on its merits within this section; however, I shall present 
how these barriers affect potential competition within a shipping 
market. 
 
In practice, regardless of the degree of concentration that exists in a 
certain market, these factors are primarily taken into account by a 
potential ship-operator before deciding to join a consortium or a pool. 
The cost structure and the availability of capital constitute essential 
conditions to enter the market because of the great amount of 
investment and liquidity required in order to operate a vessel. Of 
course, economies of scale in themselves are not an ad hoc barrier to 
entry or a reason for dominance205. Economies of scale allow 
companies to achieve the lowest possible cost and capture shares of 
the market to the least efficient scale of production. Perhaps an 
economy of scale can be deemed as an achievement of efficient 
shipping entrepreneurship from which the consumer is directly 
benefited; an altera pars on behalf of consortium participants. They 
claim that even where large incumbents entered into widespread 
exclusivity agreements with independents and shippers, an entrant 
would be able to compete by incurring the same losses or offering the 
same or lower prices. This matter is analysed further below.206 
                                                                                                             
number of shipping lines, in spite of their links with the TACA parties on other 
trades, entered the transatlantic trade outside the TACA between 1997 and 1998 
does not necessarily show that those lines represented significant potential 
competition during the period covered by the contested decision”, TACA ibid. paras 
1025 and 1026. 
202  United Brands op. cit. para 122 
203  Hoffmann La Roche op. cit. para 49 
204  BPB Industries op. cit. para 116. The issue of economies of scale has been 
partially addressed, since the key issue has been the fact that BPB Industries had 
90% market share. 
205  Nazzini Renato, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law:  The 
Objective and Principles of Article 102 [Oxford University Press, 2011] p. 347 
206  See section 2.2.1.4 Relative Market Shares among Competing Shipping 
Companiesp.109 
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However, markets can be manipulated and legitimate benefits can 
become tools of exploitation; hence, economies of scale combined with 
additional factors may give rise to a dynamic barrier to entry. For 
example, in INTEL (2009)207 the Commission found that, in addition to 
the economies of scale, sunk costs have also been a decisive factor. 
Thus, a dominant undertaking could discourage entry by committing 
to, or establishing a reputation for, a practice that denies an entrant a 
minimum efficient scale. Nazzini (2009) 208 considers that this can be 
materialised in two stages: “Ex ante”, where entry becomes too risky 
and “ex post”, where economies of scale may contribute to a dominant 
undertaking’s ability to foreclose competitors who face much higher 
costs by implementing exclusionary above-cost price cuts. 
 
There is always a bundle of conditions that contribute to the 
distortion of competition and market power, though these conditions 
are not organized into a unified checklist. 
 
As Nazzini (2009) observes, the case law and the Commission practice 
considered economies of scale contributors to a dominant position 
without an integrated analysis of all the other factors relevant to the 
                                       
207  It was held: “Therefore, in the light of: (i) the significant sunk costs in 
research and development, (ii) the significant sunk costs in plant production and (iii) 
the resulting significant economies of scale which mean that the minimum efficient 
scale is high relative to overall market demand, it can be concluded that there are 
significant barriers to entry in the market.” See: Intel 2009, Commission Decision of 
relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA 
Agreement [2009, COMP/C-3 /37.990] para 866 
208  See: Nazzini (2011) op. cit. p. 347, where he criticizes this inconsistent 
practice in determining the critical market share: “The case law and the Commission 
practice, however, have sometimes considered economies of scale as contributing to 
a dominant position without an integrated analysis of all the other factors relevant 
to the dominant undertakings ability to harm competition. The elements that 
contribute to a dominant position are simply listed almost as if it were possible to 
pick a number of factors at random as long as they are in the abstract capable of 
being barriers to entry and happen to be present on the facts of the case”.. However, 
one must also take into consideration that the ECJ does not confine itself to the 
specific wording of the Treaties, nor it is always bound by the legal precedents. Its 
reasoning is “teleological”, meaning it aims the goals of the Treaties by using every 
legal theory. So perhaps the references of ECJ may not be exhaustive enough, 
however they do not show a lack of legal reasoning. See also: Dabbah (2004) op.cit. 
p. 342. 
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dominant undertaking's ability to harm competition. In order to 
discover these conditions the correct approach would first be to assess 
the gravity of all the barriers in question, in the context of a maritime 
market; as regards the economies of scale, by determining the 
essential costs of setting up a service at a level comparable to that of 
the allegedly dominant carrier or carriers209. 
 
In this context, the benefits that derive from the management of cost 
structure and economies of scale become relevant once they are 
combined with other indicators that contribute to market power. In 
TACA210, the CFI examined whether the TACA Conference had abused 
its collective dominant position. The Court examined, among many 
issues, whether the element of economies of scale constituted a 
barrier to entry for potential entry. There have been two significant 
findings from their examination of the facts: 
 
i) The elements of cost and economy of scale are related 
more to the potential competition than to the actual. It is 
a pure barrier to entry that contributes to the dominance 
that acquires additional gravity according to the 
circumstances. For instance, in TACA (conference) the 
parties were found to hold a dominant position in the 
relevant market - that, in view of the links existing 
between the TACA parties on other trades, it was probable 
that if those shipping lines entered the transatlantic 
trade, they would do so by becoming members of the 
TACA211. 
 
                                       
209  Atlantic Container Line AB (TACA) and Others vs Commission (TACA 
Judgment), Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, CFI [2003] ECR II-3275 
op. cit. para 1017. 
210  TACA Judgment (2003) ibid. paras 1024-1026 
211  TACA Judgment (2003) ibid. para 1006 
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ii) The economies of scale benefit, in two ways, the dominant 
party: a) it allows it to pool and adjust transport capacity 
and b) its control over the market allows it to pass on 
these savings achieved by economies of scale and 
efficiency by granting rebates, in order to ensure further 
loyalty of its customers.212 
 
iii) Dominance reduces not only internal competition but has 
an effect on the objectives of the economy of scale. This 
practically means that the cost and economy of scale are 
discouraging factors for potential entrants (in the form of 
original investment and the sunk costs involved in case of 
business failure). 
 
iv) What should be combined with other conditions   may 
also drive existing competitors to enter the established 
joint venture agreements in order to effectively deal with 
the matter. It is on these grounds that the Commission in 
TACA held that the fact that all these entries [n.b. the new 
entrants into the market in question] took place after the 
period covered by the contested decision is irrelevant; 
deciding an abuse by effect.213 
2.2.1.2 Capital 
 
Capital requirements to entry are certainly important for any entrant 
in shipping transport. In United Brands,214 the ECJ held that the 
particular barriers to competitors entering the market are the 
exceptionally large capital investments required. 
                                       
212  Hoffmann-La Roche paras 90 and 91, and Michelin (1983) para 71 
213  TACA (Judgment) (2003) op. cit. para 1026 
214  United Brands op. cit. para 122 
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In TACA Decision215, the Commission found that the investment 
necessary to enter the market could vary between USD 400 million 
and USD 2 billion. The operating costs are also high. At paragraph 
288 the Commission states that an investment in the region of USD 
500 million is necessary in order to be able to provide a fixed-day 
weekly service calling at three or four ports in northern Europe and 
the same in the United States; “such a service requires a fleet of five 
vessels of similar speed and capacity together with a complement of 
containers of three times the capacity of the fleet”. 
 
2.2.1.3 Market Share 
 
Market concentration is another factor to consider in assessing the 
possibility of abuse. My findings confirm that market power is 
assessed in shipping as a result of combination of factors; moreover 
market share becomes less relevant over time, though it continues to 
be considered as an appropriate criterion for assessing market power 
in cases under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.216 
In fact, a significant number of economists217 have investigated 
whether liner conferences in ocean shipping act as effective cartels by 
empirically testing whether the rate structure in ocean shipping is 
consistent with cost-based factors, the exercise of market power by 
conferences, or the exercise of market power by liner firms in a 
manner unrelated to the conference system. 
 
The results were conclusive that no statistically significant relationship 
exists between freight rates and the market share of the conference 
serving the route - which indicates that conferences do not act as 
                                       
215  TACA Decision op. cit. para 545 
216  Pozdnakova, 2008,, op. cit, p. 252 
217  Clyde, Paul S., Reitzes James D., “The Effectiveness of Collusion Under 
Antitrust Immunity, The Case of Liner Shipping Conference”, Bureau of Economics 
Staff Report Federal Trade Commission Washington, D.C., (2005), p. 1 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/232349.pdf  [accessed 2 April 2009] 
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perfect cartels maximizing the joint profits of their members. In any 
case, the frequent suggestion that liner conferences are long-lived and 
stable is misleading in two respects. 218  First, due to the fact that the 
conferences themselves typically lasted only a few years, and 
individual conference membership fluctuated along with carriers' 
business strategies and secondly, all the steps towards deregulation 
and  the  introduction  of  price  competition through confidential, 
individual service contracts have hastened the virtual demise of the  
conference  system in  less than ten  years.  
 
It is worth noting that due to the new legislation219 which abolishes 
conferences, there are no published rates available by freight-
forwarders’ associations.  
To begin with, Article 5(1) of the Consortia Regulation220 clarifies that 
the market share of a consortium is the sum of the individual market 
shares of the consortium members. In fact, this merely codifies the 
Commission’s reading of Regulation No 823/2000. The individual 
market share of a consortium member includes all volumes carried by 
that member, whether within the consortium in question or outside 
that consortium — be it on the member’s own vessels or on its behalf 
on third party vessels on the basis of a slot charter agreement or any 
other cooperation agreement (Article 5(2) Consortia Regulation). The 
                                       
218  Sagers Chris, "The Demise of Regulation in  Ocean Shipping: A Study in the 
Evolution of Competition Policy and the Predictive Power of Microeconomics", 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Volume 39 [2006] pp.779-818, in 
particular see p. 815 where 
219  Since there are no uniform rates published, and transport rates are 
negotiated in bilateral basis (shipper-shipowner), the only way that one can obtain 
freight statistics is by contacting individual shipping lines and asking for their rates. 
It comes as a natural consequence that now the market is absolutely fragmented. In 
addition, rates published by the shipping conference pre-October 2008 were 
‘notional’ and not linked to any economic trends. Up until the 1980s there were rate 
differentials for commodity (goods) type but that has broken down since then, and 
shipping conferences set the rates in bilateral negotiations with the shippers and 
freight-forwarders. Source: Email exchange with UK Freight Transport Association 
(www.fta.co.uk). See supra footnote 321. 
220  Consortia Regulation op. cit § 44 
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rationale behind this approach is that a consortium member cannot 
really be expected to compete with itself.221 
 
The above thresholds constitute indicators of dominance and a 
starting point for further investigation by the Commission; yet the 
30% mark was not based on any defined concerns relating to 
consortia which have a market share in excess of 30%. In particular, 
the Commission did not refer to any case where a consortium with a 
market share of more than 30% had given rise to concerns; moreover 
the Commission did not report any case where it had thought it 
appropriate to withdraw the benefits of the block exemption from a 
consortium with a less than 30% market shares.222  
 
In any event, market share size and/or thresholds continue to be an 
important indicator for the establishment of market power. Regardless 
of the exemption threshold, the more concentrated and stable223 a 
market is, the more likely it is to be uncompetitive224. The obverse is 
also true: the less concentrated the market, the less likely it suffers 
from collusion.225 I believe this is one of the most logical and crucial 
arguments. Despite its simplicity, the logic behind this argument is 
the practical inability of public enforcement institutions to measure 
the marginal costs and firms’ elasticity of demand.226 As the great 
majority of authors and the European Commission opine, liner 
alliances have the tendency to constantly grow their market share 
until they turn the market into a (natural) oligopoly. This statement is 
proven by studies, surveys, or empirical evidence by observing the 
                                       
221  Prisker (2010) op. cit p.10 
222  Levitt (2010) in Wareham (ed) op.cit p. 46 
223  Hoffmann-La Roche (1979), op. cit, p. 15-16  
224  Whish (2005), op. cit. p. 44 
225  Athanassiou (2009) in Antapassis Antonis, Athanassiou Lia, Røsæg Erik 
(eds) (2009) op. cit. p. 90 
226  The economic test of product substitution is regarded to determine 
dominance in the relevant market, a test of cross-elasticity of demand to determine 
whether the characteristics are specific. Where the relevant product market is 
narrow, the relative dominance of the undertaking is enlarged, see United Brands 
case. 
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absolute and relative market shares of conferences. But perhaps the 
best way to corroborate the systematic and substantial market 
power227 of consortia is by reminding oneself of their nature and 
objectives vis-à-vis the role of their competitors228. 
 
By juxtaposing this parameter with the conditions in tramp shipping 
(in relation to the high risk factor that exists in shipping) an essential 
difference is observed: the efforts to minimise risk and instability is a 
derivative of the pursuit of greater consolidation of market share. Here 
is where a paradox is created: it is the same purpose of rationalising 
services that turns the market into oligopoly as pursues durability 
and stability. To prove this, I refer to the example of (currently 
abolished) conferences. It is a fact that, with very few exceptions, 
conferences have lasted in all the trades where they were first 
established and they have maintained their market share positions 
until being abolished.  
 
Normally, the Commission understands market share as an important 
factor to measure market dominance and uses current market shares 
in its competitive analysis229. In Hoffman – La Roche (1979) the ECJ 
established that “...very large market shares are in themselves, and 
save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of 
dominant position. An undertaking, which has a very large market 
share and holds it for some time ... is by virtue of that share in a 
position of strength.”  
 
                                       
227  On the concept of market power and the link between market power and 
market structure in general. Bishop, S., M. Walker, The Economics of EC 
Competition Law: Concepts Application and Measurement, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd 
Edition 2002).  
228  See also §  
229  As to the calculation of market shares, see also Commission Notice on the 
definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, 
[OJ C 372, 9.12.1997], paras 54-55. See also Hovenkamp (2005) p.82, “...a large 
market share functions not only as a surrogate for market power but has also an 
independent role, as size of market share determines whether particular market 
behaviour makes economic sense or not”. 
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The subject is raised again in many cases230 and EC texts. Changes in 
historic market shares may provide useful information about the 
competitive process and the likely future importance of the various 
competitors, for instance, by indicating whether firms have been 
gaining or losing market shares. 
 
In any event, the Commission interprets market shares in the light of 
likely market conditions; for instance, if the market is highly dynamic 
in character and if the market structure is unstable due to innovation 
or growth.231 Changes in historic market shares may provide useful 
information about the competitive process and the likely future 
importance of the various competitors, for instance, by indicating 
whether firms have been gaining or losing market shares. In 
Philips/Agilent and in HP/Compaq cases the ECJ explored whether a 
high market share might not have been a proxy for market power in 
the rapidly adapting markets of electronic goods, where the changes in 
the market as a result of innovation were set to a 4-5 year cycle.232 
                                       
230  Hoffmann – La Roche & Co AG vs. Commission of the European 
Communities, ECJ Case 85/1976, ECR [1979] para 41. See also: CEWAL, 
Commission Decision 92/163/EEC, appeal before the CFI: Compagnie Maritime 
Belge (CEWAL I), Cowac and Ukwal, OJ [1993] L34 para 76. See also TACA Decision 
(Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement) 1999/243/EC of 16 September 1998 (Case 
IV/35.134) [OJ L 95, 1999] para 85. See also: Revised TACA Decision, Commission 
Decision 2003/68/EC of 14 November 2002 (Case COMP/37.396) [OJ L 26, 
31.1.2003], para 85 and 86. See also the TACA Judgment, CFI Joined Cases T-
191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v 
Commission (TACA Judgment) [2003] ECR II-3275 paras 924, 925 and 927 
231  Guidelines on the assessment of  horizontal  mergers under the  EC  Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings”; (OJ, C 31/03, 
2004] para 15 
232  Philips/Agilent Health Care Technologies [2001/C 9/05] paras 31-32, where 
the changes in the market, as a result of innovation are defined to a 4-5 years cycle. 
In particular the Court held: “...the cardiac ultrasound market is R&D intensive and 
largely driven by technological innovations which take place at relatively rapid pace, 
on average every 4-5 years”. See also: HP/Compaq, [2001/C 374/10] where again 
the volatility in the market affects the degree of market power. In fact, even a high 
market share of may not signify any market power. The Court held: “...The market 
investigation has however indicated that such a high market share is not a proxy for 
market power in this technologically rapidly evolving server market. Over the past 
five years, HP’s and Compaq’s market shares have been highly volatile, whilst Dell 
has continuously gained market share and has doubled its sales over the past three 
years. Dell, which enjoys substantial cost advantages derived from its built-to-order 
direct distribution model, is considered by the market as a dynamic and price 
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In addition to the aforementioned trend, current market shares are 
adjusted to reflect reasonably certain future changes; exit, entry or 
expansion.233. For example, the Maritime Competition Guidelines 
(2008)234 states that “market shares provide useful first indications of 
the market structure and of the competitive importance of the parties 
and their competitors” and “...the Commission interprets market shares 
in the light of the market conditions on a case-by-case basis.” 
Especially for liner shipping, “volume and/or capacity data have been 
identified as the basis for calculating market shares in several 
Commission decisions and Court judgments”. 
 
The matter is also referred to in the Guidelines on the assessment of 
Horizontal mergers (2004)235, whereby the issue of market share is 
understood as the “aggregate of pre & post merger shares”. In this 
context, any post-merger market shares have to be calculated on the 
assumption that the post-merger combined market share of the 
merging parties is the sum of their pre-merger market shares.236 
Hence, in view of the particularities of a complex and dynamic 
maritime sector, it is not only the current size of the market share 
that must be taken into account.  The other main issues, summarised 
by Pozdnakova (2008)237, are: 
i) stability of market share over a certain period of sufficient 
length; 
ii) its comparison to the competitors’ endurance; 
                                                                                                             
aggressive competitor with reliable and technologically advanced offerings...” para 
39. 
233  Astra Zeneca/Novartis [OJ 2000 C53/04] paras 150, 415. 
234  Maritime Competition Guidelines op. cit. para 33 
235  Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004/C 31/03], 
paras 8, 15, 29 and 70. 
236  When relevant, market shares may be adjusted, in particular, to account for 
controlling interests in other firms. See: Exxon/Mobil, [1999/C 127/03] paras 446-
458; Boeing/Hughes, [2000/C 157/03] paras 60-79; Hutchison/RCPM/ECT, 
[2001/C76/10] paras 66-75 
237  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p 254 
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iii) the collective or individual nature of the market share held 
by the carrier.  
 
Basically, there is no rule to easily approximate the market share size. 
So far, economists have not developed simple and effective rules for 
controlling dominant firm conduct. Accordingly, the criterion of 
market share may be a helpful benchmark in the absence of a 
consolidated policy; the view of the Commission is more or less 
established. For shipping, the Commission correlates market share 
with other factors that may contribute to market power. 
In the case of the liner conferences, the EU accepted that, although 
conferences have lost some of their share in recent years, they still 
have a strong position238 in the market - enjoying between 40 and 70 
per cent of the market share in the main trades. In contrast to this 
view, other economists239 argue that a market share of between 40 
and 60 per cent would not create a dominant position. Thus, it is left 
to economists to interpret the boundaries of a dominant position, 
while at the same time the legislators, i.e. the EU Commission and the 
Council, accept one position or another, as their own position (as 
discussed earlier) has varied over the years.240  
                                       
238  Brooks, M. R., Sea Change in Liner Shipping: Regulation and Managerial 
Decision-making in a Global Industry, [Elsevier Science & Technology, 2000] pp. 3-4 
and 206. Also see: EU Commission discussion paper of July 2005, European 
Commission, Paragraph 89, citing in support of the Erasmus report, see supra 
3.3.7.2 
239  Bonassies, P., Le règlement sur les conditions d’ application des article 85 et 
86 du trait aux transports maritimes in Bonassies et al, in Shipping law Faces 
Europe: European Policy Competition and Environment, International Colloquium 
[MAKLU, Brylant, Brussels, 1995], p. 189-210; and Blanco, 2007, op. cit, p. 457. 
240  In 1985, when the Block Exemption for Liner Conferences was first adopted, 
the Commission held that a 60-70 per cent market share is an acceptable 
percentage for a liner conference.  The remaining 30-40 per cent was reserved for 
tramp maritime companies.  See European Commission 1985 Report paragraph 63. 
In its early cases, the Commission dealt with extremely high market shares in 
markets that were largely closed to competition. In its Decision of French-West 
African Shipowners’ Committees (with a market share of almost 100 per cent), the 
Commission found that the Committees created a true collective monopoly on top of 
the liner conferences in trades in question and had abused their dominant position 
according to article 102 TFEU; Commission Decision 92/262/EEC of French-West 
African Shipowners’ Committees, OJ [1992] L134. See also AKZO below § 456. 
Hence, a limit of 50 per cent is thereafter considered as a sufficient platform, and 
that if it is exceeded it is highly probable to constitute dominance.  
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Those distinctive approaches are apparent again in CEWAL case. In 
CEWAL, the Commission established the existence of a dominant 
position with a market share of 90 per cent. Nevertheless, within 
CEWAL, a more compliant stance to the traditional aspect of 
competition law has been established. One could say that it is the first 
step toward the abolition of competition law immunity in shipping, 
completed in 2009. 
 
Thus, in CEWAL, the Commission put the members of the conference 
in a collective position hence, declaring that the market share of 70 
per cent is enough to establish a dominant position. In this way, the 
Commission has taken steps to align with the acquis. Blanco (2007)241 
refers to this acquis as an ‘orthodoxy’ that exists in the heavy industry 
and tertiary sector of the economy, converging the standards between 
maritime and inland companies and thus adopting the rules 
established earlier; 
 
The cases mentioned exhibit a trend toward progressive reduction in 
the standards required for a dominant market share, and the 
introduction of other factors that contribute to market power. At first, 
this can logically be conceived by the progressive erosion of the 
market shares that had been observed in liner conferences where 
statistics had shown a reduction in market shares, as they are being 
substituted by independent liners or tramp services.  This may 
apparently be connected to the volatility of the maritime cycles. Thus, 
unless a merger had occurred among liners that would strengthen 
their market share, their share would eventually decrease. This, 
however, does not signify that market power and shares are not 
correlated.  Although the issue of effective competition has been raised 
by the liner companies, the EU Courts (the CFI followed by the ECJ) 
have held that a large market share may reveal a dominant position; 
                                       
241  Blanco (2007) op. cit. p. 458 
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in contrast, a reduction of even very substantial market shares cannot, 
in itself, prove the absence of a dominant position.242  
 
In P&O Royal Nedlloyd,243 the Commission confirmed that actual 
competition did exist because the post merger share of 30 percent of 
the market was in the hands of two independents and cleared the 
merger between the parties. The Commission went on further to 
investigate the effect on that market by the combined share of P&O 
Nedlloyd on the trades in question. In the absence of a sizeable 
market share it emphasised the matter of the link between the merger 
and the conference of which the parties were members in order to 
confirm that effective competition could be also protected. In this case, 
again, the market share worked as a possible presumption of 
dominance and, because it was low, the merger was cleared. The 
cases of EANZC and ANZELA are important since the Commission 
evaluated the degree of effective and actual competition in a 
conference irrespective of their market share. The Commission 
examined common market shares of Nedlloyd in EANZC244 and 
ANZELA245, and recognised that there was only effective competition, 
and not actual competition, despite the fact that the routes covered 
only between 50 and 60 per cent of the market - while the 
independent operators had a combined market share between of 15 
and 20 per cent. 
 
The Commission has followed the P&O Nedlloyd methodology, 
studying the consequences of the notified operation for the market 
position of the conferences and consortia (in addition to that of the 
notifying shipowners), it has not deemed that market share is linked 
to possible dominance and its abuse. Also, in the MAERSK / 
                                       
242  CEWAL I (1996), op. cit. § 102 paras 77-81. 
243  P&O Royal Nedlloyd op.cit paras 63 and 65 
244  EANZC Conference (between Northern Europe, Australia and New Zealand), 
Nedlloyd (1996 case), op. cit, paras 88-101 
245  ANZELA Conference (between the Mediterranean and Australia and New 
Zealand), Nedlloyd (1996 case), op. cit, paras 88-101 
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SAFMARINE case, despite the substantial market share which the 
shipowners possessed (55 - 65 per cent), they were found not to be 
reinforcing their market position.246  
Moreover it was stated that market share was not enough for the 
proposed merger to enjoy a dominant position.247 Likewise, in 
MAERSK SEA-LAND, as regards the TACA, USSEC248 and IPBCC249 
conferences, all of which had market shares of below 50 per cent, the 
Commission reached the same conclusion.250  
 
In contrast to this, in the EATA251 and FETTSCA252 cases where the 
conferences in question held 86 and 80 per cent of the market shares 
respectively, the Commission refused to grant exemptions since they 
did not fulfil the first condition of Article 101(3). Yet again, the 
Commission did not take into account the arguments of the 
shipowners253 referring to the critical mass and sustainability of their 
                                       
246  MAERSK / SAFMARINE  Prior notification of a concentration, Case No 
IV/M.1474 (MAERSK / SAFMARINE) para 24EMPTY REFERENCE 
247   ibid. 
248  United States South Europe Conference 
249  The Indian subcontinent shipping consortium, known as the India Pakistan 
Bangladesh Ceylon Conference (IPBCC); it has also been referred to as the 
‘Karmoham Conference’.  
250  MAERSK SEA-LAND (1999) case, op. cit, Paragraph 21 
251  Europe Asia Trades Agreement (EATA). See Commission decision EATA 
(1999) 99/485/EC. OJ [1999] L193 p. 23, paragraphs 80, 188 and 234. It is 
illustrative of the Commission’s approach in this respect that it has never accepted 
the need for ‘stabilisation agreements’ or ‘capacity management programmes’. 
Agreements of this kind, under which participating lines agree not to use a 
proportion of their capacity, are inimical to the basic aims of the EC competition 
rules. Their sole purpose is to increase prices by limiting output. As mentioned, 
such agreements have been condemned by the Commission in its TAA and EATA 
decisions. It should be emphasised that the fact that the guidelines adopted by the 
parties to the agreement are described as being purely ‘voluntary’ will not cause the 
Commission to view such guidelines in a more favourable light.  
252  Far East Trade Tariff Charges and Surcharges Agreement (FETTCSA). See 
Commission decision FETTCSA (2000) case 2000/627/EC, OJ [2000] L268, p. 1 
253  Ibid. Paragraph 36. According to their position ‘the share of the FEFC on the 
north Europe/Far East trades had by 1990 fallen to approximately 59 per cent and 
the market sharing agreement was terminated for the principal reason that the 
parties to it no longer had sufficient critical mass in the NE/FE trades to regulate 
reserve capacity in a way that would contribute the stabilisation of trades’. Likewise, 
in Wallenius Lines merger with Hyundai, the Commission examined the 
compatibility with EU competition law in a particular trade between the merged 
companies and a third party ‘NYK’. The WALLNYK agreement had to be terminated, 
based again on the market power assumption: should Hyundai join, the trade would 
produce a significant change in the market shares (that would reach 80-85 per cent 
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dominant positions. In other words, the argument about the stability 
that conferences serve, i.e. the fundamental reason and justification 
for the block exemption under (the currently abolished) Regulation 
4056/86254, has been repealed by the new law, Council Regulation 
1419/2006. From the shipowners’ point of view, this results in 
destructive competition on the already hard-pressed ocean shipping 
lines; from the EU Commission’s point of view, it is a step towards 
actual and effective competition, better freight rates and a measure 
that responds well to the demands of the developing world.255 
 
I deem that the stance of the Commission with regard to market share 
is governed by a degree of uncertainty due to the fact that its analysis 
has not focused on the exact definition of the dominant position per 
se. Instead, it valued only the level of actual competition; hence the 
criteria that constitute a dominant position have not been made clear 
in case law. Perhaps it would be also wise to consider market shares 
in relation to the extent of competitive rivalry over time, without 
disregarding the other surrounding factors, and examining the degree 
of contestability within a market. 
 
Therefore, a large market share may not necessarily be indicative of 
an uncompetitive market as is evident generally within the shipping 
industry. We already know from the methodology that is followed by 
the Commission in Merger Control cases that market share plays an 
important role - but not a solely determining one - in the exercise for 
confirming post-merger actual and effective competition. For instance, 
                                                                                                             
compared to the 55 per cent that was the pre-merger condition). Although the 
Commission in ANZELA and EANZC cases have introduced the concepts of actual 
competition, in WALLNYK the EC returns to the ‘conservative’ philosophy of 
evaluating a conference’s compatibility with Article 101 based on the market share 
by establishing a platform of 50-65 per cent market share depending on the case. 
254  The justification for the block exemption in essence assumes that 
conferences bring stability, ensuring exporters reliable services which cannot be 
achieved by less restrictive means. See: Council Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 op. 
cit. para 3 
255  Townley Chris, “The Liner Shipping Block Exemptions in European Law: Has 
the Tide Turned?”, World Competition Volume 27(1) [2004] pp. 107-153 
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the endurance of the competitors and their inherent capacity to 
respond to the behaviour of the dominant firm, as per point (ii) above, 
is also a relevant concern. I agree with the CFI analysis made in 
AIRTOURS256 that the power of the competitors to respond to anti-
competitive strategies of the dominant party is also an essential part 
of the analysis. Though the Court did not use the word “inherent”, it 
indirectly defined the actual abuse in relation to the capacity of the 
competitor to respond to the tactics of the dominant party (not 
objectively). An analysis, then, must determine whether the 
concentration alone generates enough market power to discourage 
(actual and potential) competitors from making an expansion; market 
power would be identified as the factor that renders expansion for 
competitors intrinsically more risky than the strategy of remaining 
small and buying capacity on competitive markets257. In other words, 
an analysis must investigate foreseeable reactions of current and 
future competitors, as well as of consumers, so as to not jeopardise 
the results expected from the large operator’s common policy – that, 
after all, aims to rationalise their economies of scale. This will allow us 
to confirm whether a consortium is abusing its dominant position or if 
its behaviour is merely a response to market trends. 
 
Another example: a consortium may reduce available cargo capacity to 
a level below what is required to adjust to anticipated trends in 
demand. The question here is whether the competitors can respond 
effectively to such a reduction in capacity, put on to the market by the 
large operators to a level below estimated demand, by increasing their 
capacity to take advantage of the opportunities inherent in a situation 
                                       
256  See supra § 149 
257  AIRTOURS (2002) op. cit. para 212. “the package holiday industry is one in 
which alternative business strategies may produce good results and one in which 
there is little room for operators of intermediate size...undertakings may either 
operate on a small scale and buy on competitive markets the capacity which they 
need in order to supply package holidays (airline seats and hotel beds). Alternatively, 
they may decide to produce a large volume of package holidays. Those undertakings 
will nevertheless find it risky to buy in large quantities of capacity (particularly 
airline seats) on competitive markets, which is why it is necessary for them to 
become vertically integrated, at least in air transport services.” 
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of overall under-supply and thereby counteract the creation of a 
collective dominant position. An analysis must establish if competitors 
can actually counterbalance the dominant undertaking with services 
that shall fill in the gap in such a way as to render the dominant 
oligopoly unviable. In AIRTOURS258 what has also been demonstrated 
that a large market share, even combined with vertical integration, 
does not necessarily lead to viability and efficiency. Hence, a correct 
analysis would be to see whether the behaviour of the dominant 
undertaking is capable enough to impede competitors to invest and 
expand further259, and confirm to what degree the practices of the 
dominant firm make expansion intrinsically riskier for the competitors 
than the strategy of remaining small and buying capacity on other 
competitive markets.260 
 
Once more I revert to the issue of time context as examined on page 
126. For this reason, market share makes better sense in relation to 
its fluctuations over a period of time. Perhaps it is necessary to 
reconsider the conclusion that a reduced market share may not be 
equally important, in contrast to what was held in CEWAL I. temporal 
market share correlation may thus indicate that the market in 
question is in fact competitive, even though during the period in 
question it may have had a very high market share (exceeding the de 
minimis platform). A large market share may be quickly whittled down, 
due to the phenomenon of maritime cycles and the recession cycles of 
the global economy, even if a maritime firm makes excessive profits in 
an industry for a certain period; in consequence, other firms enter the 
market. Based on this, operators constantly review their schedules 
and services. It is a fact that shipping services are provided by means 
of a highly mobile factory, each unit of which supplies capacity in 
large discrete ‘lumps’ (e.g. cargo hulls/tanks or available container 
                                       
258 Ibid para 212 
259 Ibid para 212. 
260  See also Munari Francesco (2012), op. cit.§ 26 p. 23  
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capacity etc.) that can either accommodate cargo or remain empty, 
failing to pay the investment. 
 
There is another aspect of concentration that should be considered: a 
consortium that includes small firms becomes the vehicle for them to 
access greater benefits, giving them the opportunity to acquire an 
indirect critical mass. Blitz (1993)261 argues that conferences also help 
to coordinate their members’ joint investments and thereby allow 
small firms in this industry to exploit vast network economies (akin to 
those in other transportation industries) that they could not capture 
on their own.  
 
In the main, I am inclined to agree with the established view, however 
I also evaluate the importance of correlating the market share in a 
specific time context. The main meter of the market power of a liner 
shipping conference is its ability to deviate profitability from marginal 
cost pricing. Hence, measuring marginal cost level should be the most 
appropriate base assessing the market power of a given company.262 
At the moment, it is very difficult to effectively measure profit margin 
in shipping for reasons analysed263 in combination with the large 
market share and the capacity to withstand competitive pressure 
through the maritime cycles (statistical element of duration.) 
 
                                       
261  Blitz, David ‘Ocean Shipping Economics: Free Trade and Antitrust 
Implications’, Contemporary Policy Issues, Vol. 11 (1993), pp. 69-80. It is argued (by 
whom? If by Blitz, then why not cite him directly? Also, this footnote seems almost a 
direct repetition of the statements made in the text—why include both?) that 
conferences also help to coordinate their members’ joint investments and thereby 
allow the historically small firms in this industry to exploit vast network economies 
(akin to those in other transportation industries) that small firms could not capture 
on their own. <www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-9280363_ITM> 
[accessed  3 April 2009] 
262  Herbert Hovenkamp’s hornbook, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of 
Competition and its Practice, (MN West, St Paul, 3rd Edition, 2005), pp. 80-81. Also 
see: TACA decision, op. cit, § 920-921 
263  Infra section 2.2.3.1 Unfair and Excessive High Freight Rates). 
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2.2.1.4 Relative Market Shares among Competing Shipping 
Companies 
 
Relative market shares are just as important as absolute market 
shares; that is, the market shares of the closest competitors to the 
consortium in a dominant position. In the section above, the strength 
of dominance with regard to the actual market share held by the 
independents and other transport operators compared to those of the 
consortium.  Relative market shares that are held by competitors of 
the liner conference operators may be affecting the competition 
conditions. The independent liner firms or firms that participate in a 
consortium negotiate their rates with shippers through the 
independent action provision. Since CEWAL (1992), "independents" 
are defined those that do not belong to a consortium (or a conference). 
This definition should be expanded to include tramp companies, as 
they successfully contribute to competition. 
  
The AIRTOURS case sets interesting criteria, critically assessing 
combined transport and tourism services with a focus on effective 
competition. The Court examined, in the anti-competitive situation 
anticipated by the Commission, whether the hundreds of small 
operators already present on the market, taken as a whole, can 
respond effectively to a reduction in capacity put on the market by the 
large tour operators to a level below estimated demand by increasing 
their capacity to take advantage of the opportunities inherent in a 
situation of overall under-supply; and, whether they can thereby 
counteract the creation of a collective dominant position.264 The Court 
found that regardless the size of each of the competitors, the fact that 
the competitors are numerous signifies that there is actual and 
effective competition. I use the AIRTOURS case as a model, as I would 
like to diverge for a moment from the traditional perspective where a 
                                       
264  op. cit. paras 213-214 
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confirmed abuse is a self-standing reason that distorts competition. 
Small operators, potential competitors, and consumers can 
counterbalance an oligopoly and their reactions are usually 
underestimated in study. 
I argue that, in shipping, both abuse and market power must exist in 
order to cause distortion of competition and damage to the 
consumers. In AIRTOURS265, the Commission had to establish that 
smaller tour operators would be incapable of successfully countering 
the creation of a collective dominant position. In practice, the ECJ 
appreciated266 that the market in question featured several small 
operators which could increase their market share, suggesting they 
were “extremely keen to make the most of any opportunities afforded as 
a result of the leading tour operators making capacity reductions 
unconnected with foreseeable trends in demand”. 
 
Competition from independents is the most important ‘limitation’ the 
development of market power that consortia face,267 and the most 
necessary for the fulfilment of the fourth condition of the exemption in 
Article 101(3). The market shares of independents (in the liner 
shipping sector) have gradually increased since the introduction of 
containers at roughly the same time as the UNCTAD Code was 
adopted. From 10 per cent in 1979 (when the Regulation 4056/86 was 
being debated), the independent market share had reached 22-40 per 
cent by 1983268; exceptionally, independents enjoyed market shares 
reaching 70 per cent269 in Canadian trades. Hypothetically, an 
independent which controlled 20 percent of the market would not be 
adhering to its traditional role. Based on this evidence, one can 
assume that a liner outside a consortium would find it difficult to 
                                       
265  AIRTOURS (2002) op.cit. para 208 
266  Ibid. para 220 
267  Blanco, 2007, op. cit, p. 463 
268  House of Lords (1983): Competition Policy: Shipping, (House of Lords. Select 
Committee on the European Communities, Session 1985-86, 3rd Report), [HMSO, 
London 1983], Paragraphs 18-19 
269  Also see: Sletmo and Holste, op. cit, p. 257 
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survive unless it completely changed its organisational structure and 
shareholders’ profiles. On the contrary, belonging to a consortium is 
in a large liner company’s interests, should the principals wish to 
maintain their market position and minimise market erosion. 
 
Progressively, in EC competition law, the market share held by 
independents has evolved to be a criterion (though not an important 
one) in determining the dominance of the bigger service providers. In 
various cases, the EU Commission has emphasised the factor of 
market share dominance and, for ancillary reasons, only has relied on 
the share of independents270 per se. 
 
Until their abolition, conferences could impose direct or indirect 
control over the trades; consequently, they had access to capital with 
good terms (low interest rates) and introduced new and better 
vessels.271 In practice, every shipowner secures access to capital by 
providing creditors only with a charterparty. Better finance brought 
                                       
270  In CEWAL I (1992) case, ‘Grimaldi’ and ‘Cobelfret’ (the competitors of 
Compagnie Maritime Belge) were found to hold only 2(should this say 20?) per cent 
of the market. Though this number is reasonable, the Commission decided to put 
forward the argument that market share of the independents and that of the 
conference was enormous. See in CEWAL I paragraphs 57 and 59. Likewise in TAA, 
where the five most important independent shipowners held around 20 percent of 
the market, the decisive factor behind the decision was the extent of collusive 
agreements between the conference members. Evergreen Marine Corp, the main 
competitor, held a noticeable market share - but was deemed incapabale of exerting 
pressure on the conference. See Commission Decision TAA (1994) paragraphs 
146,148 and 427. In P&O Nedlloyd (1996) though the share of the conference had a 
35-40 per cent, none of the independents’ share exceeded 5 percent. See 
Commission Decision P&O/Royal Nedlloyd (1996) paragraphs 68-69 and 73. In 
TACA Decision (1998), despite the large market share of the independents that was 
around 30 percent, the conference was found to hold a dominant position in the 
market. See Commission Decision TACA Decision (1998) paragraphs 244-266. 
Finally in FETTCSA, though the independent liner companies did not disclose their 
exact market share (it is estimated that together they make up some 20 percent of 
the market), the Commission overcame the lack of evidence and reached a decision 
without them. The major criterion of market dominance has been the merger of the 
FEFC and EATA conferences into a greater association, the FETTCSA. 
271  The argument of quality, as expressed by the ELAA, is supportive of the 
argument that the liner shipping market is not homogeneous. The ELAA contests 
the view that liner shipping services are all the same. The level of quality of service 
differs. Shippers have described as their most critical performance factors network 
and delivery, followed by price. See: ELAA Response to Issues Paper, [30 October 
2006], p. 6 <http://www.elaa.net/files/pdf/ELAAResponseIssuesPaper.pdf> 
[accessed 20 January 2009] 
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better ships; better ships brought better quality and longer COAs. The 
rule with the established consortia, however, is that they enjoy better 
access to capital compared to the independents and this works as a 
barrier to entry. In contrast, independents and new entrants settle for 
the confined part of the market allowed to them by the conferences, 
affecting their capacity to raise capital. This works as a residual 
barrier to entry for any smaller competitor; should it be combined with 
practices and intent to eliminate competition by the dominant 
consortium, then it is an aggravating factor for the consortium. 
Historically, the independents’ market share was minimal, in both 
collective and individual terms. This, however, has changed recently, 
as independent companies establish themselves in certain trades. 
 
Though there is no balance between consortia and independents, the 
situation becomes evidently more unbalanced as soon as market 
entrants arrive in the market in question, increasing the cargo 
carrying capacity.  
 
Nonetheless, one must recall that the revenues of independent 
carriers always exceed those of the conference carriers due to 
flexibility of operation. Therefore, it is possible that the following 
situation arises: 
 
- A carrier currently operating outside the said geographical 
market would like to enter the market as an independent; 
- If it can afford to cover its low operational cost, it will negotiate 
for a lower price, deducting revenues from the consortium below 
their operating cost; the consortium would have to exit the 
market; 
- This may cause the voluntary exit of one or some of the 
incumbents; 
- Once a new entrant is established, the competing independent 
carrier could find it profitable to join the consortium, since a 
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gap would have been created by the withdrawal of a conference 
member; 
- This would consequently reduce the number of independents by 
one, and the profit of all carriers would once again increase. 
 
The above hypothesis was first raised as a possibility by Blanco 
(2007)272. Although Blanco (examining the matter of block exemption 
in liner conferences) considers it very unlikely that free competition 
will encourage single undertaking monopolies, he acknowledges that 
an immediate prohibition of conferences may ultimately have no 
practical effect if the oligopolies are not tackled head on by competent 
authorities.273 
Conversely, Bredima (2010)274, in her plea for global governance 
competition rules appropriate to a global industry, disagrees [with 
emphasis] with the view of those who believe that the abolition of 
protective regimes will be beneficial for the industry as well as the 
consumer. She supports that any effort of unilateral deregulation in 
the EU, without consultation with the rest of the world, may not bring 
about the intended (competitive) effects; she holds that the abolition of 
conferences will certainly lead to oligopoly in the market. Wareham275 
believes that the EU reforms on the rules governing maritime 
transport may turn out to have disastrous implications for liner 
trades, finally leading to the shrinking of the industry, creating 
oligopolies in lieu of free competition. I also take into account the 
opinion of Allsop (2009)276 that denotes the importance of uniform 
                                       
272  Blanco (2007) op. cit. pp. 552,582-589 
273  Ibid. p. 589 
274  Bredima Anna, “Shoot first, ask questions later: International implications 
resulting from the unilateral abolitions of liner conferences in the EU” in Wareham 
(ed) 2010 op. cit. p. 64 
275  Wareham (2010) in Wareham (ed) op. cit. p. 65 
276  Allsop James, "Maritime Law-The Nature and Importance of Its International 
Character", Tulane Maritime Law Journal, Volume 34,  [2009-2010] pp. 555-590. He 
supports (p. 586) that: “...it was the threat of impending  fragmentation  of 
international sea commerce by inconsistent and idiosyncratic  national legislation 
that led even the  imperial  power of Great Britain to  recognise  its  national 
interests  in  a coherent international bargain.  The appreciation of this background 
should then inform the interpretation of the Hague Rules as a balanced attempt as 
114 
 
rules in the maritime industry, given its global character. I observe 
that the authors above do not object to the mindset of free competition 
that the EU wishes to promote in liner shipping. I would say that their 
concern is concentrated on three issues: 
- A global industry must not be legislatively fragmented, in 
contrast to the pioneering jurisdictional intervention made by 
the EU; 
- The true properties of the sector have to been taken in to 
account, dismissing thus strict interpretation of article 101 
TFEU as simplistic. 
- The potential risk that a unilateral change could create to the 
stability of the transport system must be considered in 
legislation/judicial findings etc. 
I agree with the concerns of the aforementioned authors and their 
views are perhaps confirmed by the current slump in the freight 
market and the world recession that has plunged several container 
companies into severe financial difficulties277. Both authors, 
supported by economists, suggest that mergers, acquisitions and 
joint ventures in shipping “do not, in principle, create monopoly or 
market power or restrict competition”.278 Recently, the FMC in its 
recent liner transport Report confirms the assumptions of the 
critics, as it shows that the freight rates have fallen, whereas 
concentration in the market has increased.279  
                                                                                                             
far as they went to compromise these differences, with due  recognition  of the  
contours  and  context  of particular compromises”. 
277  I believe that the opinion of Bredima (2010) has special significance given 
her professional and academic status. Dr Anna Bredima is the acting head of EU 
Affairs at the Union of Greek Shipowners (UGS). As it is known, the UGS, in their 
overwhelming majority, are dry–liquid bulk tramp carriers, which, logically, would 
have every interest for liner conferences to be abolished. Nevertheless, a criticism of 
the EU regulatory effort arrives from an unexpected source; we thus receive a legal 
risk assessment that disagrees with the official EU Commission competitiveness 
prediction. 
278  Panayides, Photis, Stephen Gong, ‘Consolidation, mergers and acquisitions, 
in the shipping industry’ in Handbook of the Maritime Economics and Business, ed. 
by Costas Grammenos, (London: Lloyds of London Press, 2002) p. 603 
279  Federal Maritime Commission, Bureau Of Trade Analysis, Study of the 2008 
Repeal of the Liner Conference Exemption from European Union Competition Law 
[January 2012, uploaded in February 2013, accessed in 20 Feb 2013], para 17. The 
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I investigate the matter further in this paper, and attempt to explain 
the pattern that could lead to unintended concentration in the 
shipping markets. I examine the matter from the economic point view, 
borrowing elements from the equilibrium theories of Pareto and Nash.  
 
Bearing in mind Nash’s theory on actors' strategies, if certain 
conditions are satisfied, then equilibrium280 could exist in the 
strategies among the Consortium / Independents actors; however, a 
substitution of equilibrium in mixed strategies is observed. In such 
equilibrium, firms constantly try to take each other by surprise, in 
ways similar to circling behaviour, so that no stable number of 
carriers exists. In a simplified approach, the market could then be 
described as circling dynamic behaviour among a few firms.281 
 
2.2.1.5 Relative Market Shares of Independents and the 
Exogenous Shock of Global Recession. 
 
Nowadays, independent liner companies offer high quality services 
with adequate modern vessels, and have eroded the oligopoly of the 
traditional liner companies by matching their levels of service. 282 They 
                                                                                                             
Report examines the post repeal market effects. From the findings it appears to have 
been a small increase in market concentration– a result that suggests that, in the 
absence of a forum for carrier discussions and information sharing, market 
concentration may increase slightly more rapidly. Moreover, the Report denotes a 
relative decline in market share stability that may be related to rate volatility and 
market concentration. Market share stability noticeably declined in the Far 
East/North Europe trade in the post-repeal period. That was also the trade in which 
relative rate volatility and market concentration appeared to have increased. In 
contrast, there was increased market share stability in the Far East/US trade. 
280  Infra § Nash 
281  Ibid., p. 174 
282  Independents’ market policies have changed in the last decade. It may be 
wrongly deemed that the traditional structure of a dominant conference service and 
a small contingent of opportunistic outsiders (attracting a comparatively small 
market share by offering an inferior service at discounted prices) still represent the 
situation. However, this model is no longer applicable. As already mentioned above, 
though conferences remain an important factor in many trades, a decline in 
conference share (and a corresponding rise in non-conference market share) does 
not necessarily translate into appreciably greater competition since many 
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have undermined the capacity of the traditional liner companies to 
collude and generally challenged the role of the traditional liner 
companies as undisputed leaders in the liner market.283 They have, 
however, paid a price to do so. 
 
The general principles of maritime economics and, in particular, of the 
freight and newbuilding markets are relevant to understanding how 
independent liner companies have managed to increase their own 
market share over time. The main issue for an independent operator is 
providing a service that is of equal or higher quality than that offered 
by other liner companies. In order to achieve this, independent 
operators must offer bigger and faster vessels and attempt to realise 
economies of scale. This results primarily in borrowing for the renewal 
and the expansion of the fleet, or for meeting demands.  
 
In reality, however, even this argument is weakened by the economic 
evidence. The fact that almost all shipowners are flexible enough to 
manage their fleet, either as members of a joint venture or as 
independents, is often overlooked.284 
Within the OECD Report (2002)285 it is mentioned that – in contrast to 
what is believed by theoreticians of neo-classical competition law 
                                                                                                             
independent operators have every incentive to price off conference rates rather than 
competing vigorously and independently with conferences on price. Furthermore, 
many smaller independent operator services may be inferior to those offered by 
Conference lines in terms of geographic scope and frequency of service. See: Meyrick 
& Associates, ‘Economics of Liner Shipping Conferences: A Critical Review of the 
Literature and its Implications for Australian Policy’. Australian Productivity 
Commission Inquiry into International Liner Cargo Shipping (A review of Part X of the 
Trade Practices Act) [April 1999], p. 239 
 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=281755> [accessed 20 May 
2009];  Also see: OECD Report (2002), op. cit, pp. 22-23, 65 and Figure 4.6 
283  OECD (2002), op. cit, pp. 20, 44 
284  Blanco, 2007, op. cit, p. 467 
285  OECD Report (2002), op. cit, pp. 31-32. As mentioned in the report, Asia-US 
eastbound rates in 2001 were almost 12% lower than the 1993 levels and rates in 
the opposite direction (US-Asia westbound) were nearly 46% lower. Corresponding 
figures for the Europe-Asia-Europe and Europe-US-Europe trades were -35% 
(eastbound)/-23% (westbound) and -42% (eastbound)/-12% (westbound), 
respectively. In contrast, rates for the commodities carried in 2002 are significantly 
lower than those in 1993. With regard to mega-container vessels (economy of grand 
scale) another study shows that both Asia-Europe and Asia-North America routes 
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concerning dominance and price policy – freight rates clearly follow a 
deflationary course. This volatility could be a natural result of 
changing trading patterns between the regions involved, and a 
consequence of changing equilibria in world trade - subsequently, the 
demand for maritime transport from these areas fluctuates.286 Thus, 
the particular drop in rates was aggravated by competition from many 
independents that faced the same need to fill their ships with cargo in 
these unbalanced trades at the same time freights were battered by 
deflationary trends in contrast to the inflation that prevailed that 
period. 287 
 
A set of conclusions can be drawn from this: independents (tramp and 
liner) were subject to higher pressure than their consortia 
competitors, and had to lower their tariffs for reasons of preservation; 
competition since has been effective, since all parties were forced to 
proceed to mass discounts in order to defend themselves against 
market uncertainty; finally, when this crisis passed and the global 
economy emerged out of the recession, the share of the independents 
                                                                                                             
were competitive in all scenarios, while it was viable for North American trade only if 
the feeder and freight costs were low. See: Akio Imai, Etsuko Nishimura, Stratos 
Papadimitriou, Miaojia Liu ‘The economic viability of container mega-ships’ 
Transportation Research Part E (Logistics and Transport), [Electronic Article Elsevier 
Ltd 2009], p. 20 
<http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/repository/90000084.pdf> [accessed 20 August 2009] 
286  OECD (2002), op. cit, p. 31. Accordingly, the Asian economic crisis of 1997 
caused demand for US and European exports to drop, freeing up capacity on Asian 
in-bound routes. At the same time, as a result of currency devaluation and 
competitive advantage due to lower production costs, Asian exports towards the 
United States and Europe were buoyed by growth. Carriers, in order to supply the 
capacity necessary to carry Asian exports, were faced with excess capacity on the 
return leg (and a corresponding need to reposition empty containers). The overall 
capacity was also growing over this period, as liner operators were receiving delivery 
of larger ships ordered on the premise of continued steady economic growth in Asia. 
The result was that carriers slashed prices in an effort to attract and/or retain 
steadily dwindling cargo. 
287  One has to take into account that the real income from the freight rates 
have been reduced, since, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
global inflation levels between 2000-2008 produced an aggregate of 20-30% within 
the period mentioned (the annual average was 2%-3%). See: IMF, World Economic 
Outlook Globalization and Inflation, [2006] and [2008], pp. 10 and 5 respectively. 
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/pdf/weo0406.pdf> and 
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf> [accessed 23 March 
2009] 
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had not been reduced.288 The said crisis led to another phenomenon: 
after 2001, South-East, East and Far East Asia witnessed an 
unprecedented growth explosion. The Asian economies have managed 
to penetrate the Western markets with products based, in part, on a 
combination of cheap production and low transport costs. 
Facts have proven that the question mentioned above can create only 
false dilemmas. Based on the UNCTAD (2004) Report,289 the market 
had recovered rapidly, and in the second quarter of 2004, the freight 
rates surged. The cause of the surge in freight rates was a shortage of 
vessels and containers, caused by the previous recession phase.  
Relatively inelastic demand-and-supply reflected the rapid recovery of 
the global economy. It is apparent that this shortage directly led to 
increased prices as the shipowners had to offset the investment in 
new vessels (by building, purchasing or leasing containers or vessels). 
It is also evident that the shortage of supply forced conferences to re-
arrange vessels, a fact that led to the further reduction of services. 
  
                                       
288  See Maersk/Safmarine (1999) where Maersk, an independent ship owner, 
purchased Safmarine, member of the Europe South Africa Conference (ESAC). See: 
Commission Decision Maersk/Safmarine (1999), op.cit. para 28 
289  UNCTAD, Transport Newsletter no 24, Q2 [2004], pp. 11-14. It (by whom? 
Same as earlier note) is reported that ‘a severe shortage of containerships is forcing 
a group of major carriers to plan a new Asia-Europe service deploying just seven 
vessels rather than the usual eight. The unusual configuration is a direct reflection 
of an unprecedented squeeze on tonnage availability, with the carriers in question 
unable to find enough ships to meet their preferred requirements. Between March 
and April 2004, the index rose another 5.4 per cent. The annual increase up to that 
month varied between +54% and +95%, depending on vessel types. 
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Figure 5 Baltic Dry Index Volatility 1999-2012 
 
This kind of “correlation effect” resulted in the rise of rates within a 
very short period of time. 
For example, demand did not grow in 2001 although 2001 was 
followed by an extraordinary boom - significantly higher than the 
expectations of most industry experts, in following the global 
recession. In 2012 demand has collapsed290, and in September 2012 
the Baltic Dry Index (BDIY)291 was at an all time low.  
As a policy statement, I believe the EU Policy must focus on how to 
support the European fleet against natural and inherent market 
threats that work as self-regulating properties; dominant position 
when the index has reached 662 points is difficult to be 
established.292  
  
                                       
290  Baltic Dry Index Chart. See figure 5.  
291  The index provides an assessment of the price of moving the major raw 
materials by sea. Taking in 23 shipping routes measured on a timecharter basis, the 
index covers Handysize, Supramax, Panamax, and Capesize dry bulk carriers 
carrying a range of commodities including coal, iron ore and grain. Stopford Martin 
(1997) op. cit. p. 93 
292  Figure 2 Ibid. 
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The HARPEX293 shows a similar image; the 10 year index of freight 
rates in container shipping presents significant volatility. In 
September 2012, the market is at its lowest levels. 
 
Figure 6 HARPEX 10y Index 
 
 
 
Against this 
collapse 
managerial 
stance taken 
by 
shipowners 
has been 
radically different from trends followed by the inland enterprises; liner 
companies preferred to dock their vessels empty of cargo rather than 
demolishing them. Had the maritime industry followed the views of 
independent industry experts, the world would have suffered from 
undersupply during the last few years, as there is a very long lead 
time between investment and capacity entering the market.294 
 
This is another paradox in comparison to inland companies: price 
coordination occurs indirectly. An independent in the shadow of a 
conference or a consortium is also benefited by price planning. 
Accordingly, the ‘outsiders’ lower their prices slightly (say, by about 10 
to 15 per cent),295 a calculated risk, and this differential is 
proportionally maintained even when conferences decide to modify 
their own rates. This proves that independents systematically follow 
                                       
293  The HARPEX Shipping Index tracks weekly container shipping rate changes 
in the timecharter market for eight classes of all-container ships. The index was 
compiled in 2004, but by using a database of 10,000 records, can be calculated 
retrospectively back to 1986. 
294  ELAA Response to Issues Paper (2006), op. cit, p. 6 
295  Global Insight Report (2005), op. cit, pp. 152-153.  
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conference policies296 and adjust their pricing policy accordingly. Dual 
synchronisation is henceforth the key element that governs shipping 
markets: between trade flows and freight, between consortia and 
independents. So far, there is no international coordination that 
would suggest the opposite. In any event, it is within independents’ 
business discretion whether to become a consortium member or 
continue to operate independently. 
2.2.1.6 Effective Competition by Non-Vessel Operators 
(NVOs). Issues of Horizontal and Vertical Synergy. 
 
The maritime market serves transnational transport of goods on a 
large scale. The task of transfer is achieved by non-vessel operators, 
such as shippers and freightforwarders who operate vehicles, 
locomotives and airplanes. Looking first at forwarders, their role is to 
organise the transport of goods for other clients. The practice 
resembles the multiple charter policy as applied by certain 
shipowners, where the commercial management and operation of the 
vessels is the responsibility of the charterer. The charterer, who may 
be a freight forwarder, is accountable to the owners for the usual 
charter hire provided for in the charterparty. 
 
Until the 1980’s, liner shipping was characterised by an oligopolistic 
supply in collusion, confronted with a competitive demand side: small, 
sometimes ill-informed shippers who were unable to exercise any 
influence on liner rates and conditions. Nowadays, the situation has 
been absolutely reversed. Today's shippers and freightforwarders, i.e. 
the Demand Side (DS) of transport, may be considered part of an 
oligopoly. They have been developed into large associations, and often 
possess a more relevant market share and more information than 
                                       
296  CFI TACA (2003), op. cit, Para 1074. See TACA Decision (1998) paras 534-
537. See declarations of French shipowners (Armateurs de France) in the review 
process of 4056/86. Also see: Blanco (2007) op. cit. p. 467 
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most shipping lines297 with regard to the particular mode of transport 
they operate. This is mainly due to the controllable size of the market 
in which they operate. For instance, inland transport is fragmented 
into localised cartels of small size, underpinned in specialised and 
narrow markets. On many occasions, consortia of lorry transporters 
may control 100 percent of a market to/from a port terminal. NVO’s 
are not only confined to the goods carrying and distribution roles by 
inland transport mode; it is essential to look into the operational 
nature of NVOs and investigate their relation with maritime transport. 
Do NVO’s successfully compete with shipowners and carriers, and how 
do the two systems interact?  I shall examine the subject firstly from 
the NVO and secondly from the carrier’s perspective.  
 
Starting with Article 1(3) of the abolished Regulation 4056/86, 
shippers and consignees are grouped together as users of maritime 
transport.298 A shipper is any person who places goods in a vessel, 
whether or not he owns them and chooses the method of 
transportation, the route, their storage and the procedure of handling 
them;299 therefore, forwarders are generally considered to be 
intermediates between the shipowner and the shipper-carrier,300 as 
opposed to shipper-producers who own the goods in question 
(consignors).301 In this context, a freight-forwarder may be a 
principal302 for the liner company or an agent303 vis-à-vis the shipper. 
                                       
297  It is implied in that NVOs usually have much smaller market size to control. 
Blauwens, Gust, Peter De Baere, Eddy Van de Voorde, Transport Economics, 
(Uitgeverij De Boeck, Antwerpen, 3rd Edition 2007), p. 325 
298  The matter is also analysed infra in section  2.2.1.6 Effective Competition by 
Non-Vessel Operators (NVOs). Issues of Horizontal and Vertical Synergy. 
299  Carr Indira, International Trade Law, (Routledge Cavendish, 3rd Edition, 
2005), p. 411 
300  In UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents, a freight 
forwarder is deemed as intermediate, in the strict sense of the word, and 
terminology wise, is called ‘non-vessel owning carrier’ (NVOC) See: UNCTAD/ICC 
Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents, [ICC Publication No. 481, 1992], p. 5 
301  Blanco, 2007, op. cit, p. 470 
302  That is to carry out the task of the shipper itself, giving undertaking to the 
consignors or consignees of the goods to guarantee their delivery to the agreed 
destination, even becoming a combined transport operator (CTO). See: Goode, Roy, 
Commercial Law, (Penguin Books, 2nd Edition, 1995) pp. 922-923 
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Furthermore, the two types of NVOs should be differentiated: some 
operators, ‘although they do not have their own vessels on the routes in 
question, do have them in other routes’304 and hire out cargo capacity 
in a bilateral long-term manner. Others ‘have no vessels on any 
route’.305 The latter, in addition to undertaking to carry cargo, offer 
forwarding services such as documentation, customs clearance and 
storage.306 Like any shipper, these operators undertake tasks from 
liner conference members and almost always through a service 
contract with one or more liner companies. 
 
In view of this, the possibility of and manner in which NVOs may 
compete with shipping operators in terms of quality, price and 
geographical cargo forwarding ability should be examined. As far as 
quality is concerned, leaving aside the view of the EU Commission,307 
it is possible to empirically demonstrate that there is no significant 
difference in the quality of the services offered. This narrows down the 
list of reasons why a shipper would choose a shipowner instead of an 
NVO. In terms of geographical cargo forwarding ability, a shipper is 
more or less satisfied by both operators; shipowners are in a 
disadvantageous position, since NVOs have access to multiple modes 
of transport. As far as price is concerned, shippers generally select the 
most economical mode, unless they demand regular service for large 
volumes of cargo. As far as price competition is concerned, NVOs with 
vessels on other routes may compete in rates, but this greatly depends 
                                                                                                             
303  That is to deal and contract with the carriers for substantial amount of 
cargo, delivered by shippers of all types. See: UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal 
Transport Documents, op. cit, p. 14 
304  This practise is followed by many carriers like ‘Hanjin Shipping’ and 
‘Hyundai Merchant Marine Co.’, which charter container slots in other shipowners’ 
vessels. See: TACA (1998) decision, op. cit, para 158. The slot capacity sharing is 
similar to ‘coach’ flights within airline alliances. See: Angela Cheng-Jui Lu, 
International Airline Alliances [Kluwer Law International 2003], p. 65 
305  The Commission gave the examples of international freightforwarder 
companies like ‘Kühne and Nagel Inc’, ‘Danzas International’, ‘Schenker 
International’ and ‘Panalpina Welttransport AG’. See: TACA (1998) decision, op. cit, 
Paragraph 159 
306  TACA (1998) decision, op. cit, para 159 
307  TACA (1998), op. cit, par 160 
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on the underlying carrier - with whose pricing policy it will be 
necessary to align.308 Competing is difficult for two reasons: mutual 
interdependence in slot availability, and the fact that the companies in 
question do not belong to the same market. The shipper may be a 
connecting factor, but it is impossible to define certain market 
boundaries or expand EU jurisdiction to a clustered market that is 
situated within a third country. 
 
NVOs that do not operate any vessel on any route and the freight 
forwarders belong to the same category of transport. Blanco309 et al 
argue that NVOs do not compete effectively with shipowners, while 
others310 hold that size and risk factors of the investments committed 
by NVOs are smaller and of lower risk compared to shipping firms, 
giving them an advantage with regard to required costs.  
 
In general, one must acknowledge that NVOs live off the excess 
capacity of the underlying transporters, without which they would not 
exist311. NVOs may contribute to the existence of the excess capacity 
ad hoc, as they represent potential customers for shipowners. This 
may explain how conferences have repeatedly argued that NVOs 
compete effectively with their members and limit their joint market 
power312. Moreover, it is striking how cooperation is not restricted to 
the shipping lines themselves; in fact, virtually all market players in 
the logistics chain are involved. The interests and intentions of each of 
the players tend to develop rapidly, especially in the case of those who 
                                       
308  Blanco, 2007, op. cit, p. 471 
309  Blanco, 2007, op. cit, pp. 471, 472 
310  Michael-Garrett, Graham, David Owain Hughes, Containerisation in the 80s 
[Lloyd’s of London Press, London 1985], pp. 38-39. They hold that since NVOs do 
not invest in carriage and capacity, they tend to offer their services at marginal 
costs. 
311  Graham, Hughes, ibid., pp. 38, 212 
312  See: TACA decision (1998), op. cit, para 156. Shipowners have advocated 
this point of view in the discussions with the EU. OECD (2002)  
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are constantly trying to gain direct control over an ever-greater share 
of the logistics chain.313 
 
The trend of expanding the logistics chain usually constitutes a motive 
for further vertical integration that may extend to sea transport and 
vice versa, in a shift towards more pronounced vertical integration 
within this chain. However, this integration has not been expanded 
beyond NVOs and the shipowners, and has limited itself only to the 
services related to freightforwarding. The reasons that demand 
complementarity314 between shipping and freightforwarding are weak 
and apply only on limited occasions; they appear to be related to 
managerial problems that such integration creates. Benefits are 
clearly not strong enough to overcome the disadvantages that may 
arise from the diversity of managerial skills and strategies that 
different business may require. The opinion of the shipowners that 
NVOs constitute a competitor, which deserves to be taken into 
account in the relevant market315, appears to be incorrect. 
 
On the contrary, it appears that the former view is accurate - although 
NVOs are in a less risky business position overall (as regards ROI) 
than shipping firms. On many occasions they may even improve their 
position, since they enjoy a degree of purchasing power by 
establishing freight-forwarding consortia. NVOs frequently form 
groups and horizontal and/or vertical (including carriers) alliances, 
which aim at achieving better slots in container allocation and 
management. However, the restrictions that exist in the EU and US,316 
                                       
313  Blauwens, De Baere, Van de Voorde, 2007, op. cit, p. 342 
314  Heaver, T. D., Responding to Shippers’ supply chain requirements in J. 
McConville, Alfonso Morvillo, Heather Leggate, Routledge advances in maritime 
research: International Maritime Transport, [Routledge, 2004], pp. 204-206 
315  See TACA Decision (1998), op. cit, Paragraph 156 where the TACA parties 
consider that the provision of multimodal transport service by the TACA parties is 
substitutable with the provision of such services by NVOs. 
316  See Article 1(3)(b) of the EU Regulation 4056/85. See also US Shipping Act 
1984, 46 U.S.C, app 1702(24) dated 1/3/07, §B7 (A)-(B), where it stipulates that 
carrier means an association of ocean common carriers permitted, pursuant to an 
approved or effective agreement, to engage in concerted activity and to use a 
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and the actual market size that the NVOs hold, dictates that NVOs do 
not really constitute an important competitors to shipping 
companies317. The fundamental criterion is the power to control and 
manage shipping operations, and this is something that NVOs do not 
currently  possess.  
 
Yet carriers would enter into multiyear agreements, usually tied to 
productivity and guaranteed slots for vessel berthing, in order to 
minimize the time spent in ports.  Moreover, carriers also realised that 
terminal operations could be highly profitable and they began 
investing in the landside operations. As mentioned in the European 
Commission Report on Terminal Handling Charges 2009,318 global 
operators could structure their pricing completely differently than 
local, national or regional operators. This included, for example, P&O 
Ports, APM Terminals and Terminal Link (CMA CGM), in addition to 
large, global terminal operators such as Hutchison Port Holdings, SSA 
Marine, DP World and ICTSI.  The competition between terminal 
operators and ports, especially in Europe, resulted in a periodic 
shifting of carriers to different terminals or ports in order to maintain 
cost control, achievement of higher productivity and guaranteed 
berthing and services. What is remarkable in this Report is the finding 
is that: “...THCs have remained very stable since their introduction with 
few increases despite the changes in the sea freight rates and 
surcharges over time. This is probably due to lower costs achieved 
                                                                                                             
common tariff; but (B) does not include a joint service, consortium, pooling, sailing, 
or transhipment agreement. < uscode.house.gov/download/pls/46C401.txt> 
[accessed 10 April 2009] 
317  Actually, it appears that shipping lines have been most actively involved in 
the drive towards closer cooperation. As a result, they have acquired a stronger 
negotiating position vis-à-vis the other market players (e.g. port authorities, 
stevedores, inland transportation firms etc). Stevedores have responded in a variety 
of ways, ranging from joint ventures for establishing dedicated terminals to 
attracting fresh capital from international groups (e.g. Hutchinson Wampoa at KCT 
in Rotterdam), but this can be classified as defensive strategy rather than market 
dominance. Thus, shipping companies remain dominant in the area of sea 
transport; a fact that we accept as natural. 
318  European Commission, Competition DG Report "Terminal handling charges 
during and after the liner conference era", [October 2009] p. 7 
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through higher levels of productivity and better contract terms from 
terminal operators”.319 The Report was ordered by the Commission in 
order to also examine possible impact from the abolition of liner 
conferences to the THC.  What is also worth quoting from this report 
is the finding that while the terminal handling charges that had 
remained virtually unchanged for nearly 15 years in Europe changed 
almost overnight, carriers abandoned the differential pricing by trade 
route and terminals within a port and switched to a single charge by 
country, irrespective of which terminal was called at by services on 
differing trade routes. The repeal of the block exemption for 
conferences caused a major change in the pricing strategy of terminal 
handling costs by the shipping lines320; an unintended consequence of 
the repeal of block exemption in liner conferences.  
A negative consequence also may be the fact that larger carriers are 
certainly able to negotiate with terminal operators to achieve a better 
contract deal than small carriers, particularly if they are also willing to 
sign up for a long term contract. As suggested by the aforementioned 
Report, the matter requires further research: terminal handling 
charges appear to be negotiable between shippers and carriers, 
particularly with “all-in” freight rates that obscure the level of 
individual charges. In this context, the level of THCs is likely to 
change annually as cost recovery needs shift and larger shippers' 
negotiating powers evolve. It may be an effect of liberalisation in the 
market, which I would suggest is “over-liberalisation”.321 
 
 
2.2.1.7 Time and Risk Parameters 
 
In this section, I explore the nature of the temporal (seasonal) or 
cyclical factor that exists within a shipping market, and how this 
                                       
319  Ibid. p. 7 
320  Ibid. p. 28 
321  See also supra §§ 274, 275 
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affects market definition and dominance. In this context, I investigate 
whether the boundaries of temporal capacity changes and their 
influence on actual as well as potential competition. With the term 
“potential competition” I understand the competitive pressure which 
has not materialised at the time of the events in question, but which 
may be seen in the short or medium term, on the basis of precise and 
consistent indicia, with some degree of certainty at the time of those 
events.322 Potential competition is not usually taken into account 
when defining relevant market. A relevant market analysis that would 
include the matter of potential competition would have relevance for 
shipping as it is a capital intensive market with important costs and 
risks that may discourage either incumbents to continue or potential 
competitors to enter. Thus, it is in the best interests of the 
incumbents to limit the market players to a convenient number so 
that they preserve their market shares. Furthermore, potential 
competition must not be confused with actual external competition.  
 
2.2.1.7.1 Capacity Changes and Adjustments in Relation to Time 
 
Within Article 5 of the Liner Consortia Regulation323 capacity 
adjustments are allowed within the list of exempted activities. The 
Regulation clearly recognises the necessity of these adjustments in 
response to fluctuations in supply and demand. A doubt emerges, 
however, as to the frequency and intensity of these fluctuations. 
Logically, this matter is subject to interpretation by the competent 
bodies. Levitt (2011)324 discusses this matter supporting the view that 
the wording covers capacity adjustments whether or not they are 
temporary. I believe this uncertainty is an important issue that needs 
further exploration. For example, an uncertainty of such kind would 
                                       
322  TACA Judgment (2003) op.cit. para 1025 
323  Op. cit 
324  Levitt Matthew, ‘Liner Consortia, Liner Mergers and individual exemption’ in 
Wareham (ed) (2010) op.cit. p.51 
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likewise apply to co-ordinated vessel withdrawals and lay-ups in 
response to the recession in the world trade and the collapse of freight 
rates.325 
 
The most recent case in which the ECJ has considered a co-ordinated 
capacity withdrawal scheme is in the Irish Beef case326. The Court has 
been very sceptical about capacity arrangements. In assessing the 
goal of the scheme, the ECJ deemed the subjective intention of the 
parties as “irrelevant”.327 It restates the principle that an object 
restriction can be found even if the agreement does not have the 
restriction of competition as its sole aim but also pursues other 
legitimate objectives.328 Not surprisingly, the ECJ rejected the 
submission that the arrangements do not fall foul of article 101(1)(b), 
which prohibits the limiting of production. Moreover, the ECJ firmly 
stated that the types of agreements listed in article 101(1)(a)-(e) “do 
not constitute an exhaustive list of prohibited collusion”.329 
 
In the same spirit, the Commission investigated two cases of similar 
relevance: the "Baltic Max Feeder"330 scheme,  “European Minibulk eG 
and Container Feeder eG”331. In the former case, vessel owners agreed 
to jointly cover the costs of removing vessels from service. In the 
latter, maritime cooperatives established in Germany aimed to 
coordinate certain activities of the owners of minibulk and container 
feeder vessels, mainly in Northern Europe. By consolidating joint 
purchases of inputs such as fuel, and setting an information exchange 
system for this purpose, the Commission was concerned that, through 
this compensation and/or particular information exchange system,  
                                       
325  Ibid. p. 51 
326  Irish Beef, Case C-209/07, Irish Competition Authority vs Beef Industry 
Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd (Reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court) [2009 4 C.M.L.R. 6]. 
327  Ibid para 21 
328  See: General Motors BV (formerly General Motors Nederland BV) vs 
Commission, Case C-551/03P  [2006 ECR I-3173] para 64. 
329  Irish Beef (2009) op. cit. para 2 
330  IP/10/21 of 15th January 2010 
331  IP/13/82, of 31st January 2012 
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the maritime cooperatives would provide an incentive to withdraw 
capacity from the market, resulting in charter rate increases. In both 
cases, the cooperatives agreed to abandon these two aspects of their 
cooperation before they had been implemented. 
 
In view of the above, two kinds of arguments can be supported: One 
could argue that these cases demonstrate the wish of the ECJ to 
discover the existence of restrictions even being subsequent to the 
true contractual will of the parties. An altera pars could argue that the 
observed paradox (i.e. between the article within the block exemption 
on liner consortia vis-à-vis and the Court’s interpretation in Irish Beef) 
signifies that anti-competitive behaviour is decided on a case-by-case 
basis. I believe the latter argument to be more valid as regards the 
competition law trends.  In any event, the purpose of competition law 
should be to safeguard the good operation of the market and maintain 
benefits to the consumer. Although sometimes this approach may not 
be flexible enough to anticipate every case that emerges, it can be 
adjusted according to the specific case in question. Levitt (2011) 332 
observes that, in commenting on the Irish Beef case, the Commission 
noted that the ECJ did not expressly exclude that a reduction of 
overcapacity could result in the preservation of the economies of scale 
by the operators which stay in the industry; nor did it rule out that 
the article 101(3) could apply if it could be proven that these positive 
effects outweigh the negative effects associated with reductions of 
capacity.  I agree with the observation of Levitt and below adapt this 
legal aspect in relation to liner shipping realities that drive synergy: 
defensive concentration between liner operators and less permanent 
structures for co-operation in the operation of services in order to 
reduce costs. 
 
                                       
332  Levitt (2010) in Wareham (ed) (2010) op.cit. p. 52 
131 
 
2.2.1.7.2 Dominance in Relation to Time and Risk Exposure 
 
So far, I explored the concepts of market share as dominance can be 
established taking into consideration by various factors . I presented 
the case that capital intensive element of shipping can we establish 
market power without the above elements, and what would be its 
duration? The answer to the first part of the question is “affirmative”; 
the answer to the second part is “short”. 
In particular, as mentioned above maritime cycles and market 
volatility affect the return of investment (ROI), both profitability and 
liquidity. It is of paramount importance for shipping companies to 
have tight finance and budget control, as any unfortunate move might 
have an irreversible impact on the future of a company. The latter 
parameter is indicative of the inherent inflexibility of a maritime 
company to respond to market trends, since any changes are not cost 
effective in view of the investment required. This particular argument 
can be best illustrated with the following figure that shows the ROI 
among various investments. In its extreme, Bulk shipping produces 
the highest standard deviation per annum and average yield333: 
Figure 7 Volatility of Bulk Shipping and other types of investment 
Investment Portfolio Period 
Average ROI 
% per annum 
Standard Deviation 
% per annum 
Treasury Bills 1926-1985 3.5 3.4 
Long-term govt bonds 1926-1985 4.4 8.2 
Corporate bonds 1926-1985 5.1 8.3 
Common Stocks FTSE 100 1971-1990 11.0 17.0 
Dry Bulk Shipping (bulk 
carrier) 
1971-1990 9.0 35.0 
Liquid Bulk Shipping (tanker) 1980-1994 5.2 30.0 
 
                                       
333  Brealey Richard A., Stewart Myers, and Brattle Group, Capital investment 
and valuation on Corporate Finance Series, [McGraw-Hill Professional, NY, 2003], p. 
135p.  
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In particular, the issue of market cycles vividly presents the argument 
of unpredictable risk that weakens market dominance. In comparison 
with the industrial sector, or other companies from the services 
sector, shipping companies are faced with the same amount of 
deviation in predicting investment yields as the stockbrokers are with 
high risk funds. Nonetheless, there is a significant difference: in the 
stock market, the investor can minimise their losses and withdraw, or 
move the capital to another investment. Diversification of investment 
is essential for minimising losses; ultimately, it is the only thing that 
guarantees stability. In shipping, however, diversification is difficult to 
achieve, and if it is achieved, it acquires a different meaning—as to 
modify strategies and re-organise staff. In spite of this possibility, risk 
factors are equally high for reasons of inherent inflexibility in 
modifying the core targets of the investment. 
 
The reason for this inflexibility relates to the financing conditions and 
financial intensity of the industry, as well as its inflexibility. Though 
the industry is capital intensive, few financial institutions have 
available portfolios to cover its needs. On many occasions finance is 
secured through syndicated resources: loans (solo or syndicated), 
bonds, stocks, shares, equity. As mentioned, personal equity covers a 
considerable amount of financing needs and often exceeds the ten per 
cent of a project. Should a project not produce the expected results, 
sunk costs are a significant factor. In this context, a shipping market 
is never a fully contestable market due to the sunk costs involved. 
 
The above comparison between the stock exchange and shipping, 
offers another conclusion: shipping and financial services have similar 
high risk profiles. In reality, shipowners undertake higher risks, since 
fluctuation in the freight rates, the perils and unforeseen costs that 
may occur in the sea are significantly higher  and can affect the 
liquidity and reserves of a small and medium shipping  company. 
From the business point of view, fleet management has to be 
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productive, since it is impossible to relocate or liquidate the assets 
(vessels) easily. Furthermore, practice shows that the aforementioned 
proposal suggesting risk management options by allocating capital 
and assets of the company from sea carriage operations to the other 
shipping markets is never effortless or inexpensive. 
 
Therefore, a third possible dimension to market definition (and 
consequently crucial for the determination of market power) is time. 
To some extent, the time dimension is simply an extension of the 
product dimension: i.e. the product can be defined as the supply of 
services at a certain period of time. Examples of how the timing of 
production and purchasing can affect markets are found within the 
OFT’s Market Definition Guidelines334. A time dimension might be 
appropriate where it is not possible for customers to substitute 
between time periods335. For example, peak shippers might not view 
peak and off peak freight rates as substitutes, and accordingly ship 
operators cannot substitute between time periods.  
 
In particular, the Guidelines refer to: 
 
i) Peak and off peak services. This can be a factor in transport 
services with regard to the concept of the maritime cycles; 
ii) Seasonal variations, such as summer versus winter months. 
This again has relevance, but more for tramp service and less 
for liner service. Again we have to distinguish between container 
service and break-bulk liner, as the former may not be affected 
at all, while the latter may be aligned with seasonal variations; 
iii) Innovation/inter-generational products. Customers may defer 
expenditure on present products because they believe 
innovation will soon produce better products, or because they 
own an earlier version of the product which they consider to be 
                                       
334  Office of Fair Trading, Market Definition, Understanding Competition Law 
[2004] p 18, paras 5.1-5.3 
335  Ibid. para 5.2 
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a close substitute for the current generation. Again, this has 
significance for shipping, as carriage accommodates two types of 
consumers that benefit from the service itself: the users (the 
shippers), and the sequence connected with the consignment 
note, i.e. gross retailers, the retailers and final consumers of 
goods. In the ECJ's analysis of the intergenerational element, it 
supports that, “It is the beneficial nature of the effect on all 
consumers in the relevant markets that must be taken into 
consideration, not the effect on each member of that category of 
consumers”336. The price for goods transported to the country of 
destination may indicate the extent to which a shipping service 
is valuable for a concrete shipper. For any shipper, the 
relationship between the tariff rate and price of goods at 
destination is essential for its choice whether to ship goods or 
not. Where the tariff rate is such that it will exceed the final 
price at which goods can be sold at destination, the shipper will 
choose not to ship the goods at all. Therefore, price still remains 
the dominant factor in the shipper’s choice of service337. 
2.2.1.7.2.1 Peak, Off-Peak and Seasonable Variations 
 
With regard to peak and off-peak services, we know that the subject 
has been dealt with in many cases. For example, in Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (2004)338, the issue of volatility versus stability is effectively 
dealt with as a factor that can significantly change the market 
dynamics. 
In particular it is acknowledged that the less complex and the more 
stable the economic environment, the easier it is for the firms to reach 
a common understanding on the terms of co-ordination. For instance, 
it is easier to co-ordinate among a few players than among many. It is 
                                       
336  ASNEF (2006) para 70, See also Shaw and Falla vs EC Commission (SHAW), 
Case T-131/99, [2002 ECR II-2023] (2002) para 163 
337  Stopford (1997) op. cit. p 363 et seq 
338  Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers (2004) op. cit. paras 18 
and 45. 
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also easier to co-ordinate on a price for a single, homogeneous 
product, than on several prices in a market with many differentiated 
products. Similarly, the issue of stability versus volatility and unstable 
markets was dealt within SCA/METSA339. Conversely, unstable 
demand, substantial internal growth by some firms in the market or 
frequent entry by new firms may indicate that the current situation is 
not sufficiently stable to make co-ordination likely340, especially when 
prices decrease. In markets where innovation is important, co-
ordination may be more difficult since innovations – particularly 
significant ones – may allow one firm to gain a major advantage over 
its rivals. The subject is presented in Ritter & Braun (2005)341 and 
notably in the AIRTOURS (2002) case342. In AIRTOURS the issue of the 
duration of the dominance vis-à-vis the seasonal and temporal 
element of the market was examined by the CFI. On the occasion of 
the merger among three operators, the new entity AIRTOURS/First 
Choice, Thomson and Thomas Cook, “would have had the ability, 
which they did not previously have, to adopt a common policy on the 
market”, and therefore the transaction did not give rise to the creation 
(rather than the strengthening) of a dominant position. The Court 
identified the following conditions necessary for finding of a “collective 
dominance”: 
 
i. Each member of the dominant position must have the ability to 
know how the other members are behaving in order to monitor 
whether or not they are adopting the common policy; 
                                       
339  Commission Decision 2002/156/EC in SCA/Metsä Tissue, [OJ L 57, 
27.2.2002] para 45. The Commission held that “...it also easier to coordinate on a 
price for a single, homogeneous product, than on hundreds of prices in a market 
with many differentiated products. Similarly, it is easier to coordinate on a price 
when demand and supply conditions are relatively stable than when they are 
continuously changing”. 
340  Kodak/Imation, [Case IV/M.1298 – 1998] para 60 
341  Ritter Lennart, Braun W. David, European Competition Law: A Practitioner's 
Guide  [Kluwer Law International 3rd edition 2005] p.580-581 and 606-608 
342  AIRTOURS  op cit para 62 
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ii. The situation of tacit co-ordination must be sustained over time. 
i.e. there must be an incentive not to depart from the common 
policy) on the market (credible threat of retaliation). 
 
Moreover, with regard to the issue of potential consumers that could 
benefit from the existence (in other words the preservation) of a liner 
trade, the ECJ, in Compagnie Générale Maritime,343 held that “regard 
should naturally be had to the advantages arising from the agreement 
in question, not only for the relevant market … but also, in appropriate 
cases, for every other market on which the agreement in question might 
have beneficial effects, and even, in a more general sense, for any 
service the quality or efficiency of which might be improved by the 
existence of that agreement.” This element has a particular 
significance vis-à-vis the argument of destructive competition usually 
presented by the consortia as a defence. Basically, consortia aim to 
achieve economic efficiency through actions on cost.344 Their main 
objective would be joint control (ideally 100 per cent) of scheduled 
shipping markets.345 The principal activity of consortia is to meet 
frequently in order to influence freight rates through control in the 
supply/demand equilibrium. Freight rates are typically set by 
commodity, with the highest value commodities being charged higher 
rates than lower value commodities. Of course, the process of 
achieving this can be immensely complicated, because the consortium 
has to evolve to a size and type of cartel. For example, carriers might 
all wish to rationalise service by scheduling the vessels so that they 
carry at full capacity. 
 
                                       
343  Compagnie Générale Maritime (2002) para 343 
344  Blanco, 2007, op. cit, p. 461 
345  Scott Morton, Fiona, ‘Social Status, Entry and Predation: The Case British 
Shipping Cartels 1879-1929’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 
47 [1997], pp. 41-49 
 <http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/fms8/papers/shippingcartels.pdf> 
[accessed 02 April 2009] 
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Accordingly, the main argument of liner consortia could be based on 
the quality and consistency of service that may also be a good reason 
for an intergenerational benefit: firms that do not compete on price 
(hence, without being preoccupied by destructive competition), may 
have an incentive to invest in higher quality vessels, subsequently 
providing higher quality of service346 so as to attract more customers.  
 
Moreover, the stability of the market could allow them to carry on 
their business across the seasonal instability of the maritime cycles 
and thus reduce the risk caused by, for example, the current global 
economic situation. Finally, the co-ordination on prices, tacit or 
explicit, direct or indirect (with the use of the information exchange347 
on supply between incumbents) could be accepted only in the name of 
the intergenerational benefit, allowing potential shippers to benefit 
from stable freight market conditions and draft their business 
projections accordingly. In fact, these are the arguments in favour of 
the liner conferences: price fixing, in contrast to the free market, 
brings stability in the market while the rates remain stable and low. 
However, the option of controlled stability of the market through price 
fixing has been ruled out with the abolition of the liner conferences. 
The idea behind the abolition has been that the risk against effective 
                                       
346  Devanney, III J. W., V. M. Livanos, R. J. Stewart, ‘Conference Ratemaking 
and the West Coast of South America’, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
[1975 Vol. 9] pp. 154-177. The authors analyse the issue of price fixing – that 
conferences once enjoyed – as a guarantee to quality of service. The limitation of 
price competition enabled conference members to compete on ‘quality of service’. A 
good insight into the role of the ‘quality’ variable in liner shipping can be found in 
Devanney et al (1975). These authors observe that conferences, while often being 
considered as monopolists, do not actually earn the corresponding monopoly profits. 
For this issue the analysis continues infra in page 155. They explain this by pointing 
at the strong competition among conference members on the quality of service. 
When pricing is fixed, differentiation on quality is the only way a conference member 
can increase his own revenue at the cost of other members. As derived from 
empirical data, the criteria associated with quality variables are considered to be the 
provision of information and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems; logistical 
services; better coordination and integration with inland transport companies; 
ownership and management of terminals and equipment; frequency of service; and 
geographical coverage and efficient response to the particular requirements of 
customers. 
347  Pozdnakova Alla, ‘Information Exchange Agreements between Liner shipping 
companies under EC Competition law’, in Antapassis Antonis, Athanassiou Lia, 
Røsæg Erik (eds), op. cit. p. 376 
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competition in the future could be greater should the conferences 
continue to operate. The Commission decided that the self-awareness 
obligation of the conferences has been a weak measure. The 
assumption of competitiveness for a liner consortium largely depends 
on its desire to maintain effective competition. It is possible for an 
alliance to detect and then deter member firms from secretly cutting 
rates (thus becoming more competitive overall) in order to maintain its 
market position; evolving thus from a partial function joint venture to 
a full function cartel. Experience shows that the greater the 
dominance is, the more probable it is for the firm to abuse its position.  
 
Taking also into account the established view of Community law, I 
believe that the temporal element has to be always incorporated in the 
market definition analysis, in a way to include the dynamic and 
changing element of the liner, as well as tramp and maritime market. 
 
In an analogous condition with the temporal markets, the 
introduction of the temporal element in the market definition analysis 
facilitates us in producing the following findings: 
 
i) Tonnage capacity is supplied by the carrier(s) as a response to 
an uncertain demand by the shipper, in the context of a 
temporal period in which the demand appears and then 
disappears.  The degree of uncertainty of demand results from 
the cyclical behaviour of the business. This cyclical demand, 
which is at the same time difficult to predict, is the key element 
that both makes the market volatile and self-regulates, in the 
mid-term, any imbalances in the supply/demand equilibrium. 
So, the temporal element becomes a substantial factor that 
affects the stability and the length of the demand; in other 
words, uncertainty is met by instability (the volatility) within a 
certain trade. The cycle of the season in liner shipping could be 
determined with the help of maritime economics and can 
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theoretically be determined in accordance with the theory of the 
maritime cycles;348 
ii) Transport service accommodates a certain pattern of demand. 
Carriers respond to the demand of shippers for a certain service. 
They simply adapt to the need for transport that could be of a 
long-term or short-term nature; moreover they manage their 
assets trying to predict their future value. Whether it is a 
container vessel or a bulk, it is a response to the shipper’s 
demands. Thus, the market cannot simply be determined by the 
narrow route and the vessels, per se, but by the need of the 
shippers for vessels for their patronage, i.e. the container 
vessels for ready goods and break-bulk for resources. It is the 
shippers that demand the quality of service (expressed in terms 
of liner scheduled services) in an non-predictive pattern; 
iii) Tramp shipping and other modes substitute liner service only to 
a marginal degree, mainly in cases of over-demand, simply due 
to the fact they satisfy different consumer needs; 
iv) In contrast, liner service can substitute tramp shipping to a 
great degree. 
 
 
Disregarding any “lazy monopoly” conditions that may exist in a 
conference or a consortium, one can claim that a reason behind 
possible inefficiencies consists of the lack of flexibility to increase 
prices, hence to heal its inefficiencies through profit. In liner shipping, 
however, the issue of profitability has been partly dealt with through 
measures of naval engineering innovation and IT systems that have 
been developed by ship operators (and partially with the alliances). 
Through rationalisation of service and reduction of costs, carriers 
avoid inefficiencies due to oversupply over time, while at the same 
time the freight rates remain reasonably fair.  
 
                                       
348  Stopford Martin (2009) op. cit. p 36 et. seq. 
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In view of the above I summarise with the following findings: 
 
i) It is not possible for customers to substitute service between 
time periods; peak shippers might not view peak and off peak 
liner service equally as substitutes. For example, capacity to 
produce crops may vary between time periods and it may not be 
possible to store fruit from one period to another. 
Containerisation, however, is a recent phenomenon in the 
history of maritime trade (the last 50 years only). The fact of 
economies of scale that is a characteristic feature of liner 
shipping may actually turn into disadvantage as economy of 
scale is connected with the supply of vessels.  
ii) Whereas current liner fleets have managed to provide quality of 
service and relatively low freight rates by incorporating 
economies of scale, they also constitute a frequent and serious 
risk exposure on their own: larger vessels require larger 
expenditure and provide the management with less flexibility. 
 
 
2.2.2 Non-Pricing Exclusionary Abuses  
 
 
Once it is established that a liner shipping company or group of 
companies is dominant, their market conduct becomes potentially 
subject to prohibition of the abuse of dominant position laid down in 
Article 102 TFEU. The starting point for considering an abuse must be 
in the context of Article 102, before the conditions that contribute to 
the abuse can be derived by the Commission’s decisional practice and 
the Community Courts.349 In the sections below we will analyse the 
circumstances whereby the dominant players’ market conduct effects 
the exclusion of actual and potential rivals from the market. 
                                       
349  Dabbah (2004) op. cit. p342 
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2.2.2.1 Requirement, Tying and Rebate Arrangements 
 
Usually, arrangements stem from a dominant firm, where it may 
impose an obligation on one or more of its customers to agree and/or 
purchase their requirements from it. In shipping, this is usually put in 
practice through loyalty and rebate arrangements whereby a shipper 
is granted benefits for choosing designated vessels, as per the 
consortium’s requests. This sort of tying is caught by Article 102 
TFEU. In Hoffmann La Roche350 the ECJ refers to an obligation on 
customers to purchase "all" or "most" of “their requirement from the 
said undertaking whether the obligation in question is stipulated 
without further qualification or whether it is undertaken in 
consideration of the grant or a rebate”. It is important to consider the 
expected benefits. 
 
Second, it is important to distinguish rebates and related loyalty 
agreements that are conditional on shipper’s loyalty to the carrier 
from rebates, such as volume rebates and other discounts, granted by 
the carrier on the basis of cost savings and other efficiencies achieved.  
There are two basic variables set above: First, the cost savings and 
second, the efficiencies. Applying the cost-based method of assessing 
tariff rate levels requires the identification of the relevant cost 
structure and efficiencies produced of the dominant liner shipping 
company, as well as that of its competitors. Notably, both cost 
expenditure and savings can occur by the larger volume of cargo sent 
by shippers, i.e. by increased operation and by large market share. 
Hence, expenses incur due to  increased operation in the second case, 
paradoxically due to the achievement of economies of scale351. 
 
                                       
350  Hoffmann La Roche para 89 
351  Infra p. 158 
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In view of the argument above, a rebate from the standard tariff 
granted to shippers of larger quantities of cargo can, as a principle, be 
considered non-discriminatory. The rebate practice, however, requires 
more detailed analysis under Article 102(2)(c) when cost savings 
achieved by the dominant carrier are granted to some shippers as 
justification of volume discounts. In particular, it is necessary to 
clarify whether any relevant cost savings actually do flow from sending 
larger consignments. In addition, I believe that it would be wise to 
take into account matters of equality – with regard to amount and 
quality - in the way of calculating and applying volume rebates to 
shippers. Deviations from the rule of equality may lead to 
discriminatory behaviour, as competition law relates the rebates with 
the scope of their use. 
 
2.2.2.1.1 Types of Rebates 
 
With reference to the above, we have to distinguish between the 
various types of rebates that are granted to shippers in order to 
consider their importance and their impact as possible reasons for 
discrimination. Moreover, types of rebates in shipping are grouped 
and described within certain loyalty contracts. In TACA Decision352, 
the Commission analysed the rebates with reference to the loyalty 
contract the parties agree to observe listing the three most common 
categories of loyalty agreements. 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1 Conditional and Volume Rebates 
 
First, conditional or volume rebates are granted to customers to reward 
certain (purchasing) behaviour of these customers in a particular 
period of time. The usual form is that customers are rewarded if their 
purchases exceed a certain threshold during a defined reference 
                                       
352  TACA Decision op.cit. paras 116-119 
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period. In Michelin353, Portuguese Airports354 and Zaventem355 the 
court held that an undertaking occupying a dominant position is 
entitled to offer its customers quantity discounts linked solely to the 
volume of purchases made from it. However, the rules for calculating 
such discounts must not result in the application of dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties within 
the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. 
In practice, this means that the conditions based on inequality and 
dissimilarities with the intention of elimination of competition and/or 
with the intention of favouring one shipper against another are duly 
caught under Article 102. For example,  a high threshold in the 
system which can only be met by a few particularly large partners of 
the undertaking occupying a dominant position, these discounts may 
constitute evidence of discriminatory treatment.356 It is apparent that, 
in order to justify the system in question, the PORTUGUESE 
REPUBLIC has submitted only general arguments relating to the 
advantage to airports of operating a system of quantity discounts on 
landing charges and has done no more than claim that the system 
was open to all airlines. 
 
2.2.2.1.1.2 Unconditional Rebates 
 
 
Second, unconditional rebates, granted to certain shippers and not to 
others, are granted for every purchase of these particular customers, 
independently of their purchasing behaviour.357 
                                       
353  Michelin (1983) op. cit. para 71 
354  Portuguese Republic vs Commission (Portuguese Airports) Case C-163/99 
[2001 ECR 1-2613] para 50 
355  Brussels National Airport (Zaventem), Commission Decision [OJ 1995 L 
216/8] para 16 
356  Jones, A, Suffrin, B (2007) p. 596  
357  DG Competition discussion paper on the  application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to exclusionary abuses [Brussels, December 2005] 
 found: <ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf>, 
accessed May 2012, p 43 
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2.2.2.1.1.3 Rebates on Incremental Purchases 
 
Third, we have to distinguish between conditional rebates that are 
granted on all purchases, and conditional rebates on incremental 
purchases above the threshold. The former are granted on all 
purchases in the reference period once a certain threshold is 
exceeded, and can have a strong foreclosure effect. Whether the 
conditional rebate is available to all purchases below and above the 
threshold once it is exceeded or only to incremental purchases above 
the threshold makes an important difference to the way possible 
loyalty-enhancing effects are induced and how they are assessed. 
 
2.2.2.1.1.4 Loyalty Contract 
 
The “Loyalty Contract” is an agreement between the liner and the 
shipper whereby the shipper obtains lower rates by committing its 
patronage to that carrier; the contract provides for a deferred rebate to 
be arranged in favour of the shipper. The nature of this arrangement 
is binding for the carrier who is obliged to honour the terms of this 
agreement.  
 
2.2.2.1.1.5 Dual Rate Contract 
 
The “Dual Rate Contract” is a contract available to all shippers by 
providing immediate discounts – not in the form of rebates – to the 
shipper that sends its cargo exclusively on the consortium’s vessels.  
 
2.2.2.1.1.6 Deferred Rebate System 
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In contrast to these immediately requiting arrangements, the 
“Deferred Rebate System” consists of non-immediate rebate systems 
without the presence of a written agreement; these are mutual 
promises rather than binding agreements, since there is no contract 
covering its realisation.358 The shipper promises to send its patronage 
to the designated vessels, and the carrier ex ante promises to rebate 
the former with a post ante discount. It is implied that the carrier may 
seize the opportunity to forfeit the rebate if the shipper breaches the 
loyalty obligation and the burden of proof that no such breach 
occurred lies on the shipper359. In general, these three categories of 
loyalty agreements can be further categorised as fidelity rebates, 
target rebates and across the board rebates.  
 
2.2.2.1.2 Remarks 
 
 
In particular, the legal issues worth mentioning in relation to this 
state of affairs are: 
 
i) Restriction by object that is considered within the mischief of 
Article 101; achieved by offering various kinds of rebates. It may 
be objectionable where it acts as an incentive to customers to 
become tied to the dominant firm in terms of obtaining their 
requirements exclusively from the latter.360 Such rebates cannot 
be associated with volume rebates and other discounts granted 
by the carrier purely on the basis of cost savings and other 
efficiencies achieved (i.e. a correction in the profit margin). In this 
manner they achieve, directly or indirectly, a restriction in actual 
and potential competition. It is thus made progressively difficult 
                                       
358  Ibid. paras 117-119 
359  Herman Amos, Shipping Conferences [Deverter: Kluwer law and Taxation 
Publishers 1983] p. 60 apud. Pozdnakova (2008) p.75 
360  Dabbah (2004) op. cit. p 360 
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for shippers to select alternative carriers.361 In Hoffmann La 
Roche362  it was stated that “...unless there exceptional 
circumstances... are incompatible with the objective of undistorted 
competition...the fidelity rebate is designed through the grant of 
financial advantage to prevent customers from obtaining their 
supplies from competing producers”. 
 
ii) Upstream control to be considered within the mischief of Article 
102: This can be achieved not only by exclusively tying the 
shippers to a dominant carrier in two ways: (a), with regard to 
some types of cargo for which the consortium is specialised (e.g. 
containers and/or break bulk liners); (b) to all types of cargo sent 
by the shipper. This can result in substantial exclusion from the 
market for actual and potential competitors. This affects 
practically everyone involved: independent liner companies, 
tramp carriers, even incumbent competing carriers, and exceeds 
the scope of the usual fidelity rebate - it resembles across the 
board rebates363 as they are mentioned in Hoffmann La Roche364 
and Michelin365. Particularly in CEWAL II366 the conference had 
been found to be imposing a 100% loyalty agreement and using 
blacklists to enable reprisals against users; hence, shippers had 
no alternative, nor were outsiders allowed to compete. 
 
iii) Adherence of a shipper to the dominant liner shipping company 
may follow not from a policy of loyalty but merely from the 
position of dominance as such367. A dominant position is always 
associated with greater ability of a liner shipping company to 
                                       
361  See: Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening [1992],  
362  See: Hoffmann La Roche [1979] para 90 
363  Dabbah (2004) op. cit. pp. 362-363 
364  See: Hoffmann La Roche [1979] para 109-111 
365  Manufacture Française de pneumatiques Michelin vs Commission [2003 
ECR I-837] 
366  See CEWAL II para 10. CEWAL II Compagnie Maritime Belge SA, 
Commission Decision of 30 April 2004, cases COMP/D2/32448 and 32450 [OJ 
2005 L 171/28] 
367  Pozdnakova (2008) p. 404 
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satisfy shipper demands, and the presence of a dominant 
company presupposes that smaller carriers could face capacity 
constraints. Therefore, in view of the case (1) above, it is highly 
probable that a combination of progressive consolidation of 
loyalty with high market shares will eventually result in further 
oligopolistic conditions in the market. A reliable indicator would 
be to detect when the threshold for the shipper’s portion of “loyal” 
cargo is set so low that it would anyhow be obtained from the 
dominant carrier; this will not have a loyalty enhancing effect, 
and this situation is irreversible. 
 
iv) Once it is established that the dominant company grants 
conditional rebates only on incremental purchases, such 
behaviour constitutes an abuse only if the resulting price for 
these incremental purchases is a predatory price, provided the 
threshold is set in terms of a percentage of total requirements of 
the buyer or an individualised volume target. In that context, the 
leveraging between the “non-contestable” and the “contestable” 
portion of demand allows the rebate system to operate without a 
profit sacrifice - and thus to operate for a long time. Abuse is 
considered likely if the resulting price does not cover average 
total cost and the part of demand to which the rebate is applied 
is important enough to create a foreclosure effect.368 
 
The duration of this loyalty is also essential. A rebate, granted 
annually, representing a percentage of the overall turnover achieved, 
is more restraining than a narrower arrangement as regards the 
period or the market involved.369 Nonetheless, rebates linked to 
annual target purchases of capacity can also function as loyalty–
inducing rebates. In this situation, the amount of rebate will not be 
linked to capacity as such and it is possible that a shipper that leases 
                                       
368  DG Competition discussion paper on the  application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to exclusionary abuses  op. cit. p. 51 
369  Michelin (2003) ibid. 
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lesser capacity will be rewarded disproportionally higher rebates. This 
practice constitutes an abuse of a dominant position which may 
consist, for example, in applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage370. 
 
2.2.2.2 Single Branding Obligation 
 
Exclusionary abuses may be both price based and non-price based. 
Examples of non-price based abuses are contractual tying, single 
branding contracts and “naked” refusals to supply. In these situations 
it is clear that foreclosure may take place; the question is whether this 
foreclosure may be characterised as anticompetitive. The “English 
Clause” refers to situations in which a dominant firm requires a 
customer to report better offers it obtained from competitors.371 The 
Commission explains in its Guidelines on Vertical Restraints372 that 
such a clause can have the same effect as a non-compete obligation. 
Basically, the possible competition risks of single branding are 
foreclosure of the market to competing suppliers and potential 
suppliers. Such restrictive effects also have a direct impact on inter-
consortium competition, as incumbents must be free to compete with 
each other, in any event.   
 
Another issue that we have to consider is the effect that an English 
clause may have on shipbrokers’ actions, as they are, on many 
occasions, the intermediaries between shippers and shipowners. The 
problem exists with work of the chartering broker who is compensated 
with commission payments upon successful fixing of a charter. Then, 
restraints of competition create a serious consequence to the good 
operation of the market. Here a distinction must be made between 
                                       
370  British Airways PLC vs Commission of the European Communities (ECJ) 
[2007 ECR I-2331] para 58 
371  Dabbah op. cit. p. 363 
372  Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [OJ 2010/C 130/01] para 129 et seq. 
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exclusive and non-exclusive (inclusive) brokers. In the Vertical 
Guidelines (2009)373 it is stipulated that, in general, single branding 
and post-term non-compete provisions may lead to anti-competitive 
effects and may infringe Article 101(1), especially if they lead to or 
contribute to a (cumulative) foreclosure effect on the relevant market 
where the contract goods or services are sold or purchased. 
2.2.2.3 Refusal to Supply under Article 102  
 
The principle that private parties are themselves free to decide 
whether to contract with each other and to define the content of their 
contracts is fundamental to contract law. First, it is necessary to 
distinguish among the concerted practices between incumbents374 and 
refusals of dominant carrier to supply service. The former is caught 
under Article 101 as concerted practice that may arise even out of co-
ordination, which become apparent from the behaviour of the 
participants and the refusals. The latter, under certain conditions, 
amounts to abuse based on Article 102 TFEU. Below we shall analyse 
the unilateral or multilateral concurrent refusal of the dominant 
carrier to supply capacity; a behaviour that exceeds the freedom of a 
dominant carrier to choose contracting parties.375 
 
In general, imposing an obligation on a carrier (dominant or not) to 
supply shipping services to a shipper can amount to restricting its 
contractual freedom.376 However, liner shipping services are noticeably 
defined as a service available to any transport user against payment 
                                       
373  Ibid. para 19 
374  ICI (Dyestuffs) vs Commission 48/69 [1972 ECR 619] paras 64-65. See also 
Coöperative Verening “Suiker Unie” UA (SUGAR CARTEL) and others vs 
Commission, Joined Cases 40-48/73,50,54-56/73, 11/73 and 114/73 [1975 ECR 
1663] paras 173-174, Azienda Colori Nazionali - ACNA S.p.A. vs. Commission Case 
57-69 [ECR 1972 00933] para 50.  
375  Bayer AG vs Commission [2000 ECR II-3383] paras 66-72, Volkswagen AG 
vs Commission [2003 ECR II-0000] para 32. See also Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p 
323 
376  Tassel, Yves, ‘Freedom of Contract and Public Order relative to the legal 
effect of the Hague Visby Rules: Prospects of English law and of French law’, in 
Antapassis Antonis, Athanassiou Lia, Røsæg Erik (eds), op. cit. p. 376 
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even on an occasional basis. It is an extensive and paramount 
obligation of service that is clearly mentioned, inter alia, within Liner 
Consortia Regulation (2009)377, and it is on those grounds only that 
liner shipping companies enjoy, as an exchange, the aforementioned 
consortia exemption.378 A refusal to a shipper or a competing carrier is 
allowed unless the objective justification for such a refusal amounts to 
an abuse, therefore the first condition of compliance with competition 
rules relates to the said obligation; deviation is only allowed for well 
grounded reasons. Moreover, the fact of dominance per se has an 
aggravating effect in itself on the actual circumstances of the case. A 
dominant undertaking is found unable to give a valid explanation 
about refusal to supply when it infringes Article 102, as its behaviour 
constitutes an essential indication for abuse of its dominance.  
 
For example Irish Continental Group379 (a passenger service operating 
ferries between Brittany and Ireland) was denied service by the Roscoff 
Port Authority, CCI Morlaix. 
The Commission decided that, prima facie, the behaviour of CCI 
Morlaix amounted to a refusal to supply services and given the 
dominant position that it enjoyed constituted an abuse that was 
caught by Article 102.  
In addition to the above, Pozdnkova (2008)380 links the refusal of 
supply with the “unfair or unfavourable” conditions to shippers as 
additional reasons for abuse, in an analogy to the use of the “unfair” 
                                       
377  See definition of Liner Services in Commission Regulation 906/2009 on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia) [OJ 
L 256/31 2009] article 2(2). 
378  In the Scope of the Consortia Regulation (2009) it is stipulated: “This 
Regulation shall apply to consortia only in so far as they provide international liner 
shipping services from or to one or more Community ports”. See Pozdnakova (2008) 
p 325 
379  Irish Continental Group vs CCI Morlaix, interim measures before 
Commission [1995 5 CMLR 77] para 59. In this case the Commission held: “...CCI 
Morlaix détient une position dominante, pour la mise a disposition d'une installation 
essentielle. Son refus constitue un abus de sa position dominante…”. See also : 
XXVth REPORT on Competition Policy 1995 [1996] p. 120 
380  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 323 
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element that describes excessive pricing, i.e. where a shipper is faced 
with either an outright refusal to supply a shipping service, or on 
terms unacceptable to the shipper. Such behaviour is caught 
expressly by Article 102(a) and can also amount to discrimination 
within the meaning of Article 102(c), as the shipper is subject to 
abusive practices that place it in clear competitive disadvantage. 
 
 
2.2.3 Exploitative Pricing Practices 
 
2.2.3.1 Unfair and Excessive High Freight Rates 
 
Article 102(2)(a) gives as an illustration of abuse: 
 
“Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions.” 
There are three elements to this provision: 
(i) Direct or indirect; 
(ii) unfair 
(iii) prices or trading conditions. 
 
 
Though elements (i) and (iii) are clear, the provision does not clarify 
the concept of “unfair”. The matter was first dealt with in the General 
Motors381 decision, wherein the Commission condemned the excessive 
pricing of a dominant firm and imposed a fine on the firm for that 
practice. Its decision was quashed by the ECJ, which held, later, in 
the United Brands382 case: 
                                       
381  General Motors Decision (1975) op.cit. para 
382  United Brands, op.cit. para 250 
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“...charging a price which is excessive because it has no reasonable 
relation to the economic value of the product supplied is...an abuse”. 
Clearly therefore, excessive pricing can amount to an abuse of a 
dominant position. The difficulty is to know at what point a price is 
abusive (because it bears no relation to the ‘economic value’ of the 
product). Various methodologies have been used, but none is free 
from difficulty.383 In practice, the most logical one is to compare 
production cost with profit margin. 
 
An aspect that is worth mentioning is that excessive pricing policy and 
other exploitative conduct by dominant liner shipping companies does 
not infringe Article 102 TFEU if it can be justified by objective 
reasons.384  An important question is raised here: are the grounds for 
objective justification under Article 102 the same as for the purposes 
of exemption under Article 101(3)? The answer is negative: in Tetra 
Pak385 the CFI has emphasized that imposition of unfair prices is an 
abuse to which no exception can be made under Article 102 TFEU of 
the Treaty. The concept of objective justification of abuse is limited 
and does not operate as an exemption for abusive behaviour. Yet, as 
to the exact meaning of “objective justification” in liner shipping, we 
can mention the following: it is necessary to identify the grounds and 
the scope of the objective justification defence of tariff rate decreases. 
As a starting point, dominant carriers are not precluded from 
engaging in price competition in order to protect their commercial 
interests when they are attacked.386 Tariff rate decreases applied by 
dominant carriers will not infringe Article 102 EC if they both protect 
the legitimate interests of the carrier and are proportionate to the 
threat the carrier faces.  
 
                                       
383  Whish and Bailey (2012) p. 720 
384  TACA Judgment op. cit. para 1113; United Brands op. cit. p. 219 
385  Tetra Pak Rausing SA vs Commission (Tetra Pak I), Case No. T-51/89 [1990 
ECR II- 309] paras 28-29 
386 United Brands op.cit. para 189 
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Another aspect is the relationship between excessive price and 
profitability. Though the Commission and the ECJ agree that the 
establishment of dominant position is unrelated to profitability, a 
price may infringe Article 102 where the difference between the price 
that is charged and the costs incurred is excessive. The ability to 
increase prices over the period in question is considered to be a more 
decisive criterion than the actual accumulation of profits. This has 
been established in United Brands387 and in TACA Decision388 where 
the lack of profitability has not been a determinative factor in 
establishing a dominant position. In TACA Decision (para 543)  the 
Commission examined regular, albeit modest, price increases over the 
period 1994 to 1996, in stark contrast to the two other world’s arterial 
trades. The Commission decided that: “The ability of the TACA parties 
to impose regular, albeit modest, price increases over the period 1994 to 
1996, in stark contrast to the two other world arterial 
trades...demonstrates that the TACA parties have been able to maintain 
or increase prices. This has been made possible because of the 
elimination of effective competition.... in any event, it is clear that lack of 
profitability is not a determinative factor in establishing a dominant 
position”. 
 
Several issues are raised here: What can be considered as excessive or 
unfair in a free market where profit is a legitimate goal? How can we 
assess excessive pricing and what are the boundaries between 
excessive and unfair? How can we protect competition and benefit 
consumers without harming the essentials of the free market that 
presupposes free and unimpeded competition; thus to frame the 
“natural desire”389 of firms to maximise profits? Is it possible to assess 
an economic value in liner shipping, notably the value of a company 
or the excessive amount based on global freight rates?  
 
                                       
387  United Brands, op.cit. paras 125-128 
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389  Dabbah op. cit. p. 359 
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Whish & Bailey (2012)390 analyse the issue and the effect of these 
exploitative and exclusionary practices; moreover they provide us with 
altera pars arguments against direct control of the market. Arguments 
against direct control support that normal market forces have their 
way: the fact that a dominant party is able to earn large profits in the 
absence of barriers to expansion and entry, attracts -“by nature as 
well”- new entrants in the market. However, one cannot neglect that 
the exploitative and exclusionary elements in a trading practice can 
appear at any time, as they exploit the core per se of the free market, 
which is the freedom of the parties to negotiate a price. In other 
words, agreed and negotiated prices may be different prices and may 
not be discriminatory unless there is no objective justification for the 
difference. In practice, different customers often pay different prices 
for the same product as a result of main market factors. For the 
dominant firm, however, an allegation of price discrimination is likely 
to raise difficulties under Article 102 if third parties are placed at a 
real economic disadvantage as a result of the policy followed.391 I shall 
adapt Whish & Bailey’s methodology to the case of shipping 
accordingly: 
 
In order to establish a case of unfair excessive the following conditions 
must apply: 
 
i) High level of dominance: oligopoly or monopoly 
ii) Limited interchangeability and supply substitutability. In order 
for these conditions to be realised we must first have a central 
(not peripheral) port with limited access (due to its geography 
and facilities) that allows few and specific vessels to service the 
area; 
                                       
390  Whish Richard, Bailey David, Competition Law [Oxford University Press, 7th 
edition 2012] pp.718-725. 
391  Hildebrand Doris, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules 
[Kluwer Law International 2009] p. 58. 
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iii) High cost of investment and effort required to attract alternative 
suppliers to the point that the current supplier becomes a 
(natural) monopoly; 
iv) Narrow market. For a narrow market to exist, there must be 
either specialised cargo and/or limited port slots allocated to 
the dominant carriers; 
v) Elimination of competition. This means that the competition has 
been eliminated by the dominant carrier. Yet, given conditions 
(i) and (ii) require cooperation with the port authority that can 
be achieved either by collusion or by vertical integration. 
vi) Prior elimination of competition. With the exception of case (iii) 
elimination of competition can be achieved by preceding abusive 
practices that eliminated competition and led to the current 
imperfect competition therefore, 
vii) A monopsony. Where the seller is alone and faces many buyers; 
the former may dictate terms to its suppliers in the same 
manner that a monopolist controls the market for its buyers. 
viii) Natural absence of tramp competitors; something that is very  
rare to occur. Despite the fact that EU Bodies have repeatedly 
stated that in the majority of cases liner service cannot be 
substituted by tramp service392, I am convinced that when 
freight rates are low, like it is currently, (the BDIY at 662 points 
the presumption of non-substitutability between liner and 
tramp shipping set by the EU competition law may not be 
entirely accurate. Tramp operators are more willing nowadays to 
call at any port where there is charter.  
 
 
2.2.3.1.1 A Reasonable Relation to the Economic Value 
 
                                       
392  See Atlantic Container case § 90 
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The matter was first dealt with in Deutsche Grammophon393, Sirena394 
and General Motors395 , though it was the case of the United Brands396 
that established the theoretical basis for excessive pricing. The ECJ 
held that “price which is excessive because it has no reasonable 
relation to the economic value of the product supplied would be such an 
abuse”. The key phrase used in this explanation is “reasonable 
relation”. The ECJ did not expressly define the exact boundaries of 
what may be considered as “reasonable” or “excessive”;  
Usually, an analysis to define concepts as such must take into 
consideration the value of the assets in the current market, the cost 
levels and external conditions in comparison to the profit margin of 
the dominant carriers, vis-à-vis the delivered and/or required quality 
of service. Therefore, an excessive pricing analysis consists of two 
stages: determining the charged rate in relation to the costs incurred, 
and, most importantly, determining whether this price, regardless of 
the amount, is unfair. The ECJ and the Commission started their 
analysis based on the above hypothesis: difference between price and 
cost incurred. Nonetheless, they have not limited their analysis only 
within the above; they employ all possible methods to discover 
whether there is a case of abuse.  
 
Admittedly the ECJ endorses a more teleological approach and 
describes profit as derivate of the relation between economic value of a 
product or a service and the sale price. In United Brands397 for 
example, in order to prove any lack of reasonable relation, the Court 
invited the Commission to calculate “if by making a comparison 
between the selling price of the product in question and its cost of 
production, which should disclose the amount of the profit margin”. In 
this case the Commission had at least to “require United Brands Co to 
                                       
393  Deutsche Grammophon GmbH vs Metro – SB – Grossmärkte GmbH [1971 
ECR 487] para 19. 
394  Sirena SRL vs Eda SRL [1971 ECR 69] para 17. 
395  General Motors, Commission Decision [OJ 1975 L29/14] para 12. 
396  United Brands op.cit. para 250. 
397  United Brands op.cit. para 251. 
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produce particulars of all the constituent elements of its production 
costs398”. The United Brands decision is also important as the ECJ 
invited the Commission to use every means possible to discover 
similar phenomena in the EC markets399. That means that the role of 
economists to support the Commission has been established. In 
similar cases (e.g. British Leyland400 and Volvo401), the Court 
suggested that the main transgression of the ‘excessive’ fees was that 
they served as a device to interfere with market integration, not that 
they interfered (which they in fact did) with allocative efficiency. 
 
In both the Leyland and Volvo cases, the Court indicated a link 
between dominant position that was established by certain rights not 
necessarily from the held market share; de-associating thus the 
requirement of a market share from excessive pricing. It concluded 
that the abuse derives from the very subject matter of an exclusive 
right that a holder of such right is entitled to prevent third parties 
from manufacturing or selling the products concerned.402  
 
2.2.3.1.2  The “Fair” Rate Requirement 
 
The economic value of a liner shipping service is determined by a 
variety of factors other than costs of supply and cannot, therefore, be 
determined simply by adding to the costs incurred in providing the 
service a profit margin as a pre-determined percentage of production 
costs. Whether a tariff rate is unfair in itself can be determined by 
taking into account additional factors but not exclusively the profit 
margin of the dominant earner in question. First, apart from the costs 
incurred in supplying the service, the earner also faces other costs 
                                       
398  Ibid. para 256. 
399  The Court said: “Other ways may be devised - and economic theorists have 
not failed to think up several - of selecting the rules for determining whether the 
price of a product is unfair”. Ibid.para 253. 
400  British Leyland PLC vs Commission, Case 226/84 [1986 ECR 3263] para 
39. 
401  AB Volvo vs Erik Veng (UK) Ltd, Case 238/87 [ECR 1988 06211] para 5. 
402  Hildebrand (2009) op. cit. pp.53-58 
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which need to be covered by the shipper. Second, the economic value 
of a shipping service is influenced by factors relating to conditions of 
demand and shipper preferences. 
Another question also arises as to whether losses incurred by the 
carrier in conditions of seasonal, directional or cyclical overcapacity 
can be recovered from tariff rates charged to shippers in periods of 
excess demand: to ‘survive in a volatile market with prices determined 
by competition, the liner company must make enough profit during the 
good years to subsidize its operations during the bad years’403. I follow 
the ECJ approach to the Ahmed Saeed404 case whereby a precedent of 
long running cost calculation is established (across different periods) 
in combination with other notable indicators.  
 
2.2.3.1.3 Cost Levels in Liner Shipping 
 
If it is accepted that price related abuse occurs, then the problem is to 
identify and quantify it. The basic level of comparison is the cost of 
production. The difficulty in this is that these costs are generally 
difficult to assess in shipping. The cost-based method of assessing 
tariff rate levels implies that it is necessary to first identify the 
relevant cost structure of the dominant liner shipping company before 
examining that of its competitors. With regard to the former, cost 
expenditure and savings occur by the larger volume of cargo sent by 
shippers. In the first case, expenses incur due to the increased 
operation; in the second case, paradoxically due to the achievement of 
economies of scale. 
 
In addition to the above, competitors’ cost is relevant where the 
fairness of the level of rate is to be tested by comparison of the 
                                       
403  Stopford (1997) op. cit. p. 346 
404  Infra § 417 
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dominant and its competitors’ rates. Pozdnakova (2008)405 clearly 
analyses this case of relative cost allocation in liner shipping.  
 
Likewise, identifying and measuring relevant costs can be complicated 
because liner shipping is characterized by joint (common) costs, which 
are not attributable to carriage of a specific commodity or unit of 
shipment. So far, no mathematic tool has been capable of producing a 
definite benchmark for determining profit earned by a dominant 
carrier as excessive, per se. In principle, some sectors may be 
structurally more profitable than others. 
 
The problem of joint costs arises because of the high fixed costs of 
liner carriers and the large number of separate shipments that make 
joint use of a vehicle’s transport capacity on each voyage. As per Lim’s 
analysis (1994)406, these joint costs are the following: 
 
i) Variable Costs: Cargo related (Cargo expenses, Terminal 
Handling Charges and Haulages) and Navigation expenses. 
ii) Fixed Costs: Crew expenses, Vessel expenses, depreciations and 
amortization (leaseholds)407  
iii) Overheads: Administrative Expenses, Non-operating revenues 
and non-operating expenses. 
                                       
405  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit pp. 303-305 
406  Lim Seok Min, “Economies of container ship size: a new evaluation”, 
Maritime Policy & Management [1994 vol 21 no 2] pp. 149-160 
407  Fixed costs in liner shipping are associated with ownership of the entire 
fleet, costs incurred for soliciting and handling cargo, general overheads, terminal 
costs and operating costs of vessels already scheduled for sailing. Fixed costs tend 
to remain unchanged over a period of one year or longer, while variation in fixed 
costs normally takes place only in cases of major schedule revisions. See also: 
Stopford (1997) op. cit. p 358. He proves that economies of scale are important in 
relation to the fixed costs of the ship. He also demonstrates the importance of 
economies of scale to liner operators. The total cost of the 6,500 TEU ship is almost 
three times the cost of the 1,200 ship, but the cargo volume is almost six times as 
great. As the size of ship increases, the fixed cost component falls from 42 per cent 
to 26 per cent. In contrast, the fixed cost of the containers does not benefit from 
economies of scale, so its share increases from 14 per cent of total cost for the 1,200 
TEU ship to 19 per cent for the 6,500 TEU ship. Likewise, the various cargo 
handling and distribution costs (section 4 of Table 10.4) do not benefit from 
economies of scale, with the result that their share of the budget increases from 37 
percent for the 1,200 TEU ship to 51 percent for the 6,500 TEU ship. 
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Stopford (1997)408, Davies (1983)409, Gkonis and Psaraftis (2009)410 
and Grammenos411 analyse the subject thoroughly. In fact, Davies 
(1983) notes that in liner shipping the short-run period may be 
defined as the time within which it is not possible to vary either the 
size of the fleet operated by a company or the frequency of service. 
Once a schedule has been agreed upon, cost items such as fuel, 
wages, maintenance and repair (regarded as variable costs in other 
industries) become fixed, which cannot be avoided in the short-run 
planning horizon. Variable costs that change directly with the 
magnitude of cargo carried are associated with handling, loading and 
stowing cargo.412 
 
With regard to point (ii), the problem of cost allocation can also arise if 
a carrier is engaged in a range of different activities, not all of which 
directly relate to the supply of a liner shipping service. For example, 
liner shipping companies, which traditionally were exclusively in the 
transportation business with their assets limited to vessels, have 
increasingly become involved in supply of inland distribution services, 
which are particularly important for container transport.413  
Furthermore, carriers can also incur costs from supply of maritime 
carriage services other than scheduled transportation, such as tramp 
shipping, or costs which do not relate to supply of the given liner 
shipping service (for example, costs of operating a container terminal, 
                                       
408  Ibid. pp. 351-357. Stopford identifies six components of liner service costs: 
service schedule, ship costs, port charges, container operations, container costs, 
and administration. 
409  Davies J.E. “An Analysis of Cost and Supply Conditions in the Liner 
Shipping Industry”, Journal of Industrial Economics, [1983 Vol. 31, No. 4] pp. 417-
435. 
410  Gkonis Konstantinos & Psaraftis Harilaos, “Some key variables affecting 
liner shipping costs”, working paper of the Laboratory for Maritime Transport School 
of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering National Technical University of Athens 
[2009] available in: 
 <www.martrans.org/documents/2009/prt/TRB_paper%2010_3188_Gkonis_
Psaraftis_revised.pdf> accessed 4th July 2012 
411  Grammenos Costas, (2010). 
412  Gkonis & Psaraftis (2009) op. cit. p 3 
413  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p 304 
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where the service in question is that of conventional liner shipping). 
Costs arising from such activities have to be covered from tariff rates 
paid by shippers but it is necessary to decide the extent to which 
shippers should contribute to the range of carrier costs. The extent to 
which the shipper can be forced to participate in covering the 
common cost should generally be limited by a ‘fair share’ of common 
costs. 
 
The case law does not specify whether individual cost levels of a 
dominant undertaking or the general level of costs in the relevant 
market is to be considered as a threshold for measuring whether rates 
are excessive. 
Pozdnakova (2009)414 supports as a possible reliable indicator the 
individual cost levels of a dominant undertaking compared with the 
general level of costs for the relevant market (costs of competitors) in 
order to establish whether the former’s costs are disproportionate. 
However, there are three cases, Sundbusserne415, SCANDLINES 
Sverige416 and Ahmed Saeed417, brought before the Commission and 
the ECJ, respectively, which provide further evidence that should be 
taken into account. In all three, the Commission and the ECJ found it 
significantly difficult to determine costs and reasonable fares. Notably, 
in Sundbusserne the Commission did not accept ten percent as a 
reasonable limit for profit in the absence of justification of such a 
threshold, nor has the ECJ been able to set any alternative 
benchmark. Yet it was the logical decision, in view of the absence of a 
credible fixed limit that defines permissible profitability. Hence, 
though an investigation can identify the violation (i.e. the intent to use 
                                       
414  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p 309 
415  Sundbusserne vs Port of Helsingborg, Case COMP/36.570 [2004] 
416  Scandlines Sverige AB vs Port of Helsingborg, Case: COMP/A.36.568/D, 
Commission decision [2006] 4 CMLR 1224. Available from < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/36568/36568_44_4.pdf
> accesed January 2012. paras 157, 234 
417  Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Resebüro GmbH vs. Zentrale zur 
Bekämpfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V, (Ahmed Saeed) ECJ [ 1990 4 CMLR] para 
102 
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price in order to eliminate competition), it is difficult to quantify 
exactly the actual damage incurred, and, consequently, to establish 
the causation between the intention, the action and the actual 
damage. 
In order to effectively deal with the issue, the Commission 
implemented a methodology based on circumstantial evidence that 
could constitute an abuse. Thus, in SCANDLINES SVERIGE the 
Commission expanded its ratio and presented the prerequisites that 
add to excessive profit following a comparison analysis of rates 
between different ports. In particular: 
 
i) The individual cost structure of the companies, i.e. possible 
economies of scale; sailing distance, scope, existence of cost 
efficiencies; 
ii) Historical values of assets; 
iii) Level of investments committed; 
iv) Type of finance; 
v) Internal decision as regards the remuneration of the share 
holders. 
 
In Ahmed Saeed the ECJ separated short run costs from long run 
costs. In a sense, the Court, based on the EC Directive on Fares418, 
has distinguished long term costs as a reliable indicator and referred 
to the “long-term fully allocated costs of the carrier” as one of the tariff 
rate's determinants.419 In this case, it is recognised that tariffs must 
be reasonably related to the long-term fully allocated costs of the air 
carrier, while taking into account the needs of consumers, the need for 
a satisfactory return on capital, the competitive market situation, 
including the comparison of fares of the other air carriers operating on 
the route, and the need to prevent dumping. In this way, I contend 
that it is convenient and methodologically correct to use longer cycles 
                                       
418  Council Directive 87/601/EEC On fares for scheduled air services between 
Member States [OJ 1987, L 374] Article 3, p . 12 
419  Ahmed Saeed op. cit para 43 
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in order to circumvent420 the actual impossibility of calculating short 
run expenses, achieving henceforth a reliable estimation. In 
particular, there are four elements that can be used out of the Ahmed 
Saeed case : 
 
i) It is impossible to rely entirely on the short run results of a 
shipping company. 
ii) We have to distinguish between short run and long run costs. 
Long run may be useful to compare with the maritime cycles, as 
per Ahmed Saeed’s precedent.421 
iii) Fully allocated costs of a dominant liner shipping company 
include direct fixed, variable costs and overheads incurred in 
supplying a specific shipping service and a share in the common 
costs associated with supply by the carrier of a range of 
services. 
iv) Historical values of assets are an important consideration as 
well, and it can be compiled with the needs of consumers, the 
need for a satisfactory return on capital, the competitive market 
situation, including the comparison of fares of the other air 
carriers operating on the route, and the need to prevent 
dumping. This is very important, as assets become factors that 
can be correlated with the ROI; 
v) With reference to the above, the level of investment committed is 
an appreciable factor, which again can be correlated with the 
ROI; 
vi) Equally significant is the analysis of the “cost of capital”. Here 
we can see a clear divergence in the methodology followed by 
the Commission in accounting the cost of capital. In particular, 
the Commission rejected the arguments about the nature of the 
“cost of capital” submitted by SCANDLINES. Should the 
dominant firm want to justify the charged price as necessary, it 
                                       
420  Davies (1983) op. cit. supra 
421  Supra § 417 
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has to prove that the said revenue scheme intends, on one 
hand, to remunerate the bond holders (i.e. the banks in general) 
and, on the other hand, to serve dividends to the shareholders 
(i.e. the “equity” holders). Accordingly, SCANDLINES supported 
that “in the language of finance and economics, cost of capital 
refers, in broad terms, to the minimum return the capital market 
would expect a company (or project) to generate if the market is to 
invest in that company, due allowance being made for any 
specific risk associated with the company’s activities”422. I agree 
with the above approach and would add the terms of “interest” 
or perhaps “consideration” in order to determine the essence of 
borrowing, i.e. the Return of the (Borrowed) Capital (ROC) in 
form of the original capital plus the interest. While the 
Commission endorsed423 a totally different approach with regard 
to the issue of Expected Remuneration of the Equity Capital, it 
agreed that the charged price corresponds to the financial costs 
which notably include the interest charges paid on net 
outstanding debts. These costs are costs accounted for, which 
appear as such in the audited annual financial reports. I believe 
the above is a kind of paradox. Whereas we know that the 
Commission does not take into account the degree of 
profitability in assessing dominant position424, it takes into 
account the profit excess in determining abuse of the dominant 
position.  
vii) In addition to the Commission’s approximate cost allocation, 
depreciation costs are based on the historical values of the 
assets. This allows us to estimate a ship’s value though the 
period of market cycles in relation to the subsequent maritime 
markets of the transport service (the S&P and the 
Demolition425). However, a company that sets its prices on the 
                                       
422  Scandlines Sverige op.cit Appendix 3.1. para 64 
423  Scandlines Sverige op.cit Appendix 3.1. para 66 
424  See TACA supra § 388  
425  Supra  p. 54 
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basis of depreciated historical costs may well find itself in a 
position that its return does not continue to finance future 
capital expenditures for the replacement of existing assets. 
 
 
2.2.3.1.3.1 Marginal Costs (MC) Benchmark 
 
I agree with Hovenkamp (2005), especially with his opinion that the 
main criterion for the market power of a liner shipping conference 
relates to its ability to deviate profitability from marginal cost pricing. 
 
Hence, measuring marginal cost level426 should be the most 
appropriate base from which we can assume the market power of a 
given company.427 Views about the actual boundaries of market share 
and higher than the marginal cost pricing vary and the subject remains 
controversial among researchers. The reason is due to the complex 
nature of the maritime transport sector that allows limited 
generalisations; each case has to be considered separately.  
 
2.2.3.1.3.2 Average Avoidable Costs (AAC) Benchmark 
 
 
The pricing benchmark of AAC does not substantially depart from the 
one of average variable costs, since it also targets below-cost rates. At 
the same time, it takes into consideration the strategic aspect of rate 
cuts made by a liner shipping company.  
                                       
426  In economics, marginal cost pricing is the practice of setting the price of a 
product or a service to equal the production of an extra unit of output. In ideal 
circumstances, economic efficiency or social optimality involves the market price 
being equal to the marginal cost. This is also called “the marginal cost pricing” 
principle. It can be justified by another concept in economic welfare analysis, Pareto 
optimality. The question arises here is whether the marginal cost could be a reliable 
base for the EU Competition to calculate market power, given the cyclical and 
temporal elements that exists within shipping markets. 
427  Hovenkamp Herbert (2005) op. cit. pp. 80-81. Also see: TACA Decision II, op. 
cit, § 920-921 
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The AAC can be the same as the average variable cost, since in many 
cases only variable costs can be avoided. However, if a dominant 
company, had to expand its capacity in order to be able to predate, 
then the fixed or sunk investments made for this extra capacity will 
also have to be taken into account and will filter into the average 
avoidable cost benchmark.428 Given the high proportion of fixed costs 
in liner shipping, avoidable costs of the dominant carrier would 
include some of the fixed costs associated with sailing the vessel. This 
hypothetical situation outlines why this consideration is relevant. 
 
A dominant carrier which charges a lower tariff rate for all or a 
particular part of capacity supplied on the market over the relevant 
period incurred or incurs losses that could have been avoided if that 
(particular) part of its capacity was not supplied; if, for example, the 
vessel did not sail. It is, at least in the short run, not minimizing its 
losses. In general, this is sufficient to presume that it makes a 
sacrifice in order to exclude the targeted competitor. In liner shipping, 
application of the average avoidable cost concept as a relevant cost 
benchmark is particularly appropriate in cases where a dominant 
carrier releases excess capacity with a view to achieving rate decreases 
and to eliminating or discouraging a rival carrier. 
 
A large complement of costs in liner shipping, including fixed costs429, 
are not incurred until a voyage is embarked upon - although carriers 
face significant limitations in their ability to cut such costs, even when 
they do so under pressure of price competition. These include 
substantial maintenance, insurance, operational, administrative and 
marketing organizational costs necessary for running a liner fleet, 
which, given the committed nature of scheduled transport services, 
are largely fixed in the short run. Application of the avoidable cost 
                                       
428  Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses op. cit.  para 64. 
429  Supra p. 158 et seq 
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benchmark in liner shipping also requires accurate assessment of the 
length of the below-cost pricing period: when a carrier decides not to 
withdraw a vessel from service and charge below-avoidable-cost rates 
on an individual sailing, this may have been done with the aim of 
maintaining a reliable scheduled service. 
2.2.3.1.3.3 Average Variable Costs (AVC) Benchmark 
 
Variable cost is the sum of marginal costs incurred from the provision 
of the service. It is possible that the principle, based on the AVC rule, 
will not be appropriate in other predatory pricing cases: in AKZO, the 
ECJ referred to the situation of the subject case and applied the 
criterion of the average variable cost as basis for comparison430. Prices 
below AVC, by means of which a dominant undertaking seeks to 
eliminate a competitor, must be regarded as abusive. By referring to 
the elimination of an efficient competitor by pricing below the average 
total cost but above average variable cost, the ECJ may have indicated 
that Article 102 EC will generally apply only to such exclusionary 
pricing conduct that is capable of excluding competitors as efficient as 
the dominant liner carrier. 
Thus, a dominant undertaking has no interest in applying such prices 
except that of eliminating competitors so as to enable it to raise its 
prices by taking advantage of its monopolistic position - since each 
sale generates a loss, namely the total amount of the fixed costs (that 
is to say, those which remain constant regardless of the quantities 
produced) and at least part of the variable costs relating to the unit 
produced. The criterion for legitimacy of pricing behaviour can be 
based on costs and the strategy of the dominant undertaking.431 
 
 
                                       
430   AKZO op. cit para 71 
431  Ibid. para 74. 
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2.2.3.1.3.4 Other Benchmarks 
 
 
The AKZO judgment opens the possibility of identifying the abusive 
nature of tariff rate cuts by considering cost categories other than 
variable or avoidable costs. It may be reasonable to use a cost 
benchmark which would include a larger proportion of carrier costs 
related to supply of a shipping service. This can be taken as a starting 
point from which the tariff rate levels to be applied over time by a 
carrier form the basis of that carrier’s decisions to invest, and the 
costs considered in predatory pricing analysis include the total costs 
which are ‘incremental’ to provision of the shipping service. In 
Deutsche Post432, the Commission introduced a test based on the long-
run average incremental cost of the dominant undertaking as a 
threshold below which prices charged are considered predatory. 
 
The long run average incremental cost takes into account both fixed 
and variable costs, which are incurred by a liner shipping company 
from supplying an additional unit of service but excluding common 
fixed costs, which are not incurred solely as a result of this service (for 
example, those relating to the maintenance of terminals or equipment 
utilized for all activities). 
An incremental cost can relate to, inter alia, carriage of an additional 
consignment, bringing a new vessel into service, setting up an 
additional sailing, or opening a new route, i.e., costs incurred in 
supplying an additional product, referred to as an ‘increment’, over 
and above the cost of the existing activities of that firm. Long-run 
average incremental cost is the average of all variable and fixed costs 
that a carrier incurs from supplying an additional shipping service in 
the long run.433 
 
                                       
432  Deutsche Post AG op. cit. § 118 
433  Jones, Sufrin, op. cit. pp. 457-458 
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2.2.3.1.3.5 Average Total Cost (ATC) Benchmark 
 
Average Total Cost (ATC) is the sum of Average Variable Cost (AVC) 
and Average Fixed Costs.434  
 
In the absence of a clear formula for determining the price cap 
between cost and sale of the service, Competition Law relies on the 
identification of the intent of the dominant carrier. A consortium’s 
intent to eliminate smaller (and perhaps weaker) new entrants and/or 
potential competitors by using its competitive advantages is 
accordingly caught under Article 102 TFEU. So, tariff rate cuts that 
are above average total costs may be caught due to the fact that the 
liner shipping market is characterised by significant economies of 
scale and the incumbent dominant carrier may also possess certain 
non-replicable advantages. Pozdnakova (2008)435 mentions, as 
possible non-replicable advantages, the ownership of container 
terminals or inland facilities essential for integrated container 
shipping door-to-door (emphasising upstream and downstream 
factors).  
I would also add the access to capital436 as another non-replicable 
advantage.  Where this is the case, entrants may have to operate for 
an initial period at a significant cost disadvantage because entry can 
practically take place only below the minimum efficient scale. This 
condition requires special liquidity capacity (usually in the form of an 
overdraft that is usually a high interest loan). 
2.2.3.1.4 Different Policies within the Company 
 
In Deutsche Post437 the Commission established the abuse by using as 
a benchmark the prices for cross border mail with its domestic tariff 
and decided that there was indeed an abuse.  In SCANDLINES 
                                       
434  AVC+AFC= ATC 
435  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 362 
436  See supra p. 94. 
437  Deutsche Post AG op. cit. paras 160-166. 
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Sverige438  the Commission did not depend on the cost analysis. 
Showing a similar degree of flexibility as in Deutsche Post, it looked to 
see if the charges were unfair and attempted to compare them with 
prices charged for other services provided in the same port, and with 
prices charged to ferry operators in other ports.  
 
2.2.3.1.5 Yardstick Competition 
 
In Bodson439 and Lucazeau440 the ECJ implemented the technique 
described as “yardstick” competition: suggesting that a comparison 
should be made with the level of fees charged in other member states. 
When an undertaking holding a dominant position imposes scales of 
fees for its services which are appreciably higher than those charged 
in other Member States, and where a comparison of the fee levels has 
been made on a consistent basis, that difference must be regarded as 
indicative of an abuse of a dominant position. In such a case it is for 
the undertaking in question to justify the difference by reference to 
objective dissimilarities between the situation in the Member State 
concerned and the situation prevailing in all the other Member States. 
Similarly, the Commission in Standard & Poor441 investigated whether 
the practice of S&P to apply a licensing fee vis-à-vis indirect users, 
which is not in line with the ISO standard 6166 charge principles, 
constituted an abuse.442 The Commission found that inter alia the 
company had infringed Article 102 of the Treaty by setting unfairly 
                                       
438  Scandlines Sverige op.cit supra § 416. 
439  Corinne Bodson vs Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées SA, case 30/87 
[1988 ECR 2479]. The Court held : “in particular where the monopoly over the 
provision of certain services established by an undertaking or by a group of 
undertakings leads to discrimination against imported products as opposed to 
products of domestic origin”. 
440  François Lucazeau and others vs Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et 
Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) and others, case 110/88 [1989 ECR 2811 para 25 
441  Standard and Poor, Summary of Commission Decision of 15 November 2011 
Case: (COMP/39.592 — Standard & Poor's) [OJ 2012 C 31/8] para  
442  The S&P demanded extra fees from the direct users that significantly exceed 
the costs incurred for that activity. 
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high fees for the supply of US International Securities Identification 
Numbers (ISINs) in comparison to the existing ISO system. 
 
As mentioned in Deutsche Post443, an analysis of excessive pricing of a 
consortium can focus on identifying whether the set price is unfair in 
itself or in comparison to competing products. Adequate results can 
be rendered in liner shipping by the “yardstick competition” method on 
two conditions: if services provided by a dominant liner carrier are 
comparable to those of other carriers and if competition between the 
dominant carrier in question and its competitors is effective. 
Should the evidence allow a yardstick competition analysis, the con-
ditions that determine whether a high tariff rate level is  justified must 
depend on: 
i) The objective factors, such as differences in service supply 
costs; 
ii) Other factors such as density of competition, which can be 
considered at the stage when ‘fairness’ of the tariff rate is 
assessed. 
 
Nevertheless, the above requires a certain degree of homogeneity. An 
undertaking’s competing services can be defined by reference to the 
relevant market, or perhaps more broadly. Perhaps, it may be 
necessary to avoid comparison among liner shipping companies and 
tramp (non-scheduled) vessel operators or between container vessels 
and conventional liner shipping or NVOs.  
 
To this end, it is not sufficient to establish whether a shipper enjoys 
identical use of services supplied by the carriers under comparison. It 
is required that comparison is made on a consistent basis; meaning, 
first, that services provided must be comparable and, second, that 
charging systems must allow for meaningful comparison. Yet, it is 
                                       
443  Deutsche Post op. cit. para 159 
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again difficult to have an accurate measurement in shipping as the 
market is dynamic enough to create confusion in the analysis.  
 
For example, where competing carriers are merely price followers, the 
‘yardstick competition’ approach will not produce adequate results. 
This relates to the effective but not actual (lazy) competition among 
the conference and the competing independents; another paradox of 
the liner shipping business. 
 
In spite of the dynamic features of the market and the effective 
competition, price coordination does occur indirectly. An independent, 
being in the shadow of a conference (and currently of a consortium), is 
also benefited by consortium price planning. Accordingly, the practice 
is that the competitors lower their prices slightly, say by about 10 to 
15 per cent (10-15%),444 a calculated risk that is proportionally 
maintained even when conferences decide to modify their own rates. 
 
This proves that independents were systematically following 
conference policies445 and adjusting their pricing policy accordingly. A 
tacit coordination between competitors produced an effective but non-
actual competition between consortia and independents. It is the 
independents’ decision whether to be subject to the price policies of a 
consortium or to continue to operate independently. As a result of 
this, independents have established their own marketing standards in 
parallel to conferences446, though individual carriers and/or alliances 
presently make their own decisions on capacity and service. However, 
                                       
444  Global Insight Report (2005), op. cit, pp. 152-153 Though there are no 
regular or formal meetings on capacity management by known routes, it is reported 
that there are regular meetings of the ‘Box Club’, a group that consists of the Liner 
companies that includes the ELAA members as well as other independent liners that 
do not however call in Europe. This organisation has been known to carry out 
studies on supply/demand issues and one can contemplate that there must be 
regular discussions on capacity matters This footnote has been made before. 
445  TACA Judgment (2003), op. cit, para 1074. See Commission Decision TACA 
(1998) paras 534-537. See declarations of French shipowners (Armateurs de France) 
in the review process of Regulation 4056/86. Also see: Blanco (2007), op. cit, p. 467 
446  See also supra §282 
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empirical evidence has suggested that the independents’ access to 
Information Exchange Systems (IES) allows them to adapt their 
strategy in correlation with the discussions held in the conferences  
based on the prices posted in the IES.  
 
In view of the above I attempt to expand the concept of yardstick 
competition analysis in an effort to make the comparison more 
effective.   
 
2.2.3.1.5.1 Aggregating Across Markets 
In view of the difficulty in establishing a credible dominance criterion, 
I use an analogue methodology developed by the ECJ in order to 
define the aggregation of benefits in multiple markets. The matter of 
aggregation across markets is analysed above447, where I discuss the 
natural difficulty in practically enclosing an anti-competitive 
behaviour within a framework of a certain market.  
 
2.2.3.2 Exclusionary Excessive Pricing 
 
Excessive prices which are exploitative to the actual competition in a 
market may be also exclusionary for potential competition. I use as an 
obvious example the situation in which the owner of an essential 
facility (e.g. port cranes, port slots or warehousing and stevedoring 
facilities) charges an excessive or discriminatory price for granting 
access to it. 
Firstly, Article 3 of Consortia Regulation (2009) provides that the joint 
operation or use of port terminals and related services (such as 
lighterage between vessels or stevedoring services) or any other 
activities ancillary to transport are subject to exemption. Ancillary 
charges represent the additional increase in charges that are triggered 
                                       
447  Supra pp 55 - 60 et seq 
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by or associated with the operation of shifting and operating 
containers - i.e., they are ancillary to the service provided by the 
shipping lines. They include extra charges for terminal handling 
(THCs), less-than-container-load-service charges (LCLSCs), detention 
charges, demurrage costs, change of destination, special equipment 
and handling goods needing special care and service (e.g., dangerous 
goods, refrigerated goods etc.). An issue can be raised here with 
regard to the connection of these charges with the rate offered by the 
carrier. It is thus necessary to examine whether the carrier has 
control of the ancillary services of the port, incorporating them into 
the rate. Since 1995, the ECJ in Centro Servizi Spediporto 448  held 
that that in the context of Regulation 4055/86 ‘‘maritime transport 
services ceased on arrival at the port or offshore installation and do not 
therefore extend to road transport of cargo unloaded from the vessel’’. I 
believe that maritime transport has evolved considerably and vertical 
alliances are always susceptible to infringement. So, I agree with 
Chuah (2005)449 who supports that such surcharges, although 
itemised separately from the ocean tariff, may form part of the ‘‘rate’’ 
as long as they relate to ‘‘maritime transport’’.  
Whish and Bailey (2012)450 consider this practice a kind of 
constructive refusal to supply that constitutes an abuse of dominant 
position. Therefore, identifying exclusionary intent becomes the 
central element of analysis where the rate is increased to a level 
beyond average. Subsequent increase of tariff rates can only be used 
as evidence of exclusionary intent in combination with other factors; 
it is not an independent element of predatory pricing analysis. To 
repeat: application of Article 102 TFEU to tariff rate decreases below 
cost is not conditional on the actual effects of the conduct in 
                                       
448  Centro Servizi Spediporto Srl v Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo Srl. - Reference 
for a preliminary ruling: Tribunale di Genova - Italy. [1995] I ECR 2883, para 239 
449  Chuah (2005) op. cit § 12 pp.  216-219 
450  Whish and Bailey (2012) op. cit. p. 724 
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question, and it may not be even necessary to establish that the 
conduct is capable of producing such effects. 
2.2.3.3 Price Discrimination 
 
In general, lawful price differentiation is an acceptable practice in liner 
shipping. In a sense, standard tariffs are followed only on low volume 
clients. Instead, there are standard tariff deviations, structured in 
such a way that shippers are organised in different categories (classes) 
according to the conditions existing in each route i.e. the shipper’s 
cargo volume, charter negotiation, loyalty and rebates, port 
particularities etc. 
Article 102(2)(c) TFEU prohibits a dominant undertaking from 
applying ‘dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions’ with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Whereas a differentiated tariff structure does not automatically result 
in discrimination against transport users, it infringes Article 102(2)(c). 
Additionally, charging the same tariff rate for services based on 
different cost levels for the carrier is also discriminatory. 
 
The intention from and the injury caused by the dominant 
undertaking has to be clear: placing the parties in competitive 
disadvantage, moreover to harm competition. Therefore, price 
discrimination is generally classified according to the primary or 
secondary line injury it produces.451 Primary line injury is 
recognisable in loyalty rebates which result in the market being 
foreclosed for other competitors because shippers are attracted by 
lower rates offered by the dominant carrier.452 The secondary line 
injury concerns the discrimination among shippers; it produces direct 
harm for transport users as the discriminatory conditions of shipping 
service place them in a less favourable position on the market in 
                                       
451  Pozdnakova op. cit. p. 371-372 
452  Supra p. 141 
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comparison to other transport users. Below we shall analyse the 
elements of the tariff discriminatory policy by liner operators. 
 
2.2.3.3.1 Application of Dissimilar Tariff to Equivalent Services 
 
The key elements described in 102(2)(c) TFEU are the “dissimilar” 
tariff to “equivalent” services. These concepts need to be analysed 
within the liner shipping context in order to measure what are the 
conditions and standards attached to them before we proceed to the 
quantify the degree of damage inflicted in the competition by the 
discriminatory price policy of the dominant undertaking. 
 
First, the definition of price discrimination given in the paragraph 
above suggests that “equivalence” of shipping service can be measured 
on the basis of marginal cost (MC)453 of supply. Pozdnakova (2008)454 
is correct to suggest that “where the costs of supply of two shipping 
services differ, the two services are not equivalent”. Application of the 
MC as the only basis for determining the discriminatory nature is a 
parochial methodology, however. It is desirable that other cost 
benchmarks be taken under consideration as well455. 
                                       
453  Supra p. 165  
454  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 373 
455   See analysis of Cost Benchmarks, supra at section 2.2.3.1.3 Cost Levels in 
Liner Shipping 
 
If it is accepted that price related abuse occurs, then the problem is to 
identify and quantify it. The basic level of comparison is the cost 
of production. The difficulty in this is that these costs are 
generally difficult to assess in shipping. The cost-based method of 
assessing tariff rate levels implies that it is necessary to first 
identify the relevant cost structure of the dominant liner shipping 
company before examining that of its competitors. With regard to 
the former, cost expenditure and savings occur by the larger 
volume of cargo sent by shippers. In the first case, expenses incur 
due to the increased operation; in the second case, paradoxically 
due to the achievement of economies of scale. 
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In AKZO456 the matter of dissimilar tariffs was raised by the 
Commission. The Court found that, in addition to the large market 
share of 55% that proved a dominant position, AKZO’s policy of 
offering lower prices to some customers disadvantaged those still 
paying the higher prices vis-à-vis their competitors who were 
benefiting from the lower price.  
Comparable to fidelity rebates where customers paying the lower price 
have an unjustified advantage over customers not receiving the 
rebate, such instances of price discrimination have been held to be 
abusive. As already mentioned, however, it is not yet clear whether 
there is any general principle deriving from Article 102 TFEU that 
requires that - in all circumstances - a dominant firm must sell on 
non-discriminatory terms to all consumers.457 
 
2.2.3.3.2 Discounts based on Carrier’s Cost Savings 
 
Liner shipping companies offer discounts from the standard tariff for 
shipments of larger volumes of cargo under ‘time and volume’ 
arrangements and service contracts. As previously discussed458, a 
carrier in a dominant position is entitled to grant quantity discounts, 
                                                                                                             
In addition to the above, competitors’ cost is relevant where the fairness of the level 
of rate is to be tested by comparison of the dominant and its competitors’ rates. et 
seq.  Cost Levels in Liner Shipping If it is accepted that price related abuse occurs, 
then the problem is to identify and quantify it. The basic level of comparison is the 
cost of production. The difficulty in this is that these costs are generally difficult to 
assess in shipping. The cost-based method of assessing tariff rate levels implies that 
it is necessary to first identify the relevant cost structure of the dominant liner 
shipping company before examining that of its competitors. With regard to the 
former, cost expenditure and savings occur by the larger volume of cargo sent by 
shippers. In the first case, expenses incur due to the increased operation; in the 
second case, paradoxically due to the achievement of economies of scale.In addition 
to the above, competitors’ costs are relevant where the fairness of the level of rate is 
to be tested by comparison of the dominant and its competitors’ rates. 
456  AKZO Chemie BV vs Commission, Case 62/86 R [ECR 1991 I-3359] 
457  Hildebrand (2009) op. cit. p. 58 
458 Supra in 2.2.2.1 Requirement, Tying and Rebate Arrangements p. 141 
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which are justified by cost savings or economies of scale459 achieved 
by the carrier due to consignment size.  
 
Analogous to  Portuguese Airports460 and Zaventem461, a carrier is 
entitled to grant quantity discounts which are justified by cost savings 
or economies of scale achieved by the carrier due to consignment size. 
In principle, it is acceptable that shippers of larger volumes enjoy a 
proportionately larger discount in comparison to those who ship 
smaller volumes of cargo. 
 
While the carrier may save administrative costs and cargo handling 
costs, potentially justifying differences in tariff rates charged to bigger 
and smaller shippers, I believe that the above justification remains 
unclear. I deem that in shipping it is nearly impossible to quantify 
discounts, especially given the different sizes and weights of the 
products. 
 
Beginning with fixed costs Herman (1983)462 argues that 
administrative costs remain the same in many cases regardless of the 
volume of shipment. This cancels any effort of calculation from the 
start, as the element of proportional discount based on volumes 
transported. Moreover, the exact cost of carriage of each ton or unit of 
cargo cannot be determined due to the joint cost structure in liner 
shipping.463 
Another option is to rely upon gross average turnover made per 
customer; this could be a reliable first indication, as it does not 
require that cost savings be fully identified. Yet this option would 
require considerable investment (in terms of IT and administration) in 
                                       
459 Note that in Virgin/British Airways op. cit §114  para 101 the Commission 
discuss about efficiencies. 
460 Supra § 354 
461 Supra § 355 
462  Herman (1983) op. cit. pp 33-34  
463  See Lim Seok Min op. cit. § 406 
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order to calculate the exact amount of rebate per customer – avoiding 
thus discriminations and replacing them with an inefficient process. 
 
Continuing with the concepts of economies of scale and/or efficiencies, 
there is another particularity in liner shipping that is less complicated 
than cost allocation. Economies of scale can be achieved by larger 
volumes of transported goods within the same fixed cost framework. A 
sophisticated container placement on board is required in order to 
achieve this, yet this economy of scale is achieved not only by the 
carrier; the shipper's assistance is also needed. For example, a proper 
practice by freight forwarders, which purchase vessel space from liner 
shipping companies, is to perform cargo consolidation to increase 
density by arranging goods in full- container-loads. Efficient 
consolidation of cargo is particularly important in container shipping, 
where it minimizes transportation of less-than-full container loads but 
is also important in conventional scheduled transport because it 
directly contributes to more efficient use of vessel space and 
economies of scale for the carrier. In this way, freight forwarders 
perform a service for the carrier and this can reasonably be taken into 
account when relevant tariff rates are assessed in the context of 
Article 102(2)(c). 
 
Pozdnakova (2008)464 and Ridyard (2002)465  are correct to argue that 
there is almost no plausible cost function that would make any 
discount scheme cost-related in the sense that differences in price 
would be explained by differences in the costs of supply. 
Yet again, according to the ECJ,466 the amount of volume rebate does 
not need to be proportionately equal for any volume shipped. It should 
also be noted that inconsistency between the volume and discounts 
                                       
464  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit p. 374 
465  Ridyard Derek, “Exclusionary Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses 
under Article 82 - An Economic Analysis”, [European Competition Law Review 2002] 
pages 288-290 
466  Portuguese Airports op. cit. para 51 
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awarded the aggregated average stabilises at or near the maximum 
discount rate. The mere fact that the result of quantity discounts is 
that some customers enjoy, in respect of specific quantities, a 
proportionally higher average reduction than others in relation to the 
difference in their respective volumes of purchase is inherent in this 
type of system, but it cannot be inferred from that alone that the 
system is discriminatory.  
 
Therefore, I agree with the ratio of the Court in Portuguese Airports467 
which sets the intent as a key criterion that can replace the exact 
calculation, if the latter cannot be precisely achieved. Where discounts 
are enjoyed by only some trading parties, giving them an economic 
advantage which is not justified by the volume of business they bring 
or by any economies of scale they allow the supplier to make 
compared with their competitors, a system of quantity discounts leads 
to the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions. 
 
 
2.2.3.3.3 Price Discrimination Resulting in Disadvantage 
 
Article 102(2)(c) refers generally to secondary line injury, as it catches 
discrimination which places trading parties of a dominant undertaking 
at a competitive disadvantage. First, it is necessary to establish the 
meaning of ‘competitive disadvantage’ in liner shipping and clarify in 
which cases it can be caused by a discriminatory tariff system.468 
Second, it is essential to examine whether this requirement must be 
construed as a conceptual limitation on the applicability of Article 102 
TFEU to a discriminatory tariff system of dominant liner carriers.469 
 
                                       
467  Ibid. paras 52-53 
468  Pozdnakova (2008) ibid. p. 379 
469  Ibid. p. 380 
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On the one hand, we know that any price policy targets the transport 
users: the freight forwarders that obtain vessel space from the carrier 
as agents for the shipper, and the shippers which use the service of 
the dominant carrier and can trade in competing commodities. 
 
On the other hand, competitive disadvantage emerges whenever a 
user falls behind its competitors in its ability to supply goods or 
services at competitive prices. Moreover, a disadvantage may also 
arise if a user is refused a shipping service or offered less favourable 
terms and conditions of service than its competitors.  
 
Based on the findings of the section above, I consider it appropriate to 
rely on the criteria of intention and consequences as result of the 
inequality implemented by the operator to the shippers; a causation 
has to be established, however, by the action and the damage in a 
similar case as tort - the discriminatory pricing in turn must be a 
source of positive advantage to another shipper. In Virgin/British 
Airways,470 the Commission applied Article 82 EC to performance 
reward schemes of British Airways, which discriminated between 
travel agents and thus placed some of them at a disadvantage in 
relation to others in the acute competition between them.  
 
Transferring this decision to shipping, as far as the freight forwarders 
are concerned, we can assume the following: those freight forwarders 
that pay higher costs to the carriers than their competitors will have 
to charge more their customers, a fact that places them at a  
competitive disadvantage. Likewise, shippers can suffer damage in 
terms of economic loss. A peculiarity of competition law, however, is 
that damage is not required for the application of Article 102 TFEU; it 
is the “object and effect” of excluding competitors from the market 
                                       
470  Virgin/British Airways op. cit. para 111 
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that is more important.471 Notably in Clearstream472, the ECJ 
concluded that the discrimination alone against a trading partner 
continuously over a period of years “could not fail” to cause that 
partner a competitive disadvantage. 
 
 
2.2.3.4 Predatory Pricing 
 
Generally, predatory prices must be decreased below the cost of the 
predating carrier to be capable of producing exclusionary and 
eliminatory effects473. To win competition on rates so that competitors 
may have to exit the market, a dominant company does not 
necessarily have to supply a shipping service below cost and at a loss.  
 
In AKZO474 the ECJ concluded that Article 102 TFEU does not allow a 
dominant undertaking to compete by “using methods other than those 
which come within the scope of competition on the basis of quality”. The 
concept of such legitimate price competition is focused on the cost 
level of a dominant carrier and prohibits, in particular, charging rates 
below the average variable cost incurred by the carrier in supplying a 
shipping service. 
 
A dominant carrier may reduce tariff rates in response to a new entry 
to a level below the rival’s rates, so that no losses will actually be 
incurred but profit will be decreased.475 A finding of predation would, 
                                       
471  Virgin/British Airways paras 115 and 120. See also Corsica Ferries Italia vs 
Corporazione dei Piloti del Porto di Genova [1994 ECR I-1783] para 34. See also 
Clearstream vs Commission (Clearstream) [2009  ECR II-3155] paras 67-68. 
472  Ibid. 
473  AKZO op. cit. para 72: “if they are determined as part of a plan for 
eliminating a competitor. Such prices can drive from the market undertakings which 
are perhaps as efficient as the dominant undertaking but which, because of their 
smaller financial resources, are incapable of withstanding the competition waged 
against them.” 
474  AKZO op. cit. para 70 
475  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 339 
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in the case of such sustainable pricing strategy, be quite controversial. 
In this section I discuss the applicability of Article 102 TFEU to tariff 
policies of the dominant carriers which do not involve supplying a 
shipping service below cost. This affects both actual and potential 
competition.  
 
Thus, predatory pricing differs from lawful competition because lower 
tariff rates are not explained by a lower level of costs, but by the loss-
making strategy of the predating carrier. Calculating the margin 
between average variable cost and the tariff rate, which discloses 
whether the carrier incurs short-run losses when it supplies a 
shipping service, is not the only method for assessing the 
reasonableness of a dominant carrier’s pricing strategy. When a 
dominant carrier faces increased competition, it must operate in such 
a way as to stay on the market, preferably without losing any or much 
of its current market share. This can be achieved by reducing costs so 
that it is able to offer lower rates. The key criterion is to identify 
whether the dominant carrier chooses to suffer losses rather than to 
avoid them; such pricing behaviour should be examined in more 
detail because it does not, at face value, appear to be consistent with 
competition on its merits permitted by Article 102 TFEU.476 
The definition of predatory pricing is focused on the distinction 
between price competition based on efficiency, which is lawful, and 
price competition based on the exercise of market power, which 
infringes Article 102 TFEU.  
 
2.2.3.4.1 Pricing below Total Cost (TC) 
 
Due to the importance of fixed costs in liner shipping, a predatory 
pricing rule limited strictly to the criterion based on average variable 
                                       
476  Ibid. p. 345 
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cost may not be fully appropriate for assessing the predatory nature of 
pricing strategies in this market.477  
 
For a liner shipping service to be profitable in the long run, the carrier 
needs to earn net voyage revenue over a period to cover both variable 
and fixed costs as well as an adequate rate of return on capital.478 The 
policy of charging rates above the variable cost level but below the 
total cost level of the carrier in question can be explained by a variety 
of reasons, not necessarily by a predatory objective. By covering costs 
related to carriage of a specific consignment, the carrier does not 
increase its economic losses, although it foregoes recovering costs 
related to operation of the shipping service as a whole. Furthermore, a 
rate above the average variable cost still covers at least a part of the 
carrier’s fixed costs. Given that tariff rate decreases to a level 
exceeding the average variable cost of the shipping service may be 
commercially justified, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the cost test 
to establish abusiveness of pricing conduct. 
 
2.2.3.4.2 Pricing below Average Total Cost (ATC) 
 
 
Tariff rates below the total and average total cost (ATC) but above the 
average variable cost of the shipping service are abusive if eliminatory 
intent of the allegedly predatory carrier can be shown. Average total 
costs consist of average variable costs and average fixed costs479 of the 
carrier. Where a dominant carrier charges tariff rates below the 
average total cost associated with maintaining and operating a 
scheduled shipping service as a whole, such discounts are very 
suspicious; particularly where the dominant undertaking does not 
compete on the basis of better efficiency and lower costs but on the 
                                       
477  Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit p.347 
478  Stopford (1997) op. cit. supra 
479  Ibid. supra § 407 
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basis of its higher degree of market power and stronger financial 
position, which allows it to endure losses of profit longer than its 
competitors. It is necessary to distinguish, however, between efficient 
and non-efficient competitors. The former operate on the same cost 
levels as the dominant carrier, but this does not mean that predatory 
pricing targeted against less efficient rivals will, for this reason, always 
fall outside Article 102 TFEU. 480 Such an interpretation would operate 
as an exemption for dominant carriers who attempt to eliminate or 
discipline newly-established suppliers, which may have higher cost 
levels at first. This could, additionally, prevent new entry; 
notwithstanding, members of collectively dominant liner cartels can be 
even less efficient than independent carriers.481 
 
2.2.3.4.3 Recouping of Losses 
 
 
The predator’s intent is to charge a below-cost price, in a sense 
investing in self-subsidies; once competitors are eliminated then it 
achieves a return on its investment. However, it has been argued that 
predatory pricing will not always be a plausible market strategy even 
for a dominant undertaking because it may not necessarily be able to 
regain its losses. A dominant carrier may not have the possibility to 
recoup losses from predation if the competitor is not eliminated or 
disciplined, or if new entry takes place. The probability and the form 
of recoupment in liner shipping depends on a variety of conditions 
such as market structure, degree of potential competition, market 
share of the predatory carrier, as well as the individual or collective 
nature of its dominant position. The ECJ in Tetra Pack II482 held that 
it would not be appropriate to require a recouping of losses. The Court 
                                       
480  Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, op. cit para 63 
481  Pozdnakova (2008) op.cit p. 349 
482  Tetra Pak International SA vs Commission (TETRA PAK II), ECJ [ECR 1996 
Page I-05951] para 44 
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established further that it must be possible to penalize predatory 
pricing whenever there is a risk that competitors will be eliminated—
as the aim pursued, which is to maintain undistorted competition, 
rules out waiting until such a strategy leads to the actual elimination 
of competitors. 
 
Furthermore, the collective nature of dominance held by the liner 
shipping consortium may influence and affect its ability to recoup 
profit lost in rate wars against outsiders. In CEWAL I483 the Court 
found that sharing losses among the members of a dominant cartel 
reduced the financial burden faced by individual participants. Where 
the beneficiary of predation is a dominant liner cartel rather than a 
single carrier, the recoupment of losses incurred in the course of 
predation must be distributed among the members of the group; this 
presupposes at least an effective discussion and supervisory 
mechanism to negotiate and enforce recoupment.  
 
2.2.3.4.4 Above Cost Pricing with Fighting - Ship  
 
 
Consortia may reduce rates or increase the capacity or frequency of 
their members’ services to eliminate less powerful competition. The 
practice of “fighting ships” – offering selectively lower rates, different 
from those contained in the tariff, to coincide with the presence of an 
independent in a port where the conference operates - has been 
roundly criticised as an abusive practice. A ‘fighting ship’ is a vessel 
placed on berth by a liner conference to sail in competition with a 
non-conference carrier. The purpose of this practice is to persuade 
shippers, with various inducements, to dispatch their cargo on board 
the fighting ship in preference to the competitor’s vessel. In order to 
achieve this, the fighting ship would be scheduled to sail on the same 
                                       
483  CEWAL I op. cit. §102  paras 90, 91 and 101. 
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day as the competitor’s vessel, or several fighting ships would bracket 
the competitor’s sailings. The fighting ship would call at the same 
ports as the nonconference competitor, and it would charge the same 
or lower rates as this outsider, even if such rates were well below the 
conference tariff. Financial losses of the fighting vessel would be 
distributed over the members of the conference, who would each 
suffer proportionately less than the outsider. Furthermore, the 
conference members would often have the advantage of obtaining 
higher rates on their other sailings.484 However, as Chuah (2005) well 
observes485, such practice is in present day circumstances not likely 
to occur as the system of pre-booking containers for loading cargo 
would effectively prevent last minute attempts.  
 
In CEWAL I 486, selective lowering of tariff rates by a collectively 
dominant liner conference as a part of its ‘fighting ships’ strategy 
against its only competitor was found to be unlawful within the 
meaning of Article 102 EC. Shippers who were likely to switch to the 
competitor were offered discount rates, whereas others were charged 
normal or higher rates. Members of CEWAL designated as fighting 
ships those conference vessels whose sailing dates were closest to the 
sailings of the competitor’s ship without actually altering its 
scheduled timetables; the jointly fixed fighting rates differed from the 
rates normally charged by the conference lines so that they were the 
same or lower than their competitor’s advertised rates. The resulting 
decrease in profit was jointly borne by the CEWAL members; in this 
context they were collectively sharing the losses487. 
 
By contrast to the case of AKZO on below-cost selling, the fighting 
rates applied by CEWAL were above costs and simply resulted in a 
decrease in earnings for the conference members. CEWAL lines, in 
                                       
484  Discussion Paper on Exclusionary Practices op. cit. para 128 
485  Chuah (2005) op. cit. § 12 p. 231 
486 CEWAL I op. cit. §102 paras 89 et seq. 
487    See also supra section2.2.3.4.3 Recouping of Losses p.185 
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principle, merely matched competitor’s rates without ever trying to 
offer prices lower than those of the independent shipping operation. 
 
The finding of exclusionary intent was a central element of assessing 
pricing practices in this case. Eliminatory intent was primarily shown 
by the selective nature of rate decreases below the rates normally 
applied. The essence of abusive conduct by the CEWAL conference 
resided in a strategy of selective and targeted application of lower 
rates in response to the fresh competitive threat posed by the 
competing carrier. 
 
In Arkin vs. Borchard Lines488, Arkin sought damages from Borchard 
in the English courts, alleging that Borchard had breached ex Article 
82 EC, alternatively ex Article 81 EC. Although the claimant failed to 
establish a case on merits, the case is significant in that this is the 
first time that an English court has considered an action for damages 
arising from an alleged breach of ex Article 82 EC’. The Court referred 
to the judgment in Courage Ltd. vs Crehan489, which considered 
liability for breach of Article ex 81 EC. Although it did not address the 
point directly, the Court proceeded on the basis that an action for 
damages was also available for breach of ex Article 82 EC (thereby 
implicitly upholding the general private enforcement principle set out 
in Garden Cottage Foods vs Milk Marketing Board490). 
 
The claimant, a shipping group, asserted that the defendant shipping 
conferences had engaged in predatory pricing, had used so-called 
‘fighting ships’ to win business, and had spread rumours of the 
claimant's insolvency in order to drive business to the conferences. 
                                       
488  Yeheskel Arkin vs Borchard Lines Limited & Ors, Borchard Lines Limited and 
Zim Israel Navigation Company Ltd & Ors [2003] EWHC 687 (Comm Court) 
489  Courage Ltd v Crehan, Case C-453/99 [2001] ECR I 6297; Crehan vs 
Inntrepreneur Pub Company [2003] EWHC 1510 (Chancery Division); [2003] ALL ER 
(D) 354 (Jun); CA, [2004] EWCA Civ 637, 21 May 2004 
490  Garden Cottage Foods Ltd vs Milk Marketing Board [1984] 1 AC 130; [1983] 2 
A11 ER 770, HL. 
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Alternatively, the claimant argued that the agreements between the 
conferences during the relevant period in 1991 fell outside the ex 
Article 81(3) EC shipping conference block exemption regulation 
(Regulation 4056/86). The judge found that as the prices charged by 
the conferences during the alleged price war were above average 
variable cost, and as there was no evidence that the conferences’ price 
reductions were implemented with the intention of eliminating the 
claimant from the market, they were not predatory. The judge 
confirmed, however, that had prices been below such average variable 
cost, proof of exclusionary intent would not have been necessary. 
Further, there was no evidence to substantiate the use of fighting 
ships or that any rumours were spread by the defendants. The 
defendants’ behaviour during the relevant period did not fall outside of 
the block exemption regulation.  What is most important about this 
case is that Justice Colman recognised that a dominant undertaking 
was entitled to take part in ordinary competition by reasonable and 
proportionate rate reductions without having to worry that its 
competitive measures may actually succeed, thereby restoring at least 
some part of its recently lost market share and so, at least in theory, 
reducing the market share and therefore the market strengths of its 
competitor. Holmes and Lennon491 and Chuah (2005)492 agree that the 
judgment set an important precedent; the latter also argues that the 
application of a less than cost price and the use of fighting ships, 
which could not be considered as intrinsically abnormal market 
behaviour must be assessed subjectively.493    
 
2.2.3.4.5  Limit Pricing 
 
A similar phenomenon to the fighting ships that relates to 
intentionally created “excess capacity,” is limit pricing. It is a form of 
                                       
491  Holmes Marjorie, Lennon Paula, "Competition: Damages - Standard of Proof", 
International Business Lawyer, [2003] pp. 259-263. 
492  Chuah (2005) op. cit § 12 p. 230 
493  Ibid. p. 230 
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strategic entry deterrence aimed at potential entrants rather than 
existing competitors. Though there is no jurisprudence with regard to 
limit pricing, a practice of such kind could hypothetically occur when 
the dominant undertaking creates excess capacity and uses this 
capacity to deter entrants without ever lowering its price below the 
average total cost; if entry is attempted, the dominant firm can 
increase its production and lower its price without going below cost.494 
 
As discussed earlier495, issues related to dynamic changes in the 
available capacity are a rather typical feature of shipping markets, 
which can, inter alia, be explained by seasonal and directional 
fluctuations in demand and investments made in larger vessels in 
order to benefit from economies of scale.  Excess capacity can be used 
as a kind of entry deterrence strategy by a dominant carrier. First, the 
dominant carrier can hold its excess capacity and the threat of future 
output increases over smaller carriers who are thinking about 
enlarging output or entering the market. The object of the dominant 
consortium to operate empty vessels is to prevent competitors from 
entering the market, because such entry will be considered 
unrewarding. Losses incurred from such inefficient capacity can be 
transferred collectively to the group and ultimately to the shipper.496 
 
The above relies ad hoc on the detection of intent. It undoubtedly 
constitutes, in the context of competition law, a confirmed element of 
the actus reus, albeit I believe that it has to be supported by the 
evaluation of the competitor’s behaviour as well. For instance: 
i) What did the competitor do in order to defend against this 
practice? 
ii) Did the competitor use all his resources available to defend 
against this practice? 
 
                                       
494 Jones, Sufrin p. 465 
495 Supra section 1.2 Economic Analysis of the Relevant Market p. 38. 
496 Pozdnakova (2008) op. cit. p. 361 
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The matter is also addressed in Arkin vs Borchard Lines497, and 
Hovenkamp (2005)498 analyses the matter of excess capacity as the 
result of a merger against the static and traditional vision of 
evaluating market shares and market power. He raises the argument 
that an analysis should examine whether the competitor has done 
everything possible to counter the limit pricing and fighting ships; in 
particular, whether it offset excess capacity with output increases.  
 
It is worth revisiting the issue of collective dominance as a result of a 
joint venture. Since the purpose of the consortium relates to the 
rationalisation of service, I this can only be achieved by withdrawing 
excess capacity (i.e. vessels) and operating costs. Yet this becomes a 
paradox on its own merit if one assumes that whenever firms form an 
alliance, the new business entity’s market share is the sum of the 
constituent parties while the competitors’ shares remain the same - 
this is rare, especially in shipping. I thus agree with the concerns 
raised by Hovenkamp (2005)499, who holds that if the joint venture’s 
purpose is to decrease costs, the share of the consortium is likely to 
grow. By contrast, if the consortium’s purpose is to reduce output (by 
practically limiting the excess capacity), the competitors may do the 
same, otherwise they must make offsetting output increases. In the 
latter case, the share of the consortium firm will decline. Hence it is 
necessary to examine whether the competitor has done its best to fill 
the gap of the capacity that was withdrawn by increasing its output. 
 
2.2.3.4.6 Lawful Price Decreases that Fall outside Article 102 TFEU 
 
Pricing policy adopted by a dominant liner shipping company or 
companies that would, in general, be considered abusive can fall 
outside Article 102 TFEU if justifiable by objective reasons.  
                                       
497  Supra footnote 488 
498 Hovenkamp (2005) op. cit. p 214 
499  Ibid. p. 241 
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Objective justification under Article TFEU must be distinguished from 
the exemption rule laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU. Objectively 
justified tariff rate decreases fall outside Article 102 TFEU’s 
prohibition, not because they produce benefits of the kind required for 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU, but because they do not amount to 
an abuse of dominant position at all; otherwise the opposite would 
constitute an exemption. In TACA500 the CFI held that the 
justifications permitted by the case-law cannot result in creating 
exemptions from the application of that provision. The sole purpose of 
those grounds of justification is to enable a dominant undertaking to 
show that the purpose of those practices is reasonably to protect its 
commercial interests in the face of action taken by certain third 
parties, and that they do not therefore constitute an abuse. In general, 
there are three major objective reasons that can justify price 
increases: 
 
2.2.3.4.6.1 Competition Defence: 
 
According to the EU Commission501, this justification can only apply 
to individual and not to collective behaviour to meet competition; thus 
it cannot apply to liner consortia. The justification applies to 
individual dominant carriers engaged in price competition in order to 
protect their commercial interests when they are attacked.502 Price 
cuts as such will not infringe Article 102 TFEU if they, first, protect 
the legitimate interests of the carrier and, second, are proportionate to 
the threat the carrier faces. The burden of proof that these conditions 
are fulfilled will be on the dominant company. The collective nature of 
dominance held by liner shipping companies can also affect the 
availability of the objective justification defence. 
                                       
500  TACA Judgment op. cit  para 1114 
501  Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, op. cit. para 81 
502   Tetra Pak II (CFI) op. cit. para 189. 
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While this interpretation is reserved only for individual companies, I 
argue that it can expand to cover consortia as well. I will base my 
arguments on the strength and level of coordination that is necessary 
for establishing collective dominance: 
i) For collective dominance to exist under Article 102, two or 
more undertakings must, from an economic point of view, 
present themselves or act together on a particular market 
as a collective entity.503 It is not required that the 
undertakings concerned adopt identical conduct on the 
market in every respect.504 What matters is that they are 
able to adopt a common policy on the market and act to a 
considerable extent independently of their competitors, 
their customers, and also of consumers.505 
ii) Coordination is more likely to emerge in markets where it 
is relatively simple to reach a common understanding on 
the terms of coordination. The simpler and more stable 
the economic environment, the easier it is for 
undertakings to reach a common understanding.506 For 
example, incumbents may coordinate by dividing the 
market, for instance by sub-geographic area or other 
customer characteristics, or by allocating contracts in 
bidding markets.507 The ability to arrive at and sustain 
such coordination is what matters. By contrast, the more 
dynamic and unstable a market is, the less coordinated 
the joint venture may become. Thus, the necessary 
element of coordination affects the strength of the 
consortium.  
                                       
503  CEWAL (2000) op. cit. para 36. 
504  Irish Sugar PLC vs Commission, (Irish Sugar), Case T-228/97 [1999 ECR II-
2969] para 66 
505  French Republic and Société commerciale des potasses et de l'azote (SCPA) 
and Entreprise minière et chimique (EMC) vs Commission, (SPCA),  Joined Cases C-
68/94 and C-30/95, [1998 ECR I-1375] para 221 
506  Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, op. cit. para 47 
507  Ibid. para 47 
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iii) For such coordination to be achieved, a proper centralised 
mechanism must be set to monitor whether or not the 
other undertakings are adhering to the common policy.508 
This common policy must be sustainable over time509 and 
any abusive practice must not impede the implementation 
of the common commercial strategy.510 
 
If the above conditions that relate to the coordination of the policy are 
not fulfilled then we may have a loose joint venture that might not 
have established collective dominance. It is a matter of proof, however, 
and the consortium has the burden to prove that such coordination 
has not taken place. 
 
2.2.3.4.6.2 Efficiency Defence 
 
Tariff decreases, even below cost, can be explained by the need of the 
carrier to minimize losses arising from substantial fall in demand and 
resulting significant excess capacity - which needs to be filled at any 
price so that at least some fixed costs are covered. For this defence the 
dominant company must demonstrate that the following conditions 
are fulfilled511:  
i) that efficiencies are realised or likely to be realised as a 
result of the conduct concerned;  
ii) that the conduct concerned is indispensable to realise these 
efficiencies;  
iii) that the efficiencies benefit consumers; 
iv) that competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products concerned is not eliminated. 
 
                                       
508  AIRTOURS (2002) op. cit. para 111 
509  Idem. 
510  Idem. 
511  Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, op. cit. para 84 
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In order to determine efficiency, the analysis must determine the type 
and effect of costs involved. 
2.2.3.4.6.3 Promotional Campaign 
 
Promotional tariff rates, which are lower than standard tariff rates, 
can be granted by shipping lines to shippers in order to enable their 
products to penetrate new markets. This falls under the legitimate 
rebates and discounts policy as analysed in section above.512 
 
                                       
512  Supra section 2.2.2.1 Requirement, Tying and Rebate Arrangements p. 141  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter three, based on the findings and analysis of chapters one 
and two, I research the special particularities of the tramp maritime 
sector. This refers only to those specific issues that are relevant to the 
tramp maritime sector, as the majority of the legal issues are common 
between the two sectors. The subjects raised here relate to the 
definition of the relevant market in tramp shipping and review of 
tramp shipping pools and other cooperation agreements under Article 
101 TFEU. 
In the absence of any case law for tramp shipping,  it seems that the 
term “tramp shipping services,” as understood by the Commission, is 
basically an intellectual construct with blurred boundaries and an 
uncertain scope that does not merit any legal consideration since it 
has not produced any case law.  
Understanding of the industry is essential.  If the purpose of the EC 
competition policy is to contribute to the efficiency  and growth of the 
European economy, and at the same time impose non-pragmatic 
conditions and unfavourable regulatory frameworks to a market that 
accounts for more than 80% of the transport of goods, does not seem 
to be the right way to go.  
 
In order to address the above, I structure this chapter as follows: First 
I present the nature and structure of tramp shipping pool. In chapters 
one and two, I have conducted competition analysis of the liner 
shipping consortia, and I set the central idea that governs my 
analysis. In this chapter, I examine tramp shipping and tramp 
shipping pools, revisiting the concepts of the relevant market, and the 
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compatibility of tramp shipping pools with article 101 TFEU. I 
structure the chapter by focusing on the tramp shipping 
particularities and adopting the findings of chapters one and 
two(where applicable). I categorise pools according to their level of risk 
under the current EU Legislation, finally proposing an unconventional 
solution that exceeds the standards of competition law and refers to 
the definition of the relevant market.  
 
3.2 The Relevant Market in Tramp Shipping 
 
3.2.1 The Relevant Service Market 
 
 
Of course, it may not be feasible to tie the tramp shipping market to a 
pen-made definition that is not outlined nor agreed upon by the 
industry. Maritime transport is an extremely dynamic sector and 
therefore any market definition attempts must take into account the 
complexity of its structure. 
 
The complexity of the maritime transport market and the relationships 
between contractual parties must not be underestimated.  It is evident 
that supply substitutability in tramp shipping is achieved on a 
significant and satisfactory level. In a comprehensive report to the EU 
Commission, Fearnley Consultants (2007)513 analysed the tramp 
market from the techno-legal and economic point of view. In their 
report, it is suggested (and insofar remains undisputed) that vessels of 
different types and sizes can be substituted for each other to meet the 
demand for the carriage of specific cargo. As explained in chapter one, 
                                       
513 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm, Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services [‘EU Report 
COMP/2006/D2/002’, 22/2/2007]: EU Commission, paras 93-94 
<ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/maritime/tramp_report.pdf> 
[accessed 15 March 2009]. 
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service can also be substituted by liner service. Even where 
specialised vessels have been developed to meet the requirements of a 
particular type of cargo, they can also be used for other cargo,514 or 
economies of scale can be achieved by transhipments to other vessels 
of the parent company. Thus, a division between size-dependent sub-
markets is quite normal, and, with reference to the market share, does 
not play a significant role in price determination or good market 
regulation. As mentioned previously, smaller vessels can often 
compete with larger vessels due to differences in trading patterns. 
Smaller vessels, due to versatility, can combine voyages and, hence, 
increase earning days by reducing the time in ballast. As a result, the 
operators of such vessels can be competitive with freight rates for one 
or more voyages in a combination trade, and subsequently, they can 
compete with larger vessels which are unable to utilise combination 
opportunities.515 Likewise, ‘reverse substitutability’516 or competition 
between different ship types517 and significant commodity 
interchangeability518 is regularly observed.  
 
                                       
514  Even in the cases where the size of vessel used is too large to allow it to call 
at the load or discharge port, the cargo can be transhipped to or from the mother 
ship to or from the shore by “lighters” or smaller vessels. It is therefore possible to 
get economies of scale when using a larger vessel, even where a port is not able to 
physically accommodate the ship. For example, reefer ships are used to carry new or 
used cars from the Northern Hemisphere to the Southern Hemisphere on their 
backhaul routes. Also in some cases, the substitution may occur primarily in one 
direction, e.g., it is easier to utilise a tanker trading with clean petroleum products 
in the dirty petroleum product trade than the other way around. 
515 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit, Para 94 
516  Where the charterer has to rent special equipment that is not charged to the 
client. 
517  We mention for example the OBO (Oil-Bulk-Ore) and OO (Ore-Oil) vessels. 
These are vessels that are specially constructed for the carriage of both liquid and 
dry bulk commodities (albeit, not simultaneously) and can therefore compete in 
most bulk commodity trades. Another example is the deep-sea Ro-Ro carriers that 
compete with PCTCs (Pure Car and Truck Carriers) for non-vehicle cargoes. Also, 
petroleum product carriers and chemical carriers may compete for clean petroleum 
products (e.g. gasoline and naphtha). Moreover, an OHBC's and multi-purpose 
carrier may carry containers, thus competing with container vessels; and reefers 
and car carriers may both carry (second hand) vehicles. 
518  Based on the internal databases of Fearnley (2006), in a sample of 1,924 dry 
bulk vessels trading in 2003, it was found that 54 per cent of the fleet carried three 
different commodities. See: Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman 
Fenwick & Willan Law Firm (2007), op. cit, Para  98 
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Global Insight (2007)519 uses price correlation analysis520 and the 
SSNIP test in order to address the problem of the definition of the 
relevant market.521 I present a summary of the SSNIP test result 
below: 
 
Basically, the SSNIP test seeks to identify the relevant market as the 
smallest market where a 5% increase in price can be sustained for one 
year assuming that ‘the terms of sale of all other products are held 
constant’. If substitutes are available such that a 5% increase in price 
must be lowered to maintain competitiveness, then the relevant 
market needs to be expanded to include substitutes to reach a point 
where the 5% price increase can be sustained. 
 
Accordingly, in tramp shipping, a 5% price increase would be an 
increase in freight rates and the substitutable goods would be the 
vessel types. Applying the SSNIP test to tramp shipping is certainly 
less straightforward than applying it to other markets given the 
complexities of the industry. For instance, should the substitution 
rule apply in the transportation, it means that a 5% increase in freight 
rates on Capesize vessels would bring to a switch to Panamax vessels. 
However, the types of cargo that can be carried on each vessel, as they 
relate to the variety of geographical routes where these vessels can 
travel, add to the complexity of determining a standard for freight 
rates; consequently, this affects the definition of the relevant markets. 
In practice, one cannot simply consider the freight rate for the 
Capesize vessel and accordingly apply the SSNIP test in a productive 
manner, since, unlike other markets, tramp shipping experiences 
absolute geographical substitutability. 
 
                                       
519 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit,Paras 1189-1233 
520 Newbold Paul, Carlson William, Thorne Betty, Statistics for Business and 
Economics [Prentice-Hall, London 1995) p. 427 et seq 
521  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant markets (1997)op. cit, para 
15 
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Three questions are raised here in relation to the interchangeability or 
substitutability in all segments of the market: 
A) Can a shipper of dry bulk use the services of a liquid bulk vessel 
instead? 
B) Can a shipper use different vessel independently of their 
draught and type? 
C) Can one assess the degree of substitutability among different 
types of vessels or ports?  
 
To answer the above we need to establish a valid substitutability 
connection between different service providers. 
 
Thus, while the SSNIP test can be theoretically applied in tramp 
shipping, it consecutively fails firstly to identify a relevant product 
market beyond doubt; and secondly, to reveal measureable 
substitutions. The assumption is, therefore, that the market is as 
global as the worldwide vessels trade, and there are no indications of 
regional markets,522 especially since customers are prepared to switch 
between service providers regardless of their geographical location.  
 
The above results were based on the method of correlation analysis, 
which showed increased fluctuation in the correlation of tramp 
shipping markets.523 Hence, any signs of evident correlation which 
could support the existence of certain geographical markets have not 
been persistent enough to conclude that the market, as such, was 
established and that market dominance could be built. On the 
contrary, enough fluctuation to suggest the opposite524 was observed. 
                                       
522  Fearnley Consultants (2007) op. cit. para 1316. 
523  Fearnley Consultants (2007) op. cit. para 1195. In statistics, correlation 
refers to any of a broad class of statistical relationships involving dependence. 
524  In fact, from the correlation tables, Global Insight (2007), op. cit, analysis 
that spanned from 2003-2007 observed various correlations. Notably, the trans-
Atlantic grain trades in Panamax correlated with Capesize iron ore shipments from 
West Australia to Japan. Throughout the entire period the correlation factor was 
0.79 (high), while in the period from September 2003 to June 2004 the correlation 
factor was only 0.16. During this period, freight rates rose sharply towards the end 
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Another study525 indicated a spill over effect in the earnings of dry 
bulk and liquid bulk (tankers) cargo vessels. Inductively, and with 
certain degree of risk, one sees connection even between different 
types of cargo vessels. 
 
Could it be suggested that the non-existence of a relevant geographic 
market might be a general rule? 
 
-Undoubtedly, it prima facie does. From an unconventional point of 
view, the findings of Fearnley Consultants’ Report (2007) furthermore 
suggest a general spill-over of interchangeability between services, 
manifested by the continuous substitution and sui generis absence of 
clear boundaries of the geographic market. A sui generis approach 
would involve accepting the impossibility of narrowing the relevant 
market in terms of service and geographic terms, and treat the sector 
as a “genuinely” non-stable market. 
 
3.2.2 The Relevant Geographic Market 
 
Unlike many markets, tramp shipping experiences unique 
geographical substitutability. In tramp shipping, most routes within 
the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans are substitutable in the short term. If 
operating a route between the United States and Europe, a vessel can 
quite easily shift to operate a Europe-Caribbean route if the freight 
rates make it economical for the vessel to do so. Furthermore, in the 
case of an EU-based power utility importing coal, the coal market is 
relatively advanced, offering hedging (an investment position intended 
                                                                                                             
of January 2004, and declined sharply towards June. This example also illustrates 
the point that periods of low correlation can occur within one and the same product 
market and the volatility is an essential factor that influences the markets in 
question. See: Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan 
Law Firm (2007), op. cit, paras 1206 and 1208 
525  Koseoglu, Sinem Derindere, “Market Earnings Risks and Spillover Effects in 
Tramp Shipping Industry”, International Journal of Decision Sciences, Vol. 2, No.1, 
[2011] pp.37-53 
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to offset potential losses/gains that may be incurred by a companion 
investment) and derivative tools (e.g. swaps)  that provide the 
consumer with a number of alternatives for sourcing coal.526 
The traditional approach of geographic definition is presented in 
chapter one. On this issue, both the TAA and the Guidelines on 
maritime transport provide guidance. The TAA decision states that 
“the geographic market  is the area in which the services defined 
above are marketed”;527 while  the Guidelines  outline that, 
notwithstanding the final definition of the relevant geographic market, 
“ports provide the first orientation for the definition of the relevant 
geographic market”.528 The significance of the Fearnley Consultants 
(2007) findings is important. Their report proves that is only 
theoretical possible to define a geographic market in tramp 
shipping.529 I analyse below the matter of market definition by also 
exploring the concepts of cross-subsidisation and market aggregations 
as a possible proposal for market definition in dynamic markets. 
 
3.3 Review of Cooperation Agreements 
under Article 101 TFEU in Tramp 
Cooperation Agreements 
 
3.3.1 Tramp Shipping Pool and the Concepts of 
“Undertaking” and “Agreement”. 
 
3.3.1.1 A Typical Tramp Shipping Pool Structure 
 
                                       
526 Fearnley Consultants (2007) op. cit. para 1197. 
527 TAA decision op. cit. Para 37 
528 Maritime Guidelines (2008) p. 7 
529 Supra op. cit para 1316. 
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A standard shipping pool  is a type of horizontal cooperation between  
carriers  that brings  together a number of similar vessels under 
different ownership, to be operated under the single administration of  
a  pool manager who  markets the  pool vessels as a single cohesive 
fleet. 
In particular, a standard shipping pool brings together a number of 
similar vessels under different ownerships and operates under a single 
administration. Although there is no standard agreement for shipping 
pools, there are some common characteristics530, which are best 
summarised in the Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 of the 
TFEU to Maritime Transport.  The Guidelines consider a pool 
agreement to be essentially a joint selling horizontal agreement; as 
such, it could potentially fall foul of Article 101. It should however be 
noted that the Guidelines do recognise the fact that some pool 
agreements may not constitute joint selling agreements, but could in  
fact simply be joint purchasing or joint scheduling arrangements. Pool 
agreements are highly flexible, and as such, each agreement has to be 
evaluated on its own merits.531 
 
Pools, as with other looser forms of cooperation involving actual or 
potential competitors, could be deemed as prima facie anti-
competitive. Although from a competition point of view it could be 
argued that the relatively smaller bulk shipping operators cannot 
possibly compete for such contracts, pools are created in order to 
respond to demand requirements rather than to obtain market power 
or an increased market share.532 This business model may not only 
                                       
530  Holmes Marjorie, "Maritime Transport", Competition Law Insight [2008] pp. 9-
10. Holmes denotes firstly that it is rare for sector specific guidelines to be issued, 
reflecting the importance of shipping for trade and global economies. She also 
mentions the Chancery Division case of Bookmakers' Afternoon Greyhound Services 
Ltd vs. Amalgamated Racing Ltd, which highlighted that many pools operate under 
different and special circumstances. 
See case: Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Ltd vs. Amalgamated Racing 
Ltd [2008] EWHC 1978 (Ch); [2009] U.K.C.L.R. 547 (Ch D) 
531 Chuah Jason (2008) op. cit. §25  p. 366  
532 Haralambides Hercules, “The Economics of Bulk Shipping Pools”, Maritime 
Policy & Management, [Volume 23, Issue 3, 1996] p. 236 
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raise shipowners’ profits as a result of increased efficiency, but may 
also produce benefits for charterers in terms of lower quality adjusted 
freights. In this sense, bulk pools should not be seen as anti-
competitive any more than the large international shippers of bulk 
commodities whom the pools try to serve.533 Following the 
Commission’s reform programme, it has become a priority for all 
operators to examine the extent to which pools might have an impact 
on EU trade and to analyse them under the EC competition rules. 
Packard (1989)534 describes the basic features and criteria for a tramp 
pool as follows:  
 
i) a collection of similar vessel types; 
ii) under various ownerships; 
iii) placed under the care of an administration; which 
iv) markets the vessels as a single cohesive unit; and 
v) collects the earnings; which 
vi) Are distributed to individual owners under a pre-arranged 
weighting (point) system by which each entered vessel 
receives its fair share. 
 
In this context, a Pool Manager is normally responsible for the 
commercial management (for example, joint marketing,535 negotiation 
of freight rates and centralisation of incomes and voyage costs536) and 
the commercial operation (planning vessel movements and instructing 
vessels, nominating agents in ports, keeping customers updated, 
issuing freight invoices, ordering bunkers, collecting the vessels' 
earnings and distributing them under a pre-arranged weighting 
                                       
533 Lorenzon Filippo, Nazzini Renato, “Setting sail on a sea of doubt: Tramp 
shipping pools, competition law and the noble quest for certainty” in Antapassis 
Antonis, Athanassiou Lia, Røsæg Erik (ed/s.), op. cit. p. 100 
534  Packard V. William, Shipping Pools [Lloyds of London Press, London 1989] 
p. 3 
535  For example, the pool’s vessels are marketed as one commercial unit offering 
transport solutions regardless of which ship performs the actual voyage. 
536  For example, the pool’s income is collected by the central administration 
and revenue is distributed to the participants based on a complex weighting system. 
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system etc.). The Pool Manager often acts under the supervision of a 
general executive committee representing the vessel owners. The 
technical operation of vessels is usually the responsibility of each 
owner (safety, crew, repairs, maintenance etc.), and although they 
market their services jointly, the pool members often perform the 
services individually. 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Rationale for Entering a Tramp Pool 
 
Haralambides (1996)537 identifies three broad reasons that motivate 
shipowners to join a tramp shipping pool: 
Firstly, shipowners wish to obtain the best possible access to 
timecharters and depend less on the spot market. Accordingly, 
Contracts of Affreightment (COAs), i.e. timecharters, present greater 
risk sharing and income stabilisation, as well as exploitation of 
amassed resources. COAs require the regular movement of significant 
amounts of cargo on an agreed schedule with the charterer. Such 
contracts may be lucrative, but they are impossible for a shipowner to 
fulfil on an independent basis. By co-operating with owners who have 
similar tonnage, the pool can create a credible entity to meet the 
contract terms and negotiate charters with the shippers. 
Secondly, pooling resources implies that owners also pool risk. The 
overall volatility of pool earnings will be less than the volatility of the 
earnings of each individual vessel. Haralambides (1996)538 also notes 
that income stabilisation will “mainly be the result of a careful ‘mix’ of 
COAs, spot, medium and long term charters.” 
Thirdly, the (final) principal element is less to do with scale economies 
than to exploit economies of massed resources. The pool management 
can negotiate for bunkers on behalf of the fleet; obtain higher fleet 
                                       
537 Haralambides (1996) op. cit pp. 223-224. 
538 Ibid. p. 225. Of course, this type of flexibility requires a certain fleet size and 
here is found one of the advantages of pooling tonnage. 
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utilisation through improved planning; greater marketing 
effectiveness; and better networking. 
 
Indeed, some authors usually view pools as a defensive mechanism, in 
that they are often created by owners when market conditions are 
poor. This point in itself does not preclude that the pool can 
potentially influence market conditions, if it becomes sufficiently large 
enough in terms of control of the relevant market segment tonnage.539 
However, this possibility should be seen as a separate point from the 
one made earlier, in that pool operators may achieve higher earnings 
through better utilisation of the vessels and through lowering 
operating costs (e.g. in accordance with the pool’s rules for common 
purchases of bunkers, of insurance etc). The competition issue at 
stake is not the raising of earnings by lowering costs, but the raising 
of earnings by raising rates obtainable by pool members; in my 
analysis below540, I support the view that relevant market and 
dominance can also be achieved temporarily541 and influence 
conditions in a market despite its short period.   
 
                                       
539  Glen David, Martin B.T., Do Tanker Pools influence Market Rates? The Case 
of Tankers International. Conference paper presented at International Association of 
Maritime Economists (IAME) Panama [15 November 2002] pp. 5-6 apud. Cullinane 
(2011) 
540     Infra section 3.4 Revisiting the Concepts of Relevant Markets, Efficiency and 
Consumer Benefits p. 232. 
541 Supra  section  p. 126 and 131 et seq 
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3.3.1.3 Structure of the Pool 
 
The typical pool structure is depicted by the following graph: 
1. Figure 1 Structure of a typical Shipping Pool 
 
 
In a similar way to a 
liner consortium, the 
pool concept is a system 
involving the joint 
marketing of vessels 
owned by more than one 
shipowner, involving the 
pooling and sharing 
amongst the 
participants, of the 
chartering revenues or 
income accruing to the 
participating vessels. Ideally, the participants in a chartering pool 
should have similar quality-oriented management, owning and 
operating essentially similar vessels of like quality542. 
 
This flexible vehicle of co-operation, based on the principles of 
consortium, is most suitable for the shipping companies that are used 
to more traditional models of corporate governance. On those grounds 
it is clear that, apart from any potential impact on freight rates, a pool 
can achieve substantial advantages for its participants. For example, 
the availability and the concentration of vessels enables the central 
                                       
542  Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee, Memorandum to the Members of 
Greek Shipping Cooperation Committee from the Chartering Pools Sub-Committee, 
[London, June 2000]. The Committee is an organisation, which was founded in 
1935, that groups together some 150 Greek shipowners based in London and New 
York who own vessels of over 50,000 tonnes. 
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management to satisfy the terms of a charter; if, for instance, a vessel 
is out on hire, by replacing it with another available vessel. Thus, 
pools have another advantage, in view of the penalties imposed for 
breach of the terms of the COA, as the commercial individual risk and 
damages are spread among the participants. Moreover, with proper 
task and chartering management, the risks mentioned above can be 
undoubtedly reduced, as the waiting time and the ballast passages are 
minimised. 
 
With regard to the above, the burden deriving from the obligations of 
the COA are not concentrated upon a specific vessel. The participants 
thus enjoy the privilege of not being under an explicit obligation to 
carry the cargo with reference to a particular vessel or group of vessels 
and the obligation survives even the total loss of one or more of the 
vessels originally intended by the carrier to perform the contract of 
affreightment. Hence, the above concept has the advantage that none 
of the intended performing vessels is contractually committed to the 
charterparty. In this connection, the carrier can remove vessels, 
dispose of them, and substitute them with others, provided that the 
charterparty is performed in accordance with its terms. Since the COA 
is not linked to a particular vessel, the scheduling of liftings under the 
contract can become a somewhat more complicated procedure, 
involving responsibilities on the part of the carrier that do not exist in 
the case of an owner fixing a ship on the time or voyage charter. 
 
Pool structures can vary from less formal to more contractual 
arrangements, but a typical vehicle for the formation of a chartering 
pool might be the creation, in a suitable jurisdiction, of an 
independent corporation, which might be jointly owned by the pool 
participants, and which would take the vessels owned by the 
participants to contribute to the pool on a timecharter. However, this 
exceeds the scope of a partial function joint venture. 
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This timecharter would be concluded on a standard time charterparty 
form that is widely used in the marketplace for vessels of the size and 
type to enter the pool. However, instead of a fixed time charter rate, 
the pool would distribute its actual earnings to the participants pro 
rata. On those grounds, the pool would fulfil the role of and be 
responsible for the functions normally performed by a time charterer; 
while the shipowner, or its agents, would responsible for all of the 
functions for which an owner is normally burdened under a typical 
time charterparty543. 
 
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits any agreement or concerted practice 
that has an actual or potential effect on trade between Member States, 
and objects to or affects the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition in the common market. Certain restrictions are deemed 
by reason of their objects to have an appreciable effect on competition, 
including the four core restrictions of price fixing, limitation of output, 
market sharing or customer sharing.  
Inevitably, owners who place their vessels into such pool structure 
temporarily lose control over the way their vessels are traded and the 
prices obtained for the services provided through the use of those 
vessels. 
From a competition law point of view, this structure may lie under 
Article 101 TFEU as freights are negotiated, not by the members 
separately, but by the Pool Manager, i.e. either the appointed third 
person or the dominant company of the pool. In this context, I have 
investigated whether tacit or explicit price collusion exists between the 
pool and third companies due to the concentration effect that the pool 
has created. This kind of representation may, in effect, become a price 
fixing mechanism, provided that the pool secures market dominance 
                                       
543  ‘Delays to vessels caused by such events as breakdowns, accidents, boycotts 
against the vessel, its owners or arising in relation with its crew or flag, arrest by the 
Port State Control, or any stoppages or delays not related to the execution of the 
voyage would all be considered off-hire and would be dealt with in the normal way 
under a time charter. Any delays to vessels awaiting fixtures would not be 
considered off-hire, however, and the pool would absorb any such delays’. Ibid., p. 2 
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and the consortia members are deprived of their individual identities, 
without being able to advertise their respective service separately544. 
In this case, only a pool limits the service output of the pool, and is 
prima facie caught under Article 101(1) TFEU.  
 
Indeed, my analysis always has to set the criteria between partial and 
full function alliances; in other words, to investigate if a pool has 
upgraded from a simple loose alliance to a full function joint venture. 
Our analysis must focus on the role of the representative Pool 
Manager (PM). If the latter has the power to fix vessels, determine the 
commercial strategy, and influence the upstream and downstream 
service, then undoubtedly its behaviour is also indicative of 
dominance545. This would present a problem regardless of the model 
chosen (administration pool or members’ pool) and whether the Pool 
Manager is required to sub-charter the vessels or charter them as an 
agent for the members. The problem arises wherever the Pool 
Manager's functions include the commercial management of the 
vessels. It is a parameter that perplexes things; in reality it touches 
the boundaries between partial and full JV. The matter is analysed by 
Dittmer (2010)546. The author proposes first that in order to avoid a 
strenuous self-assessment process547 and the associated risks, pool 
members may decide to convert their shipping into a full-function JV. 
An option as such would subject the agreement to the EC MR, and 
does not at the outset give rise to concerns under Article 101 TFEU. If 
the parents realise a sufficiently high turnover, it will be necessary to 
notify the full-function JV to the Commission and/or a number of 
                                       
544 See Pozdnakova (2008) p. 188. See also: Herman Amos, Shipping 
Conferences [Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983] pp 140-143 
545  We need to examine if the Pool Manager’s  has the capability to deal with 
specific customers and determine (within agreed parameters) commercial strategy 
(in particular the mix between spot and long-term business) as well as to fix the 
relevant charter rates and terms of charterparties with the charterers or other third 
party customers requiring the services.   
546  Dittmer Martin Andre, “The future of shipping pools – Full Function Joint 
Ventures or Horizontal Cooperation?” in Wareham (2010) op. cit. pp. 99-117. 
547  Wareham Philip, “The Challenges of Self-Assessment” in Wareham (2010) 
op. cit  pp. 119-142. 
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National Competition Authorities.548 Dittmer (2010)549 sets certain 
criteria that distinguish between a full and partial function JV in 
shipping pools. In order to qualify as a full-function JV, cooperation 
must satisfy three criteria: First, the parent undertakings must 
exercise joint control over the cooperation. Secondly, the cooperation 
must perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. 
Thirdly, the cooperation must operate on a lasting basis, in 
accordance to Article 3(4) of the EC Merger Regulation. 
 
3.3.1.3 Clarifying the contractual basis of the cooperation 
 
The consensus of the parties while entering into a shipping pool 
structure is normally evidenced in a pool agreement. This agreement 
deals with the fundamental features of cooperation while there is no 
standard for pool agreement. 
 
The definition of undertaking is provided by ECJ in the ruling of 
Höfner vs Macrotron550. An undertaking is “every entity engaged in an 
economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it 
is financed”. Undoubtedly, a tramp shipping pool is an undertaking, 
and because shipping pools are normally organised as a separate 
entity from its members, and this organization can take different 
forms, its decisions and/or concerted practices are also caught by 
article 101. 
 
 
  
                                       
548 Dittmer (2010) in Wareham (2010) op. cit. p. 100 
549 Ibid. pp 107-114 
550  Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser vs Macrotron GmbH, ECR [1991] p.  I-01979 
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3.3.2 The Object and Effect of Pools to Restrict 
Competition 
 
I mentioned above that the shipping pool can be considered as an 
“undertaking” or “association of undertakings” pursuant to 101 (1) 
TFEU and that the pooling agreement falls within the ambit of 101. 
 
Yet it is necessary to investigate whether the type of the agreement or 
concerted practice of the undertaking is caught directly by 101 
One of the two conditions must be fulfilled: 
 
1) Pooling agreements must affect trade within the Member States. 
2) Pooling agreements must also have the object or effect to “prevent, 
restrict or distort competition within the common market” 
 
The investigation of the first condition cannot be subject of this thesis. 
As far as the second condition is concerned (by object or effect) EC 
case law (in European Night Services551) has clarified that “object” and 
“effect” are not cumulative requirements, and that, at first stage, it is 
necessary to assess whether an agreement has the object to prevent, 
restrict or distort competition.  
 
Some contractual restrictions are a priori presumed to affect 
competition, for example, the list of agreements that are found under 
article 101 (1) TFEU Treaty sections a) to e). Over this list of presumed 
practices a), price fixing, and c), market sharing, are the main 
violations that could be potentially entered into by shipping pools. If a 
tramp pool imposes a hardcore restriction on competition, it could be 
considered to have the object to restrict competition. I shall analyse 
those cases below. 
 
                                       
551  Supra § 52 
213 
 
3.3.2.1 Vessel Sharing Agreement 
 
 
This practice is widespread among ship operators. It involves the 
leasing (sharing) of cargo space of a third company, primarily for 
operational reasons. The practice is met usually in dry bulk and the 
reefer industry, as well as other markets subject to cyclical peaks, 
enabling carriers to meet temporary capacity shortages.552 They tend 
to be spot fixtures; hence, rates are determined in accordance with 
prevailing spot rates. However, the empirical evidence agrees with the 
findings of the research conducted by Global Insight (2007) that 
suggested that there were no particular competition issues that 
needed further investigation. 
 
The majority of time charterparties and other agreements entered into 
between owners or operators would not normally be expected to raise 
competition issues as they are vertical in nature. This type of synergy 
activity consists of an agreement of chartering a vessel (bareboat) that 
belongs to a third company for a certain (usually long) period of time. 
They are often entered into as a means of procuring additional 
capacity for operators who do not want to invest in additional tonnage, 
or do not have sufficient tonnage available for various reasons to meet 
their contractual obligations at a particular time. Those types of 
agreements have to be distinguished from the ‘ad hoc space share 
agreements’553 which merely involve space sharing facilitation. The 
long charterparties, from the competition point of view, may not 
infringe Article 101 TFEU; yet we have to examine if they constitute a 
quasi-downstream concentration. However, agreements as such often 
benefit from automatic exemption under the block exemption for 
                                       
552 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm, Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services [‘EU Report 
COMP/2006/D2/002’, 22/2/2007]: EU Commission Para 1974, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/maritime/tramp_report.pdf
> [accessed 15 March 2009] 
553  Supra  pp. 73 and 215 
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vertical agreements554, subject to satisfying the relevant market share 
cap of thirty per cent555 if they are exclusive. They do still raise 
concerns if they are part of a wider economic context, in particular if 
they are used overtly or covertly as substitution for a pool. Likewise, 
when they are mutual, they clearly raise horizontal cooperation issues 
and would require analysis under Article 101(1)&(3) in the same 
manner as pooling agreements. Needless to say, collusion is also 
difficult to be established here, unless the market share can be 
defined in advance of every investigation. 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Joint Outsourcing Collaboration Agreements 
 
It happens that owners may contract with the same specialist ship 
management companies for technical management services where, as 
is frequently the case, such services are outsourced556. Certain types 
of technical agreements may not fall under the prohibition set out in 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the grounds that they do not restrict 
competition. This is the case, for instance, for horizontal agreements, 
the sole objects and effects of which are to implement technical 
improvements or to achieve technical cooperation557. 
However, there could be an issue under competition law in terms of 
distortion in the dissemination of information from one owner to other 
parties, as it may be connected to concerted practices. It did not seem 
to me that it would raise any competition issue if the relevant vessels 
were in different markets, or if confidential information flows could be 
                                       
554  See Commission Regulation 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices OJ [1999] 336/21, also known as (Vertical Block Exemption). 
555  Ibid., Vertical Block Exemption (1999), Article 3 
556  Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the EC Treaty to maritime 
transport services, [OJ 2008 C245/2], paras 37, 38-46. 
557 Far East Trade Tariff Charges and Surcharges Agreement (FETTCSA), 
Commission Decision 2000/627/EC, Case IV/34.018, OJ [2000] L268, Para 
153.Also see: Deutsche Bahn AG vs Commission, CaseT-229/94, [1997] ECRII-1689, 
Para 37 
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prevented by various means (like agreements or technical methods) 
between competitors.  
 
3.3.2.3 Pure Cargo and Vessel Sharing Agreements (VSA) 
 
A limited reference has been made to a type of a quasi-pool agreement, 
which, although described by its participants as a pool, is not an 
actual pool agreement. The Vessel Sharing Agreements operate in the 
same pattern as the pools with the difference being that they are 
limited to joint scheduling.558 The European Commission has, in the 
past, been prepared to exempt a vessel sharing agreement (VSA) with 
a 24 month notice period in view of the highly integrated nature of the 
VSA.559 
 
3.3.2.4 Co-Service Agreements 
 
Another category of co-operation between carriers that is quite distinct 
from vessel pooling is co-service agreements. There is limited 
information about these agreements and no bibliographical reference; 
thus their analysis will depend on empirical evidence. 
 
                                       
558  Recently, ‘Maersk Line’ and France-based ‘CMA-CGM’ have announced the 
establishment of a new Vessel Sharing Agreement (VSA) utilising both the Panama 
and Suez Canals, which began in May 2009. Source: 
<http://www.maerskline.com/link/?page=news&path=/archive/news20081121> 
[accessed 5 June 2009] 
559  See: XXIVIIth DG Comp Report on Competition Policy [1997], p. 135 apud. 
Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law Firm 
(2007), Para 1734. Though the details of the notifying parties are confidential, from 
the relevant literature we know that the notifying parties had made considerable 
investments in the acquisition of vessels and two others had to contribute to 
financing those investments; in addition, they, and one other participant, had 
agreed to withdraw their existing vessels in favour of the newly acquired one. The 
European Commission accepted that these facts demonstrated the highly integrated 
nature of the VSA and justified the long notice period. Although this example is 
taken from the liner industry, it would appear to confirm a general principle that a 
longer notice period is more likely to be considered reasonable and indispensable 
the more integrated the nature of the cooperation. See: Fearnley Consultants (2007) 
op.cit. para 1670 
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Under co-service agreements, two or more carriers agree, inter alia, to 
seek out business opportunities jointly, to provide each other with 
vessel capacity on an equivalent of the ‘most favoured nation’560 term 
and to operate certain services jointly, while retaining their 
commercial independence and marketing their services 
independently561. Co-service agreements differ from pool agreements 
as the shipowners retain their commercial independence and bid 
against each other when tendering for the relevant contract from the 
customer (except in those cases where joint bids are accepted and the 
joint bid is submitted with the customer's knowledge and approval). 
So far, there has been no official observation that those agreements 
provide a special mechanism for the parties to carry out any joint 
marketing, but they are simply required to work with each other 
operationally and use each other's services in preference to any third 
parties wherever possible. Generally, therefore, the cooperation is 
limited to purely operational areas. 
 
Co-service agreements are basically chemical tanker markets but 
variants may exist in other markets.562 They are a relatively loose from 
                                       
560  The most favoured nation term is based on a principle established in 
international law. The said term is found GATT Treaties. In particular, a key feature 
of this term is that it is founded on the principle of equality of treatment. Member 
states must accord the same rights and benefits to each other. It is an important 
stipulation of the agreement that where a member grants certain advantages to 
another member in the conduct of trade, these same advantages are to be extended 
unconditionally to all other members of the agreement. These advantages can be in 
the form of reduced or zero-rated taxation and waiver of pre-shipment inspection. 
Others include customs formalities connected with importation and exemption from 
foreign exchange restrictions in repatriation of the profits arising from the import or 
export of the product. See: Oppenheim Lassa, Roxburgh Ronald, International Law: 
A Treatise, Volume 1 (New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange, Clark 2005), p. 374. Also 
see: Mistelis Loukas, Brekoulakis Stavros, Arbitrability: International & Comparative 
Perspectives [Kluwer Law International, 2009], pp. 190-191; Kaufmann-Kohler, 
Gabriele ‘Treaty Interpretation in Pervasive’, Problems in international Arbitration ed. 
by Mistelis Loukas, Julian Lew [Kluwer Law International, 2006]. p. 269 
561 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit. Para 1736 
562  Examples of this type of co-operation, of which the consultants are aware, 
are the co-service agreements between ‘Tokyo Marine’ and ‘Stolt-Nielsen’ in relation 
to Mediterranean-Asia trades and between ‘Jo Tankers’ and ‘Stolt-Nielsen’ in the 
transport of bulk liquids from ports in the US Gulf to Asia (not a trade route that 
directly impacts on the EU). Another example of an apparently current co-service 
agreement is that between ‘Green Reefers’ and ‘Seatrade’ which the parties claim 
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of arrangement focused mainly on finding joint operational efficiencies 
to improve the services offered to customers.563 According to those 
agreements, the competing shipping companies will either bid for new 
business in competition with each other, with the winner of the bid 
relying on the co-service agreement for additional capacity or 
operational efficiencies, or, if the customer allows, submit a joint bid.  
 
The operational cooperation consists of the premise that the 
shipowners may identify ports and berths where they can achieve 
efficiencies by working together on loading, discharging, transhipping 
and allocating cargoes to particular ships. It also offers carriers the 
possibility of servicing high volume trades which could not be 
adequately met by any one of them individually because of inadequate 
capacity. Another specific reason given is that they can reduce 
operational overlaps between the various chemical carriers on the 
same route, particularly on routes where port congestion is common, 
and so reduce delays and other inefficiencies. 
 
 
3.3.2.5 Multiple Timecharter Agreements 
 
Under this arrangement, a single shipowner or operator, operating in 
its own right in the market, enters into a series of long-term 
timecharters with other vessel owners in order to extend its fleet 
without incurring the capital cost of acquisition or financing the 
relevant tonnage or the legal responsibility for maintaining the vessels, 
crewing and other matters that belong to technical management and 
therefore remain the responsibility of the owners (and their ship 
management company). This sort of structure is considered separately 
                                                                                                             
improves their utilisation of capacity and enables a higher frequency of service, so 
offering customers a more efficient and flexible service. See Fearnley Consultants 
AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick &Willan Law Firm (2007), Ibid., Para 1739 
563 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007, Ibid., Para1737 
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in ‘multiple timecharters’, above564. However, all of the commercial 
management and operation of the vessels is the responsibility of the 
charterer. The charterer has to account to the owners for the usual 
charter hire provided for in the charterparty.  
 
This model does not even require a ship operator to actually own 
vessels at all; all vessels can be chartered in. This is similar in concept 
to the NVOs565 practice found in the liner industry, where freight 
forwarders and other third parties offer liner services without actually 
owning the tonnage, but issue Bills of Lading as if they were owners. 
Thus, the owner or operator in question retains full responsibility for 
marketing and commercial operation of the vessels and is the only 
point of contact with customers in the downstream market.566 
The difference from a pool, in the classical sense, is that once charters 
are entered into multiple timecharter agreements with the relevant 
operator, this happens on certain routes, and without any prior 
consultation with the other owners who may have leased the vessel to 
the operator. Thus, it is difficult to establish a horizontal level of 
cooperation capable of affecting competition. 
 
3.3.2.6 Joint Selling, Joint Production and Market Sharing Issues 
3.3.2.6.1 Joint Selling in Pools 
 
In order to assess the potential competition concerns on the object of 
pool agreements the following questions are relevant: do shipping 
pools engage in price fixing?; are shipping pools joint production or 
joint selling schemes?; and, are shipping pools sharing the market, 
                                       
564 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit, Para 1747 
565 Supra p. 121 et seq 
566 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit, Para 1749. Examples of multiple charters cooperation are The 
Leonina System operated by ‘NYKLauritzenCool’. See: J Lauritzen Annual Report 
2006, p. 15, 
<www.j-l.com/jlauritzen-annualreport2006/pics/annualreport2006.pdf> 
[accessed 05 August 2009]  
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and consequently, falling under the prohibitions of article 101 (1) e) 
TFEU? 
The Guidelines for Maritime Transport567 stipulate that pool 
agreements between competitors limited to joint selling have, as a 
rule, the object and effect of coordinating the pricing policy of these 
competitors.568 If the pool does not have a restriction of competition as 
its object, an analysis of its effects in the market concerned is 
necessary. An agreement is caught by Article 101(1) of the Treaty 
when it is likely to have an appreciable adverse impact on the 
parameters of competition on the market such as prices, costs, service 
differentiation, service quality, and innovation. Agreements can have 
this effect by appreciably reducing rivalry between the parties to the 
agreement, or between them and third parties.569 
 
A standard shipping pool brings together a number of similar vessels 
under different ownerships, operated under a single administration. 
Although there is no standard agreement for shipping pools, some 
common characteristics do exist. Some tramp shipping pools do not 
involve joint selling but nevertheless entail some degree of 
coordination on the parameters of competition (e.g. joint scheduling or 
joint purchasing). Such cases are only subject to Article 101(1) of the 
Treaty if the parties to the agreement have some degree of market 
power. Those characteristics are best summarised in the Guidelines 
on the Application of Article 101 to the Maritime Transport:  
 
In this context, ‘a Pool Manager is normally responsible for the 
commercial management (for example, joint marketing570, negotiation 
                                       
567  Maritime Guidelines op. cit. Para 66 
568  Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, cited above in footnote 6, 
Section 5. The activities of an independent ship-broker when ‘fixing a vessel’ do not 
fall under this category 
569 Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3), [OJ C 101, 2004] p. 97 
570  For example, the pool’s vessels are marketed as one commercial unit offering 
transport solutions regardless of which ship performs the actual voyage 
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of freight rates and centralisation of incomes and voyage costs571) and 
the commercial operation (planning vessel movements and instructing 
vessels, nominating agents in ports, keeping customers updated, 
issuing freight invoices, ordering bunkers, collecting the vessels' 
earnings and distributing them under a pre-arranged weighting 
system etc.). The Pool Manager often acts under the supervision of a 
general executive committee representing the vessel owners. The 
technical operation of vessels is usually the responsibility of each 
owner (safety, crew, repairs, maintenance etc.), and although they 
market their services jointly, the pool members often perform the 
services individually. 
 
It should, however, be understood that there is no single universal 
model for a shipping pool, and the empirical analysis (along with the 
available bibliography572) reveal a variety of different pooling 
structures—albeit with a number of similar features and typical 
provisions. However, my focus will be on the main characteristics of 
the shipping pools that are common to the majority of the agreements. 
 
This form resembles a liner consortium573. With regard to the 
commercial policy, the pool is usually formed when a number of 
tramp shipping companies join together to form a joint company, in 
which574 no single company has control575 (unless otherwise 
stipulated), though it is possible to have collective or common 
representation under a body, or major pool member that that controls 
the pool’s affairs. This style of synergy is mostly followed by liner and 
tramp shipping companies. Those horizontal agreements of 
                                       
571  For example, the pool’s income is collected by the central administration 
and revenue is distributed to the participants based on a complex weighting system 
572  The only available bibliographical information is provided by the Wareham, 
Antapassis/Athanassiou/Røsægand Fearnley Consultants. 
573 Boulton, A. H., ‘Construction Consortia -- their formation and management’, 
Journal of Business Law [1959], p. 234  
574  Farrar, John (1991), op. cit, p. 730 
575 Wooldridge, F., ‘Consortium and related operation in the United Kingdom’, 
Lloyd’s MCLQ 1978, p. 427 
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cooperation regarding provision of joint liner transport services are 
covered by the Commission Regulation 823/2000576 on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to certain agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping consortia. In 
tramp shipping, pools are basically covered by Article 101. 
 
I will attempt to analyse the matter further, in line with the idea that 
shipping is a sui generis sector where concerted practices may not 
necessarily have an effect on competition when the object cannot be 
classified as anti-competitive. 
Within the Horizontal Guidelines577 and the Maritime Guidelines578 it 
is repeatedly mentioned that joint selling agreements have the object 
and effect of coordinating the pricing policy of undertakings. 
Moreover, it is also recalled that a horizontal price of market share 
constraint, explicitly referred to in article 101(1) TFEU as core 
restriction, cannot also benefit from the de minimis rule.579  
My position is that it is difficult to establish both object as well as 
effect to distort competition in the shipping pools. 
I accordingly support that the object of a tramp shipping pool is not 
the setting of pricing policy coordination, as Pool Managers are price-
takers not price fixers. Secondly, far from restricting the volume of 
services, output in the supply side can be generally said to increase, 
as the purpose behind the rationalisation of service is to have a 
standby vessel in a particular region, ready to take cargo. This is far 
from restricting the volume of services; on the contrary, output in the 
supply side can be generally said to increase.  
 
                                       
576 ‘Liner Consortium Regulation’. OJ [2000] L100, p. 24 
577  Horizontal Guidelines, op. Cit. paras 144-145 
578  Maritime Guidelines, op. Cit. para 66 
579  Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not 
appreciably restrict competition under Article 81 (1) of the Treaty. [OJ 2001 
C386/07] no 11 
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It is quite possible that the effect of a joint selling will be the increase 
of output, therefore I agree with Athanassiou (2009)580 which contests 
this strict approach (about joint selling) and aligns with Gellhorn, 
Kovacic and Calkins (2004)581, who support that price fixing and joint 
selling may also enhance economic efficiency. The same is supported 
by Lorenzon and Nazzini (2009)582, who performed a special analysis 
on tramp shipping pools. They too claimed that this rationalisation 
(control) of supply eventually creates more stability in the market. 
This in turn may not only raise shipowners’ profits as a result of 
increased efficiency but may also have benefits for charterers in terms 
of lower quality adjusted freights.583 
I agree with the authors above and I believe that it is better to proceed 
with a “harms vs. benefits”584 analysis. Members accordingly would 
need to demonstrate that their agreement: 
i) produces efficiency gains; 
ii) The benefits are passed on to transport users, for example as 
lower transport costs or new logistic solutions; 
iii) There is no less restrictive way to obtain the efficiencies, and 
finally, 
iv) There is no elimination of competition in relation to a 
substantial part of the market considering, for example, the 
market share of the pool and the number of competitors 
operating in that market’. 
 
3.3.2.6.2 Joint Production in Pools 
 
                                       
580 Athanassiou (2009) op. cit. p. 89 
581 Gellhorn Ernest, Kovacic William E., Calkins Stephen, Antitrust Law and 
Economics in a Nutshell [Thomson West, St Paul Minnesota, 2004 5th edition] p. 223 
et seq 
582 Lorenzon, Nazzini (2009) op. cit. p. 100 
583  Quality adjusted freights reflect the quality of the service provided at any 
given freight 
584  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the TFEU to horizontal co-
operation agreements [OJ 2011 C 11/01] Paras 160, 128 
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Another category in which shipping pools could fall is “production 
agreements,” a term which is said to “vary in scope and form”. In 
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (2001 p. 12) this term is used for 
the production of goods and services, and it is said to include three 
different types of agreements: joint production, specialisation and 
sub-contracting agreements. Of course, shipping pools could not fit 
the descriptions of specialisation and subcontracting agreements, but 
the label “joint production” needs to be investigated.  
 
Joint productions are “agreements whereby the parties agree to 
produce certain products jointly, (unilaterally or reciprocally)”. 
Consequently, if pool agreements are indeed able to fall within the 
category “production agreements”, those pools with a market share of 
20% could fall within the scope of the Specialization Block exemption. 
 
In paragraph 62 of the Maritime Guidelines, the Commission says 
that the key feature of maritime pools is joint selling, coupled with 
issues of joint production. Nonetheless, the matter can be dealt with 
on a case by case basis. As per the details governing the joint 
production or selling agreements, the Commission refers to the 
Guidelines of the Horizontal Cooperation Agreements as providing 
guidelines on this matter.  I agree with the analysis of Lorenzon and 
Nazzini (2009, p. 101) that support the following: 
 
1) In the same Guidelines (para 90) all the circumstances are 
described where a joint production agreement always fall within 
article 101 and have the object in restricting competition. This is the 
case if the joint production agreement fixes the prices of the products 
supplied by the parties, limits output or shares markets. 
 
2) The Commission, however, adds an important qualification. This 
strict standard does not apply if the parties agree on the output 
directly concerned by the production agreement or if a production 
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joint venture which also carries out the distribution of the 
manufactured products sets the sales prices for these products, 
provided that the price fixing by the joint venture is the effect of 
integrating the various functions. 
 
3) The above can have application in the shipping pools. By pooling 
their vessels and agreeing on the way in which the vessels must be 
deployed, the parties only agree on the output of the joint venture. 
Furthermore, the shipping pool plainly carries out the distribution of 
the integrated service provided by pooling the ships. The fact that the 
freights are set or accepted by the pool manager may be seen as the 
effect of the provision of an integrated service. 
 
3.3.2.6.3 Market Sharing in Pools 
 
Undoubtedly, market sharing is a much more comfortable means to 
charge higher rates than price fixing. Among other reasons, market 
sharing agreements are much easier to monitor, and cartel members 
do not have to find a compromise on price level. 
The Commission has usually focused on two concerns of market 
sharing under article 101 (1) TFEU: geographical market sharing, and 
the prevention of market penetration. 
Geographical market sharing becomes very difficult in the tramp 
maritime sector, although it is not impossible. Moreover, market 
sharing as conceived by the ECJ jurisprudence requires output 
limitation, something that is totally contrary to the market reality in 
shipping, where we observe an oversupply of ships that results in the 
collapse of the freight rates.  
 
 
3.3.2.7 Price Fixing Issues 
 
With regard to price fixing, Article 101(1) stipulates: 
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‘...directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions...’ 
 
However, as mentioned above, tramp pool agreements do not pose 
competition problems if the participants cannot be considered actual 
or potential competitors. Nonetheless, pools may pose considerable 
risk, as their purpose is synergy: Cooperation is a prelude to 
concentration. The matter is discussed in the Antitrust Draft 
Guidelines for Maritime Transport (2007)585, which stipulates that: 
 
‘...pools that have very low market shares are unlikely to raise 
competition problems provided that the agreement does not contain 
provisions regarding joint price fixing and/or joint marketing.’  
 
The following paragraph refers to price fixing: 
 
‘Any agreement between competitors that results in the fixing of prices 
requires careful consideration under the competition rules. 
Agreements on prices or sharing of markets between competitors are 
severe restrictions of competition explicitly prohibited by Article 101(1) 
of the EC Treaty. They normally lead to higher prices without 
producing countervailing value to consumers.’ 
 
The text continues:  
 
“These agreements however may still be compatible with EU 
competition law if they have countervailing efficiencies fulfilling the 
four cumulative conditions listed in Article 101(3) of the Treaty.” 
 
                                       
585  Antitrust: Draft Guidelines for maritime transport – frequently asked 
questions, [Reference: MEMO/07/355 Date: 13/09/2007] 
 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/355
&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [accessed 19 July 2009] 
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As mentioned, pools have a common pricing policy. It becomes clear 
that one of the central elements of pools is the joint negotiation of 
freight rates586. My opinion is that the Pool Manager is basically a 
price taker, rather than a price fixer.587 First of all, the characteristics 
of the tramp market provide for a bidding system in order for the price 
to be agreed.588 It is not the pool manager that sets a price; the price 
is agreed by the customer and the Pool manager (with the intervention 
of the broker). Yet, a Pool Manager may, in effect, contribute to a price 
fixing mechanism and its actions need to be investigated regardless of 
the market share held by the pool in a context of geographic market. If 
the agreement has the object to restrict competition, there is no need 
to show that they have the effect of doing so. 
 
 
I agree with the authors above and I believe that it is better to proceed 
with a “harms vs. benefits”589 analysis. Members accordingly would 
need to demonstrate that their agreement: 
i) produces efficiency gains; 
ii) The benefits are passed on to transport users, for example as 
lower transport costs or new logistic solutions; 
iii) There is no less restrictive way to obtain the efficiencies, and 
finally, 
iv) There is no elimination of competition in relation to a 
substantial part of the market considering, for example, the 
market share of the pool and the number of competitors 
operating in that market’. 
 
                                       
586 Athanassiou (2009) op. cit. p. 88 
587  Varela Chouciño Milagros, “Tramp Shipping In The New Ec Competition 
Maritime Regime, Analysis of the latest developments in the regulation of Tramp 
Shipping and Tramp Shipping Pools”, Master Thesis submitted in the Instituto 
Universitario de Estudios Marítimos, Universidade Da Coruña   [2008]  p. 32 
< http://www.udc.es/iuem/documentos/monografias/2008-3.pdf> accessed 
10/9/2012 
588  Ibid. p.32 
589  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the TFEU to horizontal co-
operation agreements [OJ 2011 C 11/01] Paras 160, 128 
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So far, both in the EU and in other parts of the world, there has been 
no confirmed form of collusion in pools. 
 
3.3.4 Clauses that Restrict Competition 
 
There are, a priori, several clauses commonly contained in shipping 
pool agreements that can bring about competition concerns. The 
wording of these clauses can vary significantly, therefore such clauses 
have to be analysed on a case by case basis in order to determine 
whether they encourage anticompetitive practices. The clauses that 
could potentially have the effect of restricting competition relate to:  a) 
membership (entry and exit), b) non-competition and c) information 
exchange.  
I analyse them below: 
 
3.3.4.1 Membership Duration and Conditions 
 
It is the usual practice of a tramp pool to impose certain conditions on 
membership in order to ensure the protection of its interests and the 
investments committed against opportunistic and speculative 
members. However, conditions such as these are due to practical 
reasons, and they are unrelated to certain practices by market actors. 
The question is whether any penalties and restrictions infringe article 
101(1). As mentioned in chapter one590, any restriction must be 
proportionate to the objective pursued. Restrictions do not constitute 
an infringement of 101(1) if they are necessary for achieving the 
purposes of the main agreement, which will overall have beneficial 
effects on competition591. 
 
                                       
590 Supra Consortia Regulation 906/2009 op. cit. § 44 
591  Van Bael&Bellis (Law Firm), Competition Law Of The European Community 
[Kluwer Law International 2005] p. 80  
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Usually, restrictions to entry and penalties to entry are found within 
all tramp pool agreements. As far as the conditions of entry into a pool 
are concerned, they include, but are not limited to, matters that 
involve a) capital allowance; b) the cost of investment; c) maintenance 
costs; d) the timing of entry; e) management structure and strategy; f) 
technological difficulties; g) safety (labour and environmental) issues.  
 
With regards to the conditions and/or restrictions and penalties for 
exit, a member of a shipping company has to take into account these 
conditions and select the best strategies to deal with them. It is widely 
accepted that a pool may not only provide significant income security 
but can also reduce the barriers to entry, since they can offer owners 
long-term timecharters with the potential for a share of profits in 
addition to hire. This would secure a steady source of income for 
vessels and consequently lead to the ‘creditworthiness’ of the ship 
owners in question being upgraded. However, every new entry into a 
sector requires specialist assets and resources which must be 
acquired or developed. These do not amount to barriers to entry in the 
economic sense, but do represent initial investment costs. For 
example, in addition to the (generally higher) costs to enter the 
chemical tanker, reefer, and gas carrier trades as a ship owner, IMO 
regulations that need to be observed make the business highly 
specialised, leading to a de facto limited number of shipping firms 
which can undertake the enterprise. This may eventually lead to a 
quasi-oligopoly that is closely-related, primarily due to issues of 
raising capital and management rather than due to anti-competitive 
market practices by the incumbents in the sector. 
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3.3.4.2 Non-Competition Clause among Pool Members 
 
With regard to the ‘non-competition clause’, all pools contain a ‘non-
competition covenant’.592 The exact wording varies, although they 
usually make it clear that the restriction on competing activities 
applies only to vessels of the same type as those committed to the pool 
(which they term ‘qualifying’ or ‘restricted’ vessels) and/or in the same 
trade as the pool, and some specify that any activities must not be ‘in 
competition with’ the activities of other pool members. Some define 
the non-compete restriction in broader terms as ‘operating in a 
manner which would constitute a competition with the activities of the 
pool’, ‘engaging in independent action outside of the pool’, or ‘carrying 
on or investing in other enterprises provided they are not in conflict 
with the business of the pool’.593 
 
The Horizontal Guidelines clearly categorise cooperation agreements 
that have the object of fixing prices, limiting output, sharing markets 
or sharing customers as automatically falling within the Article 101(1) 
prohibition regardless of their effects. The section of the Horizontal 
Guidelines titled Commercialisation Agreements makes it clear that, 
for this category of agreement, Article 101(1) will always be applicable 
by virtue of its prohibited objects regardless of whether or not the 
agreement has any appreciable effects on competition (or, for that 
matter, any effect at all), and will only rarely be capable of satisfying 
the conditions of application of Article 101(3). Likewise, the Guidelines 
on the Application of Article 101 of the EC Treaty to Maritime 
Transport Services594 considers pools to be commercial agreements 
                                       
592 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit, Para 1 
593 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit, Para 1458. Moreover, termination provisions show some 
variations. Generally pools have no fixed term, but contain provisions whereby they 
can be dissolved on giving between 6 and 12 months’ notice, or whereby individual 
vessels can be withdrawn subject to notice. 
594  Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the EC Treaty to marittime 
transport services, OJ[2008] C245/2, Para 60-63. Guidelines on the application of 
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(though not joint commercialisation agreements) which generally fall 
under Article 101(1) of the EC Treaty. 
 
Owing to the difficulty of creating a pool management team from 
scratch, it is not uncommon for established operators to operate pools 
and to foreclose internal competition among the owners, as it possible 
that the operators could seek to realise profits from the pool 
management activity in addition to the earnings of any vessels entered 
in the pool. In most cases, the pool is run by a board of directors or a 
pool committee. The administration is responsible for determining the 
policy of the pool, such as chartering policy, finance, economic policy 
and operation, as well as the official representation of the pool before 
third parties. This is in contrast to the merged companies, where the 
new vehicle that is created by substituting the old companies is 
governed by shareholders and the board of directors. Therefore, the 
concept of management and administration within the pool does not 
follow the same compulsory rules of company law. The role of the pool 
committee is given the authority to transact certain activities on 
behalf of the pool, and the extent of such authority will need to be 
decided by the members of the pool. Since the authorities of the board 
of directors are not prescribed by company law and they can be 
subject to negotiation or deducted by general conditions or 
jurisprudence produced in the certain jurisdiction, the decision–
making can become a difficult and sometimes cumbersome business. 
Nonetheless, the most appropriate way to serve the concept of the pool 
can be achieved by adequate representation in the decision making of 
the pool by the participants. Unless the pool operates as a de facto 
group of merged companies, the authority of the pool committee is 
under the constant control of the participants. 
 
                                                                                                             
Article 101 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport services Official Journal-European 
Union Information And Notices 2008/C 245/02 
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As far as the assignment of the managers and the committee is 
concerned, the practices do not differ from the practices applied in the 
limited companies. It is appreciated that the management of a 
chartering pool, particularly one engaging in contracts of 
affreightment, is a complicated matter. It is essential that the pool be 
managed by an appropriate and qualified team. In the case of a newly 
established pool, the formation of a management team is clearly a 
crucial issue. Usually, the heads of the pool are shipowners that 
belong to the cast of the participants; however, my opinion stands 
that the most adequate form of governance is achieved by assigning 
independent and impartial individuals who are not specifically related 
with the participating members. Under this option, the members can 
rest assured that the phenomena of internal competition will be 
reduced, in principle. Matters of competition by the pool participants 
with the activities of the pool are frequently addressed in the pool 
agreements. In this way, it is usually a prerequisite that the 
participants should enter all of their vessels of the type in question 
into the pool. However, most of the shipowners prefer to engage only a 
part of their fleet into the pool and have the other vessels operate in 
the spot market. The security of a standard flow of income that the 
pool provides may be considered inadequate for a shipping company, 
as the dividend is not always high. On the other hand, it compensates 
the costs and the problems deriving from the search for tramp 
charter. Nevertheless, the security of a regular income, especially 
when the market news is not encouraging, is the best solution that a 
shipping company holds.  
 
3.3.4.3 Information Exchange System 
 
My opinion is that the will of the parties is to limit the information 
flow to a minimum, especially information regarding types of 
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commercial operations that are outside the scope of the pool, future 
projects, etc.  
This is confirmed by Fearnley Report (para 1012 et seq). However, this 
should be evaluated in the light of each individual clause in order to 
search for potential competition infringements.  
 
 
3.4 Revisiting the Concepts of Relevant 
Markets, Efficiency and Consumer 
Benefits 
 
As mentioned already, the standard analysis on the relevant market 
requires, a priori, homogeneity in the services offered and certain 
geographic reference. Given the nature of tramp shipping, any attempt 
to narrow the geographic market would fail to produce credible results 
due to the constant movement of fleets across different geographic 
markets. 
 
Within this section, I attempt to produce an unconventional approach 
with reference to the issue of defining the relevant market in tramp 
shipping and tramp pools. As for the concepts of cross-subsidisation 
and the aggregation of benefits across markets, I hold that when the 
dominant undertaking subsidises its operations across different 
markets, a certain connection is created between the markets in 
question, regardless of the degree of homogeneity they present. The 
fact that resources are being transferred from one market to another, 
in order either to rectify inefficiencies or to maintain and (possibly) 
develop presence in the secondary market, produces economic 
consequences to competition. This has been the case in Deutsche 
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Post,595 UPS596 and PTT Post597, respectively. The case law in the 
postal service is useful as it includes the transport as well as the 
logistics elements that require investment and involve high costs; in 
the case of shipping, the phenomenon is intensified given the 
involvement of significant capital requirements. 
 
3.4.1 Correlation of the Relevant Markets 
 
The first point in the Maritime Guidelines that is appropriate for 
tramp vessel services relates to the definition of the relevant market. 
The main terms of an individual transport request will be our starting 
point for defining relevant service markets. Following traditional 
reasoning, I need first to determine whether (from the Demand Side 
perspective) the services provided under charterparties are 
substitutable598. If they are, they will belong to the same relevant 
market. The supply-side position will also have to be examined in 
particular, as it concerns the substitutability of different cargo and 
size of vessels599. To determine substitutability there are three genuine 
difficulties: i) the overlapping of markets, ii) the fragmentation of the 
market and iii) the lack of available information (data). 
 
A separation between different vessels and different cargo types might 
well prove to be inconsistent with reality where there is substantial 
substitutability across cargo carriers and different sizes of vessels.600 
For Athanassiou (2009)601, the indicators of cost and time are crucial 
for determining the degree of the substitutability in question. She 
                                       
595 Op.cit  supra § 118 
596 Infra § 615  
597 Post / TNT / GD Express Worldwide (PTT), Merger Procedure Case No 
IV/M.843 - PTT [OJ 1996 C302/06] Para 41 
598  Fergus Randolph , “Overview, jurisdiction and legal status of Guidelines” in 
Wareham (2010) op. cit. p 29 
599 Athanassiou, in Antapassis Antonis, Athanassiou Lia, Røsæg Erik (ed/s.), op. 
cit. pp. 84-85 
600  Fergus (2010) op. cit. p. 30 
601  Athanassiou (2009), op. cit. ibid. p. 84 
234 
 
supports that if the time needed for the physical availability of a vessel 
to respond to a charter is limited – moreover, the costs involved are 
insignificant - then it is likely than the outcome of our investigation 
will show sufficient substitutability; it is the ideal condition 
undoubtedly. The temporal dimension602 of supply and demand within 
a market has to be taken into account on an ad hoc basis. In addition 
to the above two indicators, the Maritime Guidelines603  indicate that 
the elements of quality, frequency and differentiation of the service 
provided, innovation, marketing and commercialisation of the service 
are particularly relevant for the assessment of the effect an agreement 
may have in the relevant market. 
 
An interesting point is found within the Commission Notice on Postal 
Services,604 where it has been called upon to examine a number of tax 
advantages granted to a postal operator that could be used to cross-
subsidise the operator's activity in sectors open to competition.605 The 
phenomenon occurs where a company uses funds generated from one 
area of activity to fund activities in another. A cross-subsidy may give 
rise to an antitrust problem if the dominant company has an oligopoly 
or near-monopoly position in one market and also has activities in 
another related market where it is in competition with competitors 
who sell only in the second market. 
 
The problem for competition consists when market boundaries can be 
used in favour of the dominant party against its competitors in the 
                                       
602  See analysis supra p. 131 et seq 
603  Maritime Guidelines (2008) op. cit. para 35 
604  Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to 
the postal sector and on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal 
services, [OJ 1998 C39] Para 7(b) 
605 Spurling David, Introduction to Transport Economics [Universal-Publishers, 
Florida, 2010] pp. 60, 101, 208-213, 361. Spurling presents various cases of cross 
subsidisation, indicating that it is a business strategy implemented in many 
transport services. 
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second market. Temple Lang & O’ Donoghue (2002)606 describe that 
independent competitors have to meet ad hoc all the costs necessary 
for their production for a particular market (i.e. the "stand-alone 
costs"). A horizontally-integrated dominant company, however, is 
subject to several kinds of costs. Thus, it has "incremental costs"607, 
which arise only because of its operations in the competitive market; 
these would cease if the company’s operations in that market would 
also be ceased. It also has, or is likely to have, “fixed costs”608 which 
are common to its operations in both markets, but which would be 
unaffected by cessation of its activities in the competitive market. It 
furthermore has costs which arise only because of its operations in 
the market in which it has a monopoly. The problem for competition 
law is that the dominant company is able to spread its common costs 
over two sets of operations instead of only one; in other words, it 
develops economies of scale or scope. As a defence, of course, we 
could mention that the dominant party can use its reserves in order to 
improve its service; in this context the user of services is benefited by 
the variety of the available options. Another defence would be that an 
exposure as such is necessary in order to produce high gross income, 
which would secure it better pooling of finance.  
 
Within the Horizontal Merger Guidelines609 and Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements610, entry barriers are relevant not because 
they allow an incumbent to enjoy excess profits, but because they 
                                       
606  Temple Lang John, O’ Donoghue Robert “Defining Legitimate Competition: 
How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC” Fordham International Law 
Journal [2002 Volume 26, Issue 1] p. 150 
607  See supra  p. 168 
608 See supra  p.  158 et seq 
609 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2004) op. cit. Para 70 “Barriers to entry are 
specific features of the market, which give incumbent firms advantages over 
potential competitors”. 
610  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [OJ 
2011/C 11/01] Para 45. It is sited that: “Depending on the market position of the 
parties and the concentration in the market, other factors such as the stability of 
market shares over time, entry barriers and the likelihood of market entry, and the 
countervailing power of buyers/suppliers also have to be considered.” 
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reduce the profitability of entry. Hence, potential entrants may 
encounter (business generated) barriers to entry which determine 
entry risks and costs; thus, these barriers have an impact on the 
profitability of entry. Accordingly, this kind of spill-over of incremental 
costs by the dominant carrier acts as an indirect barrier to entry into 
the market for its competitor, due to the competitor's underlying need 
to enter and/or expand in the said market, and not to the dominant 
company's cost allocation.611 Henceforth, it would be necessary to 
prove objectively that independent activities in the competitive market 
were inherently unprofitable, and were not uneconomic for 
competitors only because of predatory pricing by the dominant 
company. 
 
Yet, a spread as such may be beneficial for the consumer; moreover 
we should not overlook the key factor that characterises the legitimacy 
of most of the business strategies: the absence of exclusionary intent. 
Conversely, setting prices low in one sector and high in another is 
regarded by Bellamy & Child (2008)612as indicative of predatory 
pricing613, and in that event may implicitly satisfy the same objective 
as the economic need for recoupment614; presumably, in the sense of 
protecting a dominant position in another market. Furthermore, a 
general position such as the above might effectively render cross-
subsidisation by dominant firms almost illegal per se in predatory 
pricing cases, whether or not the source of funding in the market with 
low prices was lawful or whether low prices were funded in non-
dominated markets in an attempt to gain entry into new markets.615 
However, the connection between cross-subsidisation and predatory 
pricing may not always prove to be genuine, as there is the risk of 
                                       
611  Temple Lang John, O’ Donoghue Robert (2002) op. cit. p. 157 
612  Bellamy & Child (2008) op. cit. Paras 10.117, 11.018, 12.191 
613  UK competition law case: Aberdeen Journals Limited vs. OFT [2003 CAT 11] 
Para 445 
614 See supra p. 185 et seq 
615 UPS Europe SA vs Commission (UPS) [2002 ECR II-1915] 
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potential fallacy. Alese (2008)616 analysed the subject and referred to 
the risks of broadly equating different conditions in separate markets, 
a position with which I agree: the required condition for geographical 
service relevance is homogeneity. Hence, this means that the concept 
of cross-subsidisation may be useful tool only if there is homogeneity 
between the “connected” markets in question. 
 
Homogeneity, for instance, exists if the operations in the second 
market in question are not really different in size and type, but 
constitute an extension of the business purpose of the main 
(profitable) market in which the dominant company operates. There, I 
support that the two markets are connected and they can be deemed 
as an integrated economic entity. Admittedly, by this approach, I 
suggest that there may be a suspicion of systemic nature in tramp 
shipping businesses, where several interconnected markets constitute 
a greater deregulated whole.  
However, there are many observational problems involved in 
determining and identifying the causal relations developed in open 
and complex systems. This is because the complexity and uniqueness 
of the shipping system means that it: 
 
i) Engenders new phenomena endogenously, making particular 
properties and states of the system singular, historically 
specific (through the maritime cycles) and perhaps 
irreversible, in the sense that pool size,  movements and 
incumbents’ numbers are not stable enough to produce 
credible results617; 
                                       
616 Alese Femi, Federal Antitrust and EC Competition Law Analysis [Ashgate 
Publishing, 2008] p. 359 
617  Carsten Herrmann Pillath, ‘How to research complex systems: a 
methodological comparison of Ordoliberalism, and Regulation Theory’ in Agnès 
Labrousse, Jean-Daniel Weisz (editors), Institutional economics in France and 
Germany: German Ordoliberalism versus the French regulation school [Springer 
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001] p. 272 p. 275 
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ii) Is influenced by non-linear and frequency-dependent 
processes. Consequently, causal relations exist where the 
strength and direction of both cause(s) and effect(s) are 
highly divergent in terms of magnitude and power618. For this 
reason, even the unambiguous observation of systems 
according to deterministic causality is not possible due to the 
magnitude of inherent deterministic volatility; 
iii) Has no fixed boundaries; due to the process of engendering 
endogenously new phenomena change the meaning of 
exogenous influences on the system. Synergy, as 
phenomenon for instance, alters the finance standards, and 
the legal perception (subsequently intervention) about it; 
iv) Consists of agents and actors whose actions are not fully 
determined by the system but rather stem not only from 
statistical perception of the information but from 
autonomous cognitive motives (e.g. shipowner’s atomicity 
agent, banking and financing practice, shippers’ reactions; 
short- and mid-term predictions about volatility that affect 
the company’s strategy). This means that events in the 
system are not completely dependent on the environment 
and are therefore ‘coincidental’; 
v) Consist of agents who actions are determined by cognitive 
motives; 
vi) Is hierarchically ordered. This means there is causality 
between the elements (vessels, companies etc.) and the 
particular emergent properties of the system (volatility, 
synergy etc.) which run in both directions. Thus, there is no 
easy way of ontological reduction in either direction. 
 
                                       
618 Mainzer Klaus, Thinking in Complexity: The Computational Dynamics of 
Matter, Mind and Mankind (Springer, Berlin Heidelberg NY, 5th Edition, 2007), pp. 
73-75, 301-303 
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In view of the above difficulty to define619 the service and geographic 
boundaries of the relevant market, I argue that if there are certain 
regions in which the pool may pursue more frequent presence, they 
can be defined by the statistical proof of presence in relation to their 
competitors. In any event, geographic specialisation is desirable by 
any shipping company because, in this manner, it becomes more 
acquainted with the local circumstances, the shippers and/or the 
charterers; moreover, the chances to achieve long COA increase. 
Frequent presence in the market equates to more market power. 
 
Presence in an area ultimately affects the negotiations for the COA. 
The contract market is not so much influenced by spot rates and 
demand-supply considerations as it is by the existence of long-
standing relationships between shippers and carriers. A proof of this 
is to be found in the fact that average long-term pool earnings 
demonstrate a more stable development over time than the average 
market. A shipper-carrier relationship is not based on the 
opportunities of taking advantage of favourable market conditions but 
rather on a mutual compromise by which shippers do not light-
heartedly go to the open market during periods of freight recession 
and, similarly, carriers do not charge market rates during periods of 
prosperity. In the above sense, and for their contract business, bulk 
pools could be seen as industrial carriers, or as an integral part of the 
entire production-distribution chain. Freight rates are thus 
negotiated, and although the pricing of COAs may entail a number of 
non-price considerations, the underlying forces of demand and supply 
are still there.620 
 
3.4.2 Correlation of Relevant Market Shares 
 
                                       
619 Athanassiou (2009) op cit. p. 86 
620 Haralambides (1996) op. cit. pp. 236-237 
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In tramp shipping markets, service providers compete for the award of 
transport contracts, that is to say, they sell voyages or transport 
capacity. Depending on the specific services in question, various data 
may allow operators to calculate their annual market , for instance: 
(a) the number of voyages; 
(b) the parties' volume or value share in the overall transport of 
a specific cargo (between port pairs or port ranges); 
(c) the parties' share in the market for time charter contracts; 
(d) the parties' capacity shares in the relevant fleet (by vessel 
type and size). 
 
Depending on the specificities of the relevant tramp shipping market 
shorter periods may be envisaged, e.g. in markets where contracts of 
affreightment are tendered for periods of less than one year. 
 
In practice, however, as many relevant markets overlap both in their 
product and geographical dimensions, it is nearly impossible to 
estimate market shares in each relevant market; moreover there is 
insufficient data regarding supply volume and value.621  
 
Consequently, instead of resorting to the classical market shares 
thresholds622, I would propose to adopt a combination of post-Chicago 
and neoclassical approaches based on the actual ability of the pool to 
exclude rivals and increase prices, respectively. An option could be for 
members of those agreements to include all shares of their vessels (in 
and out of the consortium) and of all vessels in other consortia they 
belong to.623 This will allow clearer pictures of market penetration and 
the critical market share, respectively, to emerge. The particular 
                                       
621  Fearnley Consultants (2007) op. cit. para 94. 
622  Whish & Bailey (2011) op. cit pp. 46-47 
623  See proposal of Holman Fenwick and Willan (Law Firm) to the European 
Commission, Document about the revision of Regulation 823/2000, [21st November 
2008], page 1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2008_consortia/holman_fenwick_
willan.pdf> [accessed 10 August 2009] 
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difference in tramp shipping is the seasonal/temporal and sporadic 
(perhaps opportunistic) ability to abuse its market power in a non-
predictable pattern, in comparison to other sectors. For example, it is 
an indication of market power for a pool if it influences the freights; its 
repeated success to bid for a charter and be awarded the COA it is an 
exception to the chaotic and dynamic characteristics of the market. 
 
This approach is also endorsed by the Maritime Transport 
Guidelines624. The pool’s ability to cause appreciable negative market 
effects depends on the economic context, taking into account the 
parties’ combined market power and the nature of the agreement 
together with other structural factors in the relevant market. It must 
also be considered whether the pool agreement affects the behaviour 
of the parties in neighbouring markets that are closely related to the 
market directly affected by the cooperation625. For example, this may 
be the case where the pool’ s market is that for the transport of 
products of type “x” in specialised box-shaped vessels (within market 
A) and the pool's members also operate ships in the dry bulk market 
(market B). 
 
Therefore, accumulation of small market shares creates a significant 
sum of market power that is not limited within the boundaries of a 
certain geographic context. Although Athanassiou (2009)626 contends 
that cost and time are more relevant factors from a competition law 
point of view, the fact that the vessels may occasionally enter a spot 
market is an indication of occasional market power that can be only 
explained as a sui generis one: Whereas it cannot be easily identified 
due to the large size and open boundaries of the markets, once they 
exhibit high degree of interdependency the evidence show as 
connecting link the pool in question. Its ability to influence multiple 
markets can be deduced by the statistical analysis of the regional 
                                       
624  Maritime Guidelines op. cit. para 69 
625 Guidelines Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, op. cit para 142 
626 Athanassiou, op. cit. p. 85 
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presence without even fulfilling the minimum market share threshold. 
In a particular manner, a pool achieves dominance when it manages 
to create (or secure) a less dynamic environment in comparison to its 
competitors, that are constantly subject to dynamic volatility. In this 
context, market power is signified by causation. 
 
Aggregating across various market shares, even of non-homogeneous 
services, which is – if it is considered by the traditional view - de 
minimis, now becomes a valuable evidence of power: the ability of the 
pool to influence prices in a certain region to a degree that pushes 
competitors to reduce prices. Here we have to take into consideration 
that the price of the freight can be pushed even lower due to feature of 
the carrying vessel (age, Classification society, Insurance etc). Lower 
COA means lower revenue, and results in a genuine inability of the 
competitors to renew and/or upgrade their fleet. Whereas the above 
constitutes a kind of paradox, since the consumer is being benefitted 
by lower prices that are not necessarily the result of predatory 
practice, I consider this approach suitable for markets of significant 
dynamism.  
 
3.4.3 Revisiting the Concept of Consumer 
Benefit 
 
 
The EU courts look for Article 101(3) benefits anywhere they are 
possible. This reinforces the idea that competition law protects 
consumers as a category, rather than as specific individuals in 
specific markets627. Accordingly, consumers must receive a fair share 
of the efficiencies generated. Under Article 101(3) TFEU, it is the 
                                       
627  Townley Chris (Townley 2011 b), “Inter-generational Impacts in Competition 
Analysis: Remembering Those Not Yet Born”, European Competition Law Review, 
[2011 Issue 11] p 4 
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beneficial effects on all consumers in the relevant market that must be 
taken into consideration, not the effect on each individual 
consumer628.  
 
Generally, the transfer of benefits to consumers depends on the 
intensity of competition in the market. Article 101(3) §3 refers to: 
‘...improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share 
of the resulting benefit’. 
 
The expression ‘fair share’ gives regulators a margin of discretion in 
applying this condition, and, on several occasions, the Commission 
has held that agreements in question did not yield a fair share of their 
benefits to consumers, particularly in the long term.629 Article 101(3) 
also manifests the Community principle of proportionality, and is not 
applicable to an agreement in restriction of competition, which adopts 
greater restrictions than those necessary to produce the benefit in 
question.630 Several times, the Commission has imposed conditions on 
parties while granting the exemption to ensure that firms do not 
operate the agreement more restrictively than the Commission was 
willing to countenance. Furthermore, if the effect of an agreement is to 
substantially eliminate competition, it will not satisfy Article 101(3).631 
                                       
628 Asnef-Equifax vs Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Asnef 
Judgment), Case C-238/05, [2006 ECR I-11125]   Para 70. 
629  For instance, in Screensport/EBU, the Commission held that a the 
establishment of a transnational satellite channel dedicated to sport may be 
beneficial to consumers in the short term, but in the long term, it would deprive 
them of the benefits having a choice of channels differing in fashion, content and 
quality. Commission Decision: Screensport/EBU [1992] 5 CMLR 273 
630  For instance, in Metropole Television SA ibid. the CFI annulled a 
Commission decision granting individual exemption to the regulations of the 
European Broadcasting Union on the grounds that it had erred in law on the issue 
of indispensability.  
631  In Heintz Van Landewyck, Fédération Belgo-Luxembourgeoise des industries 
du tabac vs. Commission, [1981] 3 CMLR 134, the ECJ upheld the Commission’s 
decision that an agreement affecting over 80 per cent of the Belgian cigarette market 
failed under this head. In the Commission Decision: Bayer/BP Chemicals, [1989] 4 
CMLR 940, the Commission had to explain that since the geographical market for 
polyethene was the entire Community, a restructuring agreement between two 
significant undertakings did not substantially eliminate competition.  
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The pass-on of benefits must at least compensate consumers for any 
actual or potential negative impact caused to them by the restriction 
of competition under Article 101(1)632. It is on the grounds above that 
the benefit to consumers constitutes an absolute rule. Practice which 
is harmful to consumers infringes 101(3), notwithstanding that it is 
not harmful to the structure of competition on the relevant market.633 
Furthermore, it is not necessary to show that the firm that is guilty of 
the infringement derives a commercial advantage from it.634 The only 
defence against this absolute rule is to prove that the practice and/or 
agreement in question shall produce benefits to the consumer, if not 
immediately, in a measurable and foreseeable future. 
 
However, Article 101(3)§3 provides that the prohibitions set in Article 
101(1) may be declared inapplicable in respect of agreements, 
decisions or concerted practices, which satisfy four conditions: 
 
iii) The agreement necessarily improves the production or 
distribution of goods; 
iv) The agreement promotes technical and economic progress; 
v) Consumers receive a fair share of the resulting benefits; 
vi) The agreement does not contain any dispensable restrictions, 
nor substantially eliminate competition in the relevant market. 
 
All four of these requirements must be satisfied if an agreement is to 
prove a true benefit to the consumer in accordance with Article 
101(3).635 
 
                                       
632 Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty, op. cit. Para 4 
633 Continental Can Co op. cit. Para 26. 
634 Football World Cup (2000) Commission Decision, (Football World Cup), Case 
IV/36.888 – 1998  [OJ L 005, 2000], Paras 101-102. 
635 In Metropole TelevisionSA vs. Commission, [1996 5 CMLR 386], the CFI 
annulled the Commission’s decision on the grounds that it had not shown enough 
evidence to support that the restrictions in the agreement were indispensable.  
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Some restructuring agreements have passed the test of paragraph 3 
because it would result in a healthier industry giving consumers 
greater benefits.636 
 
Yet another perspective may be that at the heart of competition law is 
not the debate between consumer welfare and competitor protection, 
but as to who makes the decision. Although the ideological debates of 
the twentieth century have largely favoured the market mechanism, 
the very nature of competition law suggests that there are 
circumstances in which imperfections of the market require the 
control of economic behaviour. On the one hand, this is significant 
because the use of competition law to ‘benefit’ the consumer leaves 
the door open for its populist use, and to questions about the 
competence of competition regulators to make a price determination. 
On the other hand, a short-sighted interpretation with consumer 
welfare might even cause a producer to exit the market. In the context 
of the maritime industry, and with regard to competition law, the 
European legislative position up to the end of the year 2000 was 
based on the opinion that the said industry may contain self- 
regulatory elements, or, due to its international nature, was difficult to 
regulate by a restrictive legislative framework.  
 
Even though, historically, the Commission was empowered to grant 
‘individual exemptions’ to agreements notified to it, the situation has 
since changed. Now,637 undertakings are expected to conduct a ‘self-
assessment’, and the Commission no longer enjoys a monopoly with 
respect to ‘individual exemption’ as the responsibility is now shared 
with community courts and national competition authorities.  
 
                                       
636  In Synthetic Fibres Agreement, an 18 per cent reduction in production 
agreement that was to last for three years was sanctioned by the Commission. OJ 
[1985] L207, p. 17 
637  See Council Regulation 1/2003 
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As is obvious, any benefit claimed by the agreement must outweigh 
any detriments it might produce. However, rarely has a hardcore 
restriction, such as price-fixing, been found to satisfy Article 101(3), 
whereas Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the (now abolished) Regulation 4056/86 
on maritime transport provided a block exemption for price-fixing in 
the case of international liner conferences that lasted for decades.  
 
A narrow view regarding the importance of consumer benefit is that 
subsection 3 only refers to economic efficiency that benefits the 
consumer. A greater view is that broader policy goals other than 
economic efficiency may need to be considered. Some broader 
considerations like employment, culture and environment have 
affected the decision-making of the Commission. For instance, in 
Metro638 the ECJ considered employment a relevant factor under the 
first condition of Article 101(3), holding that the agreement was to 
stabilise the provision of employment. Similarly, the Commission in 
Ford/Volkswagen639 considered the fact that a joint-venture would 
bring a substantial amount of employment and foreign investment 
into one of the poorer regions of the Community.640 Likewise, 
agreements between manufacturers of domestic appliances were 
countenanced because of ‘collective environmental benefits’.  
 
The importance that the EC Competition Law merits the Consumer 
Benefit Factor is shown by the wording chosen in the Commission's 
2004 Guidelines on Article 101(3)641. The Guidelines contain a 
statement of the objectives of Article 101: 
 
The objective of Article 101 is to protect competition in the market as 
a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient 
                                       
638 Metro vs Commission[1978] 2 CMLR 1 
639 Ford/Volkswagen [1993] 5 CMLR 617 
640  See: CECED (European Committee of Manufacturers of Domestic 
Equipment) (Commission Decision) OJ[2000] L 187/47 
641  OJ [2004] C101 para 13 
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allocation of resources. Competition and market integration serve 
these ends since the creation and preservation of an open single 
market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the 
Community for the benefit of consumers. 
 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes, who took up office as head of the 
DGComp in the autumn of 2004, continued to proclaim the goal of 
protecting competition as a means of ensuring efficiency and 
consumer welfare.642 At European Consumer and Competition Day at 
London in September 2005 she stated:643 
 
“Consumer welfare is now well established as the standard the 
Commission applies when assessing mergers and infringements of the 
Treaty rules on cartels and monopolies. Our aim is simple: to protect 
competition in the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare 
and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. An effects-based 
approach, grounded in solid economics, ensures that citizens enjoy 
the benefits of a competitive, dynamic market economy.” 
 
 
Further, her speech to the BEUC in November 2006 was actually 
entitled Consumer Welfare is the Standard of Anti-trust Enforcement.644 
In fact, at that conference the Chairman of the OFT, John Vickers 
stressed that: ‘... consumer and competition policies must work together 
in tandem if not as one’.645 
                                       
642 Jones Alison, Sufrin Brenda , 2007, op. cit. p. 46 
643  Neelie Kroes, (European Commissioner for Competition Policy 2004-2009), 
‘European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices 
‘European Consumer and Competition Day’ speech at the European Consumer and 
Competition Day, [London 15 September 2005] 
<europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/512&format=HT
ML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [accessed 17 May 2009] 
644 Neelie Kroes, (European Commissioner for Competition Policy 2004-2009), 
‘Competition Policy and Consumers’ speech at the Bureau Européen des Unions de 
Consommateurs [Brussels, 16th November 2006] 
<europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/691&format=HT
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, [accessed 17 May 2009] 
645  Jones, Sufrin, (2007) op. cit. p. 46 
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In alignment with this policy, the CFI has given important to the 
welfare of the consumers as the objective of the competition rules. In 
two judgments, the well-being or welfare of the consumer has been 
identified as the objective:646 the 2006 ÖsterreichischePostsparkasse 
judgment and the (2007) 2009 GlaxoSmithKline judgment. 
What the term ‘consumer welfare’ – as adopted by the Court - actually 
means still remains unclear. As mentioned earlier, the role of the 
national and community competition authorities has been to 
determine when a benefit under Article 101(3) would overcome a 
restriction caught under Article 101(1). In other words, competition 
law prohibits agreements, which establish anti-competitive effects and 
identify the detrimental effects that may arise from the conduct or 
transaction under review. Certainly, the standard or objective of EU 
competition law does not appear to be the ‘total welfare’.647 
 
3.4.3.1 Intergenerational Impact 
 
The fact that benefits generated in one market can spill over into other 
markets or in future generations makes sense in shipping, especially 
in connection to the quality and reliability of service. However, the 
position of EU Competition vis-à-vis the argument of intergenerational 
impact remains generally unclear.  To measure whether the presence 
of a liner service creates future benefits to the local economy is 
undoubtedly important for various reasons but cannot be addressed 
in this study. Without timely and safe service, however, industrial 
                                       
646  See: CFI Joint Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01, Österreichische 
Postsparkasse vs. Commission and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG vs. 
Commission, ECR [2006] II-1601 paragraph 115. See also: CFI Case T-168/01, 
GlaxoSmithKline Services vs. CommissionOJ [2009] C282 
647 Jones Alison, Sufrin Brenda , (2007), op. cit. p. 48 
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deliveries become uncertain; a factor that jeopardises the reliable 
operation of any business. 648 
 
Perhaps one can address the matter in relation to the 
intergenerational benefits that derive from the products that are 
specifically developed for the sector and committed R&D. 
In addition, I consider that it is necessary to investigate further the 
intergenerational impact in abnormal changes in shipping. The 
shipping business can easily turn into a failure unless good planning 
(within all shipping markets), good management, beneficial random 
events (good luck), experience and talent co-exist. In a sense it is in 
the interest of the market to safeguard possible benefits, but in 
shipping such a result can be achieved by the intergenerational 
evolution of knowledge and good practice of ship operators (i.e. the 
concept of maritime tradition as heritage). European seamanship, the 
experience of shipping managers and their experiential knowledge of 
market trends have is an important factor that saves shipping firms 
from decline and contributes to the efficiency global trade.649 In fact, I 
hold that European maritime transport industry, especially bulk 
(tramp shipping) is a constituent parameter of the multilateral 
international trade regime. In an analogy, by providing reliable 
transport services it guarantees nonrivalry, nonxcludability, 
nonexclusivity in the trade patterns between developing and 
                                       
648  In European Night Services op. cit. para 230, the CFI considered that “the 
duration of an exemption ... must be sufficient to enable the beneficiaries to achieve 
the benefits justifying such exemption, namely, in the present case, the contribution 
to economic progress and the benefits to consumers provided by the introduction of 
new high-quality transport services...Since, moreover, such progress and benefits 
cannot be achieved without considerable investment, the length of time required to 
ensure a proper return on that investment is necessarily an essential factor to be 
taken into account when determining the duration of an exemption”. 
649  Quoting John Faraclas, shipping consultant, shipbroker and editor of 
Shipping International Monthly Review  
<http://www.otenet.gr/portal/portal/info/economynews/maritime_report?media-
type=html&user=anon&js_panename=maritime_report&action=portlets.PsmlPortletA
ction&eventsubmit_doview=1714488&category=maritime_report> [accessed 10 
March 2009] 
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underdevelopment countries.650 Undoubtedly European tramp 
shipping becomes the most reliable server of the aforementioned 
principles of the international trade. In a second analogy, DG 
Communications, Network, Content and Technology651 aims to ensure 
the renewal of scientific bases for future ICT by fostering excellence in 
ICT research, and to help transform the way it is conceived, practiced, 
disseminated and used. In this context, one must take into account 
not only the benefits for the consumer but the potential preservation 
of tradition and craftsmanship that will ultimately benefit the 
consumer, since by this kind of operation safety and quality will 
continue to exist. The matter requires further investigation. It will be 
subject to future research, especially in relation to the shipbuilding 
industry.652 
 
3.4.4 Benefits to Efficiency and Competitiveness 
 
Given the above, we cannot dissociate efficiency benefits from those of 
the consumer. Either within a short or long period the consumer must 
secure a fair share of benefits. Thus, one can evaluate the 
characteristics of a market that measures only the economic efficiency 
that benefits the consumer. Another way of evaluating efficiencies 
would be based on the existence of broader policy goals besides 
economic-consumer efficiency. Parameters which could also be 
                                       
650 Mendoza Ronald, “The Multilateral Trade Regime: A Global Public Good for All?” 
in Kaul Inge, Conceição ( Conceicao ) Pedro, Goulven Katell Le, Mendoza Ronald U, 
(eds) Providing Global Public Goods [Oxford University Press 2003] pp 460-461. 
Mendoza explores whether the multilateral trade regime is a global public. 
651  See the objectives of the DG that include the development of a full-cycle 
roadmap to get the output into the EU economy, through innovation tools such as 
pilot-lines and open innovation platforms. Source: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/connect/mission/index_en.htm>  Accessed : 10/09/12. 
652 Rosa Angelo L., "Contrariety: Divergent Theories of State involvement in Shipping 
Finance Between the United States and the European Union" Tulane Maritime Law 
Journal Volume 29, [2004-2005] pp. 187-216. Rosa supports that in response to the 
financial pressures put on shipowners by the oversupply of shipping tonnage on the 
world market and the increased competition from third-country vessels, a great part 
of EU shipowners have decided to reduce their costs by registering their ships under 
non-EU flags or under second national registers, moreover they preferred foreign 
shipyards (mainly in the Far East) to build and repair their vessels. 
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considered could be market balance, economic development, 
protection of weaker companies, labour consideration, etc. It is 
evident that the competition policy related to shipping does not limit 
itself only to the aforementioned criteria of whether and to what extent 
consumers are benefited. In my opinion, the main concern so far has 
been market regulation rather than benefit to the consumer. Should 
benefit to the consumer be the decisive criterion behind any legislative 
initiative, then any amendment, as such, would be aimed at 
maintaining or promoting a regime that could guarantee the welfare of 
the consumer.  
 
In reality, the competition law regime in shipping has been more or 
less the same for the last fifty years. Maritime transport consisting of 
trampers guaranteed that transport costs would not only be low but 
would also not affect the retail price of the commodity. Indeed, this 
has been proven:  
It is cheaper, nowadays, to transport a 50 kilogram television 
appliance from Shanghai to London than to send a 250 gram First 
Class letter within the UK.653  
  
                                       
653  We refer to the Royal Mail price list. In comparison to the postage fees, we 
herewith show a chart provided to us by the ELAA. It exhibits the average transport 
cost on a variety of commodities in 2007 and 2008. It is also worth mentioning that 
the said costs refer to the route Shanghai – UK, which, incidentally, is one of the 
longest ones. It is clear that the burden of transport costs is absolutely insignificant, 
in view of the distance and the weight involved. In particular, in a television set price 
of $2,550 USD the transport costs amounts only 1.1 per cent of the retail price; as 
for the example of sport shoes the corresponding costs are 1.8 per cent, i.e. $0.9 
USD that is cheaper than the lightest 1stclass letter post within the UK, as 
mentioned above. It is evident that shipping transport utilises economies of scale 
and provides the best possible value of service in relation to the freights that they 
are charged Source: Chris Bourne, Executive Director ELAA/European Liner Affairs 
Association ASBL. Private email to Ioannis Voudouris, 05–09 June 2009. 
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Figure 2 Retail /Transport Cost matrix 
 
Retail /Transport 
Cost matrix 
Price to 
Consumer 
Ocean Freight Total Transport 
Cost 
Television Set $2,550 $12.00 $30.00 
Vacuum Cleaner $300 $3.36 $4.65 
Sports Shoes $50 $0.26 $0.90 
Video Game $135 $0.58 $1.75 
Bottle of Whisky $50 $0.13 $0.78 
 
 
Until the recent legislative initiative (started in 2004) for the revision 
of the block exemption, shipping was perceived to be a stable system. 
In practice,654 it is observed that the block exemption was considered 
by some to be a kind of ‘immunity’ that served its purpose as an 
adequate stabilising factor. Although this policy may be deemed 
conservative, it is suggested that the majority of requirements that are 
necessary for balance in the market, economic development and 
consumer benefit were all covered by the block exemption regime.  
 
The perception that the shipping industry may be an efficient and 
contestable (competitive) market has, for decades, profoundly 
influenced the legislative frameworks which govern shipping. As 
reason for this competitiveness I have so far mentioned the dynamic 
element and the loose boundaries among markets that allow 
competitors to participate. We could therefore support that the tramp 
market is – theoretically at least – contestable.  
 
In an attempt to defend contestability we shall use an example from 
retail commerce. In an analogy, a grocery shop competes with the 
                                       
654  In addition to the data provided supra (footnote 296), we refer to statistical 
information provided by IMO, according to which, ‘the transport cost element in the 
shelf price of consumer goods varies from product to product, but is ultimately 
marginal. For example, transport costs account for only around 2% of the shelf price 
of a television set and only around 1.2% of a kilo of coffee’. See: IMO Report, 
‘International Shipping, Carrier of World Trade’, [2005], op. cit. p. 1 
253 
 
supermarket/hypermarket chain for market share. The difference 
between the retail industry and shipping is that the products sold at 
the grocery shop are not usually cheaper than those sold at the 
supermarket. In contrast to the independent shipowner who is always 
cheaper than conferences, in the supermarket-minimarket equation 
price inelasticity is observed: firstly, a grocery shop does not represent 
a good example of economies of scale; and secondly, predatory pricing 
by supermarkets and agents’ commissions (market intermediates) 
inhibit the growth of grocery shops and consequently any effective 
competition between the two subsectors.655 Moreover even small 
tramp independents apply principles of economy of scale which enable 
them to compete with cartels. This phenomenon is a ‘self-regulating’ 
attribute of supply; the main characteristic of a contestable market.  
 
However, an adoption of such argument contains the risk of 
generalisation because some of the conditions of the Contestable-
Competitive Markets Theory are not met in shipping and, in 
particular, in liner shipping. For example, the Contestable Markets 
Theory opposes external interventions which impede free entry and 
exit and sunk costs. Conversely, in tramp shipping, initial investment 
and sunk costs are very high, in principle, making this an apparent 
paradox. 
Another paradox that characterises the market is that while the 
market is theoretically contestable, there are no reports of distortions 
of competition before the competent authorities. The fact that pools 
aim to regulate supply equates them to be prima facie anti-
competitive. However, I agree with Athanassiou (2009)656 on the fact 
that different forms of cooperation in shipping may be included under 
the term “pool,” that have to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Our subject matter – the partial function cooperation tramp shipping 
                                       
655 In shipping the only additional cost on top to COA may be the broker’s fee, 
gents’ fee, which is traditionally fixed (by an ‘unwritten’ rule), to 1-10% case-by-case 
basis. 
656 Athanassiou op. cit. p. 87 
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consortia – produce significant efficiencies; accordingly I suggest that 
any distortions are balanced by the benefits which relate to the 
surplus capacity effect.  
This over-surplus inefficiency is what actually makes the shipping 
market dynamic; and, subsequently, competitive and beneficial for the 
users. In particular, the opinion of the majority of maritime 
economists657 holds that an inherent structural market failure exists 
in shipping (both liner and tramp), relates to price instability (also 
known as volatility or maritime cycles), and is indicative of a 
contestable market appearing to rest on a solid foundation. This 
instability guarantees actual and efficient competition; both the old 
and new legal regimes in shipping could be considered to be explicit or 
tacit indications that the maritime market has been and continues to 
be contestable.  
Therefore, if tramp shipping has been a contestable market, how can 
we explain the efforts for regulation? The rationale behind the new 
legislative initiatives (abolition of conferences and regulation of tramp 
shipping by competition law) may have no practical effect. So what 
has been the actual motive behind the recent legislative initiatives?  
My opinion is that there is no clear answer to this question, due to the 
inconsistency mentioned above658. For example, the EU Commission 
has systematically degraded and rejected the competitiveness 
assumption of scheduled lines,659 and no special theoretical (legal or 
                                       
657 Baumol William, Panzar J.C., Willig R.D., Contestable Markets and Theory of 
Industry Structure, [New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982] p. 510; Gwilliam, 
K. M., Molenaar H. J., Current issues in maritime economics, [Dordrecht, Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993], pp. 70-75, 84; Blauwens, Gust, De Baere Peter, 
Van de Voorde Eddy, Transport Economics, [Uitgeverij De Boeck, 3rd Edition 2007], 
pp. 342-343; Desmond George, Kenneth Joll Caroline, Lynk E. L., Industrial 
Organisation: Competition, Growth, and Structural Change, [Routledge, London, NY, 
4th Edition], p. 278.; Sjostrom William, “Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of 
Monopoly and Empty Core Models”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97 No. 
5,[1989], pp. 1160-1179; Shashikumar, N., “Competition and Models of Market 
Structure in Liner Shipping”, Transport Reviews, Vol. 15 No. 1,[1995]p. 25-26; 
Meyrick, op. cit, pp. 97-98, 104, 157. De Borger Bruno, Kerstens Kristiaan, ‘The 
performance of Bus Transit Operators’ in Button K.J. and Hensher D.A. (editors) 
[Oxford: Emerald Group Publishing, 2000] pp. 578, 591 
658  See supra Nazzini § 208, Bredima § 274  and Wareham §275 
659 TACA(1998), op. cit, Para 351 
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economic) maxims have been advertised as being capable of replacing 
the contestable markets theoretical background and supporting the 
legal rationale underlying the abolition of liner conferences. Thus, any 
findings or justifications rely more on the general principles of 
competition law which govern all commercial activity and relate to 
market freedom rather than to a particular economic theory relevant 
to the shipping industry. 
Eventually, the combination of the principles mentioned above would 
lead to the conclusion that shipping is characterised as a ‘Pareto’660, 
or a ‘weak-Pareto optimised’ market. This supports the suggestion 
that tramp shipping has been and still is a contestable market from 
the theoretical point of view. An adoption of such a conclusion could 
consequently provide an argument for the reversal of the legislation 
which abolishes liner conferences (as being unnecessary). In fact, 
Liner Conferences have been abolished in the EU and demised in the 
US. In any event, one cannot derogate from or limit the confidence 
that shipping is indeed an optimised, balanced and contestable 
market by nature: these are the theoretical foundations of the 
maritime industry and are the active components of the systemic 
ontology of the maritime industry.  
 
To proceed with this analysis, I support that even dominant pools may 
not be perfectly contestable; nevertheless, they operate within a 
system of interlinked markets; the aggregate of their presence 
suggests that the tramp market is systemically contestable as a whole. 
A contestable market must first be examined with regard to whether 
and to what extent it is governed by stability, or if it is alternatively a 
naturally unstable market which is incapable of eliminating 
competition (contests). From the analysis so far, it is quite clear that 
the maritime industry is a genuinely unstable market. One cannot but 
                                       
660 Miller Grady, The legal and economic basis of international trade, (Westport 
CT, London, 1996), p. 86 
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recognise that market failures correlate with market efficiency in 
shipping.  
 
The peculiarity of maritime industry consists of inherent instability – 
one cannot but recognise periodic market failures. At the same time, 
there exists no strong evidence which proves that competition has 
been effectively eliminated, as a result of the block exemption. 
 
In particular, it is observed that the individual conditions regarding 
contestable markets are satisfied in both situations. Blanco (2007)661 
uses the case study of liner conferences and supports that:  
 
i) Either incumbents must believe that potential new entrants take the 
decision to enter on the basis that the prices of present operators are 
fixed; or, incumbents must believe that potential competitors can 
protect themselves from reprisals, by entering long term 
charterparties before entering the market; 
 
ii) Incumbents must believe that new entrants are capable of taking 
over the market by lowering the prices 
 
iii) The cost of financing capital must be the same for new entrants 
and incumbents; products must be standard; there must be no ‘sunk 
costs’ (costs that cannot be recovered once they have been incurred as 
they make expensive to leave the market); entry and exit must be 
without barriers. In this context, authorities should make markets as 
contestable as possible, facilitating the entry and exit of undertakings 
onto the market in order to reinforce potential competition. 
 
One would expect that Blanco endorses the contestability assumption. 
On the contrary, Blanco (2007)662 and others,663 including the EU 
                                       
661 Blauwens, Gust, Peter De Baere, Eddy Van de Voorde, 2007, op. cit, pp. 342-
343 
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Commission, consider that the theory does not appear to be solid 
enough, as they emphasise the prerequisites which are not wholly 
met. One of the basic arguments they offer is that the Contestable 
Market Theory depends entirely on various assumptions.664 Inter alia, 
it puts weight on the time which the incumbent outside the 
conference takes to react. Those who claim that the Contestable 
Market Theory does not apply to the shipping industry also argue that 
the theory is often presented as a model of competitive equilibrium of 
a strictly static nature and normative value; this leads to the 
conclusion that a static market can never be competitive. I agree with 
their assertions, which can be summarised in shipping as follows: 
 
i) There is limited empirical support available; 
ii) The theory depends on the reaction time of incumbents; 
iii) A contestable market produces results which are strictly static and 
refer to long-term market equilibrium; 
iv) In tramp shipping, it is doubtful that the threat of the large-scale 
entry of competitors keeps shipowners grouped in pools; 
                                                                                                             
662  Blanco Luis Ortiz, (2007), Shipping Conferences under the EC Antitrust Law: 
Criticism of a Legal Paradox, [Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, pp. 
483-484 
663  Gardner, Bernard, ‘An Alternative Model of Price Determination in Liner 
Shipping’ Maritime Policy and Management, [Vol. 5 1978], pp. 197-218; Vickers, 
John Stuart, George Yarrow, Privatization: an economic analysis, (MIT Press, Rhode 
Island, 2nd Edition, 1989), p. 61; Also see: Sayers, C. R., Contestability Theory: An 
Assessment of its Relevance to Australian Liner Shipping . (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986), p. 24-25 
 <http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/42/Files/OP076.pdf> [accessed 11 
December 2009]; Brooks, M. R., Sidney Gilman, ‘Competition Policy in Liner 
Shipping: Policy Options’ in HJ Molenaar and E. Van de Voorde, (1994), Competition 
Policy in Liner Shipping: Proceedings of a Conference Organised by the International 
Association of Maritime Economists (IAME) and the University of Antwerp (UFSIA) 
apud. Voorde, De Baere, Blauwens,2007, op. cit, p. 342; Stephen Martin, Advanced 
Industrial Economics, (Blackwell Publishing, 2nd Edition, 2002), p. 305 
664  In this context, any intervention aims in reproducing ‘Kaldor Hicks 
efficiencies’. Regardless of its true scope and desired result, an intervention as such 
has to anticipate all subject market peculiarities. In cost-benefit analysis, an aim is 
evaluated by comparing the total costs, such as building costs and environmental 
costs, consumer benefits; the project would typically be given the go-ahead if the 
benefits exceed the costs. It is perhaps one of the reasons that justify the 
introduction of the block exemption in liner shipping in the first place. 
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v) In pools, the incumbent shipowners confront new entrants, right 
from the start, with price wars and other predatory tactics. This 
tactic is expensive as it generates greater sunk costs from the 
incumbent shipowners’ side; 
vi) The large sunk costs that result from leaving a route due to 
inefficiencies are difficult to be set aside by reusing vessels on the 
other routes especially in times of market crisis; the excess 
capacity would therefore remain unused; 
vii) The large-scale entry of new vessels is virtually impossible not only 
because of what such an entry would cost but also because of the 
time it would require; 
viii) Shipowners have to make a great deal of investment in the 
management and marketing of their services; these investments 
and their related assets are considerably less mobile than the 
vessels themselves;  
 
It is worth mentioning that the EU Commission clearly agrees with 
arguments (iv), (v) and (vi) above.665 In particular, the Commission and 
various academics reject the idea that a large influx of entrants by 
competitors is capable of stirring further volatility in the market.666 It 
must also be admitted that reasons (v) and (vi), regarding sunk costs, 
are well-grounded and could well be strong enough to support the 
conclusion that the liner shipping market is not contestable.667 The 
main argument behind (v) is based on the assumption that, even in 
the complete absence of entry or exit barriers, the market would not 
                                       
665  In TACA (1998), op. cit, paras 355-356, the EU Commission incorporates the 
views of Sidney Gilman (Professor (em.) University of Liverpool; member of 
International Association of Maritime Economists); while in EATA (1999), op. cit, 
Paragraphs 130-131, and FETTCSA (2000),op. cit, Par 119, the Commission even 
argues that Gilman’s analysis underestimates problems for the application of the 
theory of contestability in regular maritime transport markets, reducing it to a vessel 
mobility problem. 
666 Blanco , 2007, op. cit. p. 484 
667 TACA(1998), op. Cit, Paragraphs 351, 355 
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be so contestable as to make it possible to entirely substitute the 
existing capacity.668 
 
These arguments establish reasonable doubt regarding the 
applicability of the theory of contestability. In particular, the issue of 
sunk costs (for both tramp and liner) and the block exemption for 
liner shipping, if accepted, justify the EU change in policy towards a 
liberalised shipping industry.  
 
Instead, I propose to examine the nature of the shipping industry in a 
global context instead of merely focusing on certain points of the 
Contestability Theory. This allows one to evaluate the importance of 
the arguments made and to take into consideration additional 
features and particularities of the system. 
 
3.4.4.1 The Pareto Nature of the Tramp Shipping Markets 
 
Thus, while competition is understood as rivalry for its own sake, 
efficiency is defined as probable Pareto Efficiency. In other words, a 
change is efficient if it produces gains which are sufficient to 
compensate victims for their losses. Should legislators merely 
intervene, via protectionism, the self-generated Pareto Efficiency 
properties of shipping would be replaced by new rules which could be 
resolved by methods of cost benefit efficiency. It is on these grounds 
that proceed to the following suggestions: 
 
                                       
668 Quoting from Blanco (2007), op. cit, p. 485: ‘...sunk costs related to the 
availability of capacity for entry onto the conditions existing on other routes. If these 
routes were in equilibrium, they simply would not have the capacity of instant or 
total substitution of the companies present on any of these markets. To the extent 
that the vessels start to leave the other routes, rates would increase according to the 
elasticity of demand, and the process would quickly end’. Moreover, Sidney Gilman, 
in HJ Molenaar and E Van de Voorde (1994), gives the example of principal world 
routes with three big routes (the Atlantic, Pacific, Europe/Far East), which represent 
a big portion of the overall industry, and extends the argument to smaller routes. 
apud. TACA (1998), op. cit, para 355 
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There is an infinite loop of ‘Nash equilibrium’669, of cyclic behaviour in 
market strategies and decision-making between market players 
(whether they are conferences & independents). This can be deemed to 
be a kind of tacit and informal cartel;670 
The said equilibrium can be deemed to produce Weak Pareto 
Efficiencies (WPO) of cyclic behaviour (synchronised with the 
phenomenon of maritime cycles), in the way in which resources are 
generally allocated; 
Maritime cycles combined with maritime markets’ volatility act as self-
correcting properties with regard to the proper allocation of resources; 
The cyclic processes do not necessarily affect the price of the final 
product as both subsystems (liner consortia/independents) apply 
economies of scale provided that there are no significant market 
barriers or restrictions which distort the balance of the market. 
High competition may lead to further concentration as defence 
mechanism against destructive competition. Perhaps a good example 
                                       
669  The Nash equilibrium concept is used to analyse the outcome of the 
strategic interaction of several decision makers. In other words, it is a way of 
predicting what will happen if several institutions are making decisions at the same 
time, and if the decision of each one depends on the decisions of the others. 
Basically, Nash equilibrium in shipping is a solution concept of a ‘game’ involving 
two or more market players, in which, each player is assumed to know the 
equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by 
changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally. In many cases, most shipowners 
that operate within a certain trade might improve their revenues if they could 
somehow agree on strategies different from the Nash equilibrium (e.g. competing 
shipowners forming a cartel in order to increase their profits). See Dimitriou Loukas, 
Tsekeris Theodore, Stathopoulos Antony, ‘Competitive Network Design In Short-Sea 
Liner Markets Using Agent-Based Game-Theoretic Models’, in Proceedings of the 1st 
International Conference ‘Competitiveness and Complementarity of Transport Modes 
- Perspectives for the Development of Intermodal Transport’ University of Aegean, 
Chios [Internet Article, 2007] 
<www.kepe.gr/pdf/Competitive%20network%20design%20in%20short-
sea%20liner%20markets%20using%20agent-based%20game-
theoretic%20models.pdf> [accessed 20 August 2009] 
670 Pozdnakova, 2008, op. cit, pp. 49-50. Traditional liner conferences impose on 
their members a strict rate discipline, which can only be relaxed by taking 
independent rate action or entering into individual service arrangements. In such 
case, carriers may still be willing to cooperate on tariffs in a more flexible framework 
of stabilisation or discussion agreements. These are also known as ‘non-binding and 
recommended tariff rate levels’ and they are considered price-fixing agreements. 
Thus mainly non-conference liners may have sufficient market power to negotiate 
cooperation agreements with the conference members. 
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would be the facts in Yeheskel.671 What was interesting in this case 
was that, besides the claimant and the defendant, there was a third (a 
sizeable) competitor in the relevant market, Mediterranean Shipping 
Corporation (MSC). The price war became very serious at the operative 
time, with the claimant and MSC adopting a very aggressive 
undercutting exercise. Although MSC had not significant market 
share, its behaviour was substantial in increasing competition.  
 
 
Accordingly, the findings suggest that a further liberalisation – by 
means of legislative intervention on an already competitive market, 
could possibly result in an increase of prices: inefficient ship owners 
will have to partially or totally withdraw from non-profitable trades. 
Hence, further competition reduces capacity and, should this coincide 
with low troughs, excessive supply would lead to ‘destructive’ 
competition and the further withdrawal of supply (by way of scrapping 
or conversions). Such a phenomenon may result in a considerable 
increase of prices or in a decrease in the quality and reliability of 
services.672 
3.5 Tramp Pools and Market Power 
 
Article 102 of the TFEU could apply to pools on the basis that the 
members of a pool might hold a dominant position collectively. 
However, a dominant position would only arise if the pool had 
sufficient market power to achieve dominance in the relevant market. 
In addition, the pool would have to engage in abusive conduct which 
would not be objectively justifiable. Moreover, the evidence from 
international case law has shown that the establishment of a pool 
                                       
671  Yeheskel Arkin vs Borchard Lines op. cit. § 488 
672 Supra Bredima (2010) §274, Wareham (2010) §275 
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would not involve the strengthening of a pre-existing dominant market 
position.673 
 
The matter is analysed in chapter one. We shall only refer to the 
subjects that present differentiation. 
 
3.5.1 Cost Structure and Economies of Scale 
Indicators 
 
The tramp shipping industry has always been flexible enough to 
respond to the changing demands of its customer base. This can be 
seen in all markets and in the development of specialised vessels to 
service particular trades. Most of the changes tend to be evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary. With regard to the same type of ship, the 
rule is that there has been a general evolution towards larger ships. 
Economies of scale which are related to larger vessels reduce freight 
per unit of cargo and ease port operations, as fewer calls are needed to 
import a given volume of cargo. This is most obvious in the large 
cargo-volume markets such as those of coal, iron ore, and crude oil. 
 
However, this is not an invariable norm. Larger vessels have 
proportionally higher maintenance and operational costs than the 
smaller vessels. Moreover, the necessary capital to acquire or build 
vessels which are bigger/faster does not always come cheap. Tramp 
owners usually find it hard or unwise to commit useful equity and 
other collateral, and they prefer to focus on the S&P market by 
running older and smaller ships which can guarantee a certain yield. 
 
                                       
673  Though there has been a considerable research in many countries, we find 
no cases where pools were found to be infringing competition. See: Fearnley 
Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law Firm (2007), op. cit, 
paras 1886-1887 
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In case of pools, the profits are shared among the participants in 
proportion to their participation (without absolute dominance by one 
party)674. We have to take into consideration that, in accordance with 
the particular type of agreement, the ownership and the distribution 
of profits are exchanged with other forms of benefits e.g. privileged 
shares or managerial motives. The usual practice of profit distribution 
as applied in a typical pool structure is that each participating vessel’s 
percentage of the pool earnings is determined by a series of voyage 
calculations.675 The series of voyage calculations would include 
voyages relating to any contracts of affreightment concluded by the 
pool. The dividends are attributed according to the accession 
agreement among the participants. 
 
3.5.1.1 Cost Effectiveness 
 
Cost effectiveness can be examined from two points of view: that of the 
consumer and that of the operator. 
 
                                       
674 Young Richard, Standish Bradford, Joint Ventures, Planning and Action [New 
York: Financial Executives Research Foundation, 1977], p. 11 
675  Each voyage included in series of voyage calculations would be assigned to a 
point system (a weighting), similar to the procedure used in the scales that describe 
the various Baltic Freights and other freight indices. The earning capacity of each 
vessel participating in the pool is related to that of the other entered vessels, would 
determine the percentage of the pool earnings, and is attributed to each vessel. In 
the case of pools comprising vessels that are essentially homogeneous insofar as 
their specification is concerned, the calculation could be determined by differences 
in relatively simple factors, such as the dead-weight, speed, consumption and cubic 
capacity for cargo. There may, however, be other differences in the specifications of 
the participating vessels which are not so easily quantifiable and, therefore, a more 
subjective assessment of the value of the pool of such differences would need to be 
made. In the case for instance of the tanker market, double hull tankers versus 
single hull tankers, or tankers with heating coils versus uncoiled vessels. Such 
differences in the specification of participating vessels might give rise to a further 
adjustment factor, which would affect the percentage of the pool earnings, thus 
changing the system that is based on the model voyage calculations. Furthermore, if 
the age of the participating vessels differs widely, an age adjustment factor affecting 
the allocation attributed to each vessel might be agreed upon. Alternatively, it might 
be agreed by the participants that any overage insurance would be on the owner’s 
account. Other factors are considered, such as fuel consumption, bunker prices, et 
cetera. 
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On the one hand, from the consumers’ point of view (shipper), 
maritime transport is generally accepted to be highly cost effective. 
Despite this, given volatility,676 there has been a long downward trend 
in the ratio between freight costs and values of the products 
transported; in fact this downward trend is a genuine deflation – 
shipping rates follow a deflationary trend, reducing the actual yield 
per transported unit.  
On the other hand, the issue of cost effectiveness from the point of 
view of ship operators relates to the cost/profit equilibrium and the 
ROI. In order to effectively deal with this matter, ship owners became 
the first sector of the economy which globalised, reducing costs. 
Despite global inflation, transport costs in tramp shipping have 
declined by 80% in real terms during the second half of the 20th 
century on average.677 (A similar situation exists in liner shipping.)  
 
The main reasons are: a) the incorporation of technological advances 
in shipbuilding which allow larger, faster vessels which can leverage 
economies of scale to their benefit to be built; b) responsiveness to the 
development of the market and to shippers' needs; c) increased ‘buyer-
power’ which has encouraged banks to commit specialised funds to 
‘maritime portfolios’ which allow the financing of maritime 
entrepreneurs; d) the opening of the markets and the abolition of 
trade benefits which have allowed independent ship-operators to 
access the majority of trades and markets. Regardless of the fact that 
this has proven to be helpful in expanding operations and reducing 
costs, it has simultaneously contributed to the decrease of income 
since the economies of scale and oversupply of vessels reduce freight 
rates. 
 
                                       
676  Spot freight rates in the tramp markets are in general quite volatile, and it 
has been known for certain segments to see changes of more than 25 per cent, up or 
down, during the course of one month. 
677  Clarkson Research Studies, ‘The Tramp Shipping Market’, [April 2004], p. 3 
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3.5.1.2 Capital Considerations 
 
The pool structure does not require finance since it is basically a fleet 
of similar vessels with different owners who operate under the care of 
a central administration. Costs related to the operation of the pool are 
self-financed by charter revenues. The members of the pool would 
require working capital to finance the operation of their fleets. Owners 
retain considerable responsibility for matters relating to the vessels 
themselves, such as finance, insurance, safety and maintenance, 
classification, et cetera. 
The pool does not relate its activities, pending the receipt of freights 
and hires, in respect of the participating vessels, and such working 
capital would need to be contributed by the participants. This 
suggests that there is a similarity between the shipping pool and an 
industrial consortium.  
From the type of financing required for the realisation of this alliance, 
entering a pool facilitates financing since it is accepted that a pool is 
the only organisation that reduces maritime risk.  
 
Shipping is a capital intensive industry and there are various financial 
institutions which are involved in either providing or arranging 
finance for shipping companies. Shipping is an expensive business 
and, due to the huge funds needed, the role of financial institutions 
subsequently determines entry and operative conditions in the 
shipping market by providing the necessary funds to maritime 
entrepreneurs. A variety of financial institutions such as commercial 
banks, export credit agencies, investment banks, private equity 
houses and financial institutions are potential creditors. 
 
The three basic sources of finance are loans (including bonds, export 
credits and sellers’ credits), finance leases (including tax leases) and 
equity (either private or public). Due to the high amount which is 
needed, financial means usually include a combination of these 
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sources, as a result of which some deals are highly complex.678 One 
could claim that the stability of the shipping business relies on 
securing both charterparties and finance. Insufficient finance would 
stall any company regardless of its size and the quality of service it 
provides to its customers, and ultimately lead to its demise.679 
 
 
3.5.1.3 Multiple Timecharter Agreements and Quasi-ship-
owning 
 
Under this arrangement, a single shipowner or operator, operating in 
its own right in the market, enters into a series of long-term 
timecharter(s) with other vessel owners in order to extend its fleet. 
This practice allows the shipowner to secure revenue without 
incurring the capital cost of acquisition or financing the relevant 
tonnage680. This sort of structure is considered separately in ‘multiple 
timecharters’ above681. However, all the commercial management and 
operation of the vessels is the responsibility of the charterer. The 
charterer has to account to the owners for the usual charter hire 
provided for in the charterparty.  
 
                                       
678 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit, paras 283-286 
679  There is the notable example of one of the few villains in the maritime 
industry, the Tidal Marine International Corp, a shipping company in the 1970s that 
declared bankruptcy due to financial collapse of its main creditor (and financier) 
National Bank of North America (NBNA). Though in this case fraud was involved, it 
is indicative of how shipping and financing may be linked. See: USA Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), News Digest for Official Publication, [Issue no 73-21, 
31st January 1973], p. 2, < 
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1973/dig013173.pdf> [accessed 18 December 
2008]; Stopford, (1997), op. cit, p. 3 
680  In addition, this strategy allows a shipowner to avoid any subsequent fixed 
costs, such as the legal responsibility for maintaining the vessels, crewing and other 
matters that belong to technical management and therefore remain the 
responsibility of the owners (and their ship management company). 
681 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit, para 1747 
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This model resembles vessel sharing agreements (VSA); paradoxically, 
does not even require a ship operator to actually own vessels at all, as 
any vessels belonging to the pool can be chartered as long as the 
operator continues to be either a pool member or affiliated to the pool. 
 
This case of a quasi–shipowner is similar in concept to the NVOs (Non-
vessel operators) concept found in the liner industry, where freight 
forwarders and other third parties offer liner services without actually 
owning the tonnage, but issue Bills of Lading as if they were owners. 
Thus, the owner or operator in question retains full responsibility for 
marketing and commercial operation of the vessels and is the only 
point of contact with customers in the downstream market682.  
 
The difference from a pool, in the classical sense, is that once charters 
are entered into multiple timecharter agreements with the relevant 
operator happens on certain routes, and without any prior 
consultation with the other owners who may have leased the vessel to 
the operator. Whereas it is difficult to establish an horizontal level of 
cooperation capable enough to affect competition, it allows a shipping 
operator to expand across multiple markets. Of course, this operation 
does not constitute an abuse unless it is a dominant undertaking in 
one of the markets in question and its pricing is predatory by effect or 
objective. 
 
3.5.2 Non-Pricing Exclusionary Abuses 
 
                                       
682 Fearnley Consultants AS, Global Insight, Holman Fenwick & Willan Law 
Firm (2007), op. cit, Para 1749. Examples of multiple charters cooperation are The 
Leonina System operated by ‘NYKLauritzenCool’. See: J Lauritzen Annual Report 
2006, p. 15,  
<http://www.j-l.com/jlauritzen-annualreport2006/pics/annualreport2006.pdf> 
[accessed 05 August 2009]  
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3.5.2.1 Requirement, Tying and Rebate Arrangements 
 
Under a contract of “requirements”, one party agrees to supply as 
many goods or services as required by the other party and, in 
exchange, the other party expressly or implicitly promises that it will 
obtain its goods or services exclusively from the first party.683 
 
In tramp shipping this can be translated as follows: 
Company ‘A’, hereafter the buyer, agrees to charter from company ‘B’, 
hereafter the seller, (it may be a shipper or another shipping company 
that is entered into a VSA); in exchange, company ‘B’ will be supplying 
the charter in stable flow. 
 
Several problems typically arise with requirements contracts. 
Generally, the antitrust concerns in shipping arise because a 
requirements contract prohibits the buyer from doing business in a 
particular commodity with a party other than the seller. This may 
create an exclusive dealing arrangement which gives the seller a 
monopoly over the buyer, preventing the buyer from seeking a better 
deal if the market becomes more competitive. On the contrary, a buyer 
(company A) may be able to generate sufficient demand and can 
absorb all of the seller's output, effectively removing that seller from 
competing on the open market. This situation resembles a covert 
merger of asset substitution or a full function joint venture.  
 
Requirements contracts have nevertheless been upheld in the face of 
challenges on antitrust grounds684. The ECJ condemned requirement 
contracts in Hoffmann-La Roche685, where customers were forced to 
                                       
683  Miller Roger LeRoy, Gaylord A. Jentz, Business Law Today: The Essentials 
(Thomson-South-Western West, 2005), p. 336 
684  Bork Robert, Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself, (New York: Free 
Press, 1978), p. 309. Also see: Whish, Richard, Competition Law, (Oxford University 
Press, 5th Edition, 2005), pp. 203-204 
685 ECJ Case 85/1976, Hoffmann – La Roche& Co AG vs. Commission of the 
European Communities, ECR [1979] 
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buy vitamins from Roche. This practice directly violates Article 102, 
where the abusive nature of tie-in transactions is explicitly recognised 
in paragraph 2(d). For the most part, requirements contracts in 
shipping are unlikely to raise competition issues as they would 
normally be classified as vertical agreements and would be eligible for 
block exemption under the Vertical Block Exemption, which 
stipulates, inter alia, a 30% threshold686 for the behaviour to infringe 
competition. This is a cap that is very difficult to achieve in shipping. 
                                       
686  Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/1999: ‘On the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices’, 
[OJ 1999 L336/21]. In the event that the agreement is characterised to be vertical, 
then they are subject to the relevant 30% market-share cap and a five-year limit if 
exclusive; see para 8 and article 5 respectively of the Regulation. 
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CONCLUSION 
I. Overview 
Original Scope of the Research 
 
The aims and motivations underlining this research project and the 
research question, as described in the Introduction Chapter, have 
been: “What are the competition law issues in partially functioning 
(limited) co-operation agreements in Liner and Tramp Maritime 
Transport? Which sector-specific particularities affect (predominately 
EU) competition law? 
 
In order to answer the above research question and working 
hypothesis, I examined the partial function horizontal co-operation 
agreements in shipping that do not constitute a concentration within 
the meaning of the Merger Regulation (MR), i.e. the liner consortia and 
tramp pools. The choice of research on shipping synergy has been 
decided on the basis that they represent the most common forms of 
alliances and, most importantly, are the ones that significantly 
influence the competition law issues within the service market. Any 
analysis of competition law could not have disregarded their existence. 
Liner trade is organised, in its majority, in consortia. Moreover tramp 
pools are the most common form of alliances and constitute one of the 
most attractive strategies – though synergy is not as popular in tramp 
shipping as it is in liner shipping. 
 
Accordingly, I have examined the matter from the perspective of 
competition law, incorporating the methodology and structure as it is 
used in competition law bibliography. Moreover I extended the 
research further by informing legal analysis with sources from 
microeconomics and maritime economics. In this context, qualitative 
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data have been used in order to exhibit the properties of the maritime 
system, its functions, and its interaction with competition law in 
relation to the synergy activity. This has been necessary as the 
maritime sector is particularly idiosyncratic, and requires deep and 
global understanding of the way it is structured and operates so that 
my research will have valid and verifiable objectives and findings. 
Thus I decided to research general competition law issues in relation 
to shipping, and this required examining the four main areas of 
competition law: the relevant market, indicators of dominance, 
compliance of the alliance agreements with Article 101 TFEU and 
abusive conducts by dominant undertakings the organized categories 
of abusing conducts under Article 102 TFEU. The development of the 
above areas aims to demonstrate the interaction of sector 
particularities with competition law as a whole; conversely should I 
have focused in one category e.g. Article 101 or 102 TFEU, I could not 
have had confirmed results.  This, however, became a challenging task 
in terms of structure and content required.  
 
In this context, my work has been organised in the following manner: I 
first examine the aforementioned competition law issues in liner 
shipping and in liner shipping consortia; this has been accomplished 
in two chapters: the first analyses matters regarding the relevant 
market, the second analyses issues related to Article 101 and 102 
TFEU. In the final chapter, I review the nature of the maritime tramp 
sector and I refer only to those matters that I consider to be 
important, given that these issues have been analysed in chapters one 
and two they are applicable also to tramp shipping; on the contrary, 
equal reference to the aforementioned mentioned issues would exceed 
the limitations of a PHD research.   
II. Structure of Chapters 
 
The conclusion of this thesis has been organised into two parts: 
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The first part provides an overview of the thesis: I present the original 
research hypothesis and the structure and content of the Chapters. 
 
In the second part I present the outcomes of my research into four 
sections: Within the first section my Main Findings are listed in co-
relation to the original research question. In the second section, I 
present the Collateral (Incidental) Findings ensued during the 
progress of my research. In the third section I refer to the Findings 
that may are limited only to the maritime industry and may have 
wider application and appeal to other sectors of economy as well. 
Finally, in the fourth section I mention the limitations of the current 
thesis and I discuss candidate topics that can be subjects of further 
research. 
 
In order to meet the questions above, the thesis is structured in three 
chapters:  
 
Chapter One 
 
In the first chapter I analyse the general economic properties of the 
maritime industry and the way these influence the interpretation of 
the competition law. I also discuss – on a theoretical level – the 
economic principles that govern the maritime industry and the way it 
operates. Moreover I examine the concept of the relevant market 
revisiting the service and geographic criteria from the combined 
perspective of the maritime industry and competition law. 
Schematically, the chapter is structured in the following sections: 
 
i) Presentation of the maritime sector properties; 
ii) Presentation of maritime markets subsequent to the 
undertaking’s operation; 
iii) Examination of the current legal regime on liner consortia; 
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iv) Analysis of the relevant service and geographic market and 
analysis of the subsequent markets in shipping. ; 
v) Analysis of the stability, temporal and dynamic elements in 
shipping.  
 
Chapter Two 
 
In the second chapter, I emphasise competition law issues in relation 
to the liner consortia. I first review issues of compliance of the liner 
consortium agreement with competition law, in accordance with the 
Article 101 TFEU. Then I proceed in researching on the indicators that 
contribute to market dominance, i.e. the market shares, as well as the 
cost. Thus, I analyse general indicators such as the market shares, as 
well as more special ones such as the capital, technology, and 
economies of scale that are not only relevant to shipping but 
constitute residual elements of the sector and influence the business 
as a whole. I continue my analysis by referring to indicators that 
contribute to dominants and market power of liner consortia. In 
particular, I emphasize the concept and critical size of the power itself, 
as it is understood from legal, jurisdictional and economic points of 
view. Moreover I research the factors of cost structure and economies 
of scale, as well as capital consideration (access to capital and 
liquidity). I then revisit the subject of market share that is needed in 
order to determine the degree of dominants, and I juxtapose this with 
the market shares held among the competing companies.  I then 
proceed to examine non-pricing exclusionary abuses and I conclude 
with exploitative pricing practices. Schematically the chapter is 
structured as follows:  
 
i) Review of consortium agreements under Article 101, mentioning 
the special clauses and practises of the consortia agreements, 
such as: The rationalization, sharing, commercial policy, 
274 
 
membership agreements as well as restrictions imposed to deter 
loses of benefits. 
ii) Assessment of market power indicators.  
iii) Non pricing exclusionary abusers that are caught by Article 
102 TFEU  
Exploitative pricing practises with reference to the shipping specific 
costs and price discriminations.  
 
Chapter Three  
 
In chapter three, based on the findings and analysis of chapters one 
and two, I research the special particularities of the tramp maritime 
sector. I have preserved the structure of chapter one but I preferred to 
refer only to those specific issues that are relevant to the tramp 
maritime sector, as the majority of the legal issues are common 
between the two sectors. The subjects that I raised relate to the 
definition of the relevant market in tramp shipping, review of tramp 
shipping pools and other co-operation agreements under Article 101 
TFEU. Given that in chapter one I have made special references to the 
concept of the relevant market as it is perceived in liner shipping, I 
investigate the matter further and research this subject in the context 
of tramp shipping particularities. I revisit accordingly the concepts of 
relevant market, efficiency and consumer benefit as they required, in 
my view, special attention. In order to resolve the true difficulty of 
defining a relevant spot market in tramp shipping I propose the 
solution of aggregative market shares held by the shipping company-
consortium across markets in order to verify the actual degree of 
dominants. I then analyze the indicators of cost structure and 
economist of scale as well as capital consideration that are equally 
relevant indicators of market power.  Schematically I present chapter 
three as follows:  
i) The relevant tramp shipping market.  
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ii) Review of the cooperation agreements under Article 101 
TFEU.  
iii) Tramp pools and market power, with emphasis on the 
indicators of dominants. 
 
III. Research Outcomes 
 
Main Findings 
 
The main findings of the thesis include but are not limited to the 
following. 
 
General Findings 
 
i) I reviewed the legal and economic concepts that determine the 
relevant market in shipping. 
ii) I searched the background of the subject matter for elements 
that play important role in the interpretation of the competition 
law in shipping. I presented the subsequent and special 
maritime markets to the main service provided by the 
undertaking; I underlined their correlation with the relevant 
service and geographic market. 
iii) In an effort to bypass the genuine difficulty in defining  the 
geographic relevant market in tramp shipping, I proposed a 
possible but unconventional solution. Perhaps, the aggregation 
across markets could be an appropriate method to determine 
the actual benefits to the consumers, as well as the critical 
market share held by an undertaking that operates in multiple 
open and loose border markets. This method can be particularly 
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useful to tramp shipping, but its applicability is not limited to 
this industry.  
iv) I highlighted the cost and time parameters that are residual to 
the shipping business. I support that these indicators greatly 
influence dominance and market in both liner and tramp 
shipping. I support that these indicators are more relevant to 
determine market power 
v) I reviewed the specific clauses of consortia pool agreements and 
their compliance with Article 101 TFEU. 
vi) I conducted an assessment of market power in liner and tramp 
shipping and I researched on the maritime sector specific cases, 
by taking into account the cost related factors. 
vii) I examined abusive practices by liner consortia. 
viii) I investigated the application of the same in tramp shipping; I 
accordingly researched on the nature of tramp shipping pools. 
 
Specific Findings: 
 
i) Where pools are caught by Article 101 TFEU it is necessary to 
insure that they fulfil the four cumulative conditions of Article 
101(3) TFEU. 
ii) It is necessary to define the boundaries between partial and full 
Joint Ventures. The latter must collectively satisfy three criteria: 
First the parent undertaking must exercise joint control over the 
cooperation. Second, the cooperation must perform all the 
function of an autonomous economic entity. Third, the 
cooperation must operate on lasting basis. Regulation 
1419/2006 amended Regulation 1/2003 as regards the 
extension of its scope to include international tramp services. 
Each shipping pool must be analysed by case to case basis to 
determine by reference to each centre of gravity, whether it 
scope infringes competition. 
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iii) It is confirmed that the use of market shares, as an indicator of 
dominance, produces better results provided it is correlated with 
the frequency about the number of voyages, volume or value 
share in the overall transport of a specific cargo, the share of 
timecharter contracts and the shares in the relevant fleet. The 
degree of market stability indicates respectively the competitive 
importance of the parties and their competitors. 
iv) Whereas the SSNIP test can be theoretically applied to tramp 
shipping, it fails to identify a relevant product market beyond 
doubt, or to reveal measurable substitutions. Subsequently as 
many relevant markets overlap both in the product and 
geographical dimensions, it is nearly impossible to estimate 
market shares in each relevant market based on supply volume 
and value.  In order however to determine its degree the 
indicators of cost and time are crucial. Thus, it is the temporal 
dimension of supply and demand that has to be taken into 
account.  
v) Accordingly, supply substitutability in tramp shipping is 
achieved on satisfactory level. The fragmentation of the relevant 
market suggests that the substitutability of different cargo and 
size of vessels is essential.  
vi) In view of the difficulty to define the service and the geographic 
boundaries of the relevant market, I argue that if there are 
certain regions in which the pools may pursue more frequent 
presence, they can be define by statistical means. There I can 
define the ability of the pool to exclude rivals and significant 
influence competition. Then I use the indicator of aggregated 
market shares across the said markets in order to determine 
dominants regardless of their size. A sui generis market like 
tramp shipping, where unpredictable movements of vessels 
combined with unstable demand (temporal and seasonable) 
prevail, may ultimately be a kind of system comprised of 
multiple relative neighbouring markets that  ultimately 
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constitute a region. In other worlds it would be convenient to 
see a relevant greater trade even if this is intercontinental or 
intra-EU. In this context, it is necessary to aggregate market 
shares across multiple markets that could be relevant in terms 
of geographic and product criteria. 
vii) The temporal element in shipping is of important significance 
not only as regards the product market, but also in terms of 
measuring the  actual supply of vessels in a given time. The 
Maritime Guidelines refer to the time element in paragraphs 25, 
34 and 70 on issues related to market concentration and the 
relevant product and geographical market. Based on this 
approach, I  consider the temporal element is not only an 
element that affects supply and demand but also the residual 
elements of the shipping business, which are cost efficiencies 
and available capital. Since temporal supply and demand are 
present, I subsequently support that they may also have 
temporal dominants.  Here one has to distinguish between liner 
and tramp service. In the former, the temporal element may not 
affect the long term service and revenue projections, but it can 
overturn the medium returns. Moreover, the temporal instability 
constitutes a discouraging factor for potential entrants. The 
temporal element in liner shipping is not expressed in terms of 
short term volatility, but through greater cycles, also known as 
the maritime cycles. 
viii) In tramp shipping respectively, the temporal element 
constitutes a significant factor as it is responsible for the 
dynamic conditions that exist therein 
ix) Consumers should benefit from a  fair share  of the efficiencies 
generated and must be at least compensated for any actual or 
potential negative impact cost to them by the restriction of 
competition of Article 101 (1) . 
x) Although cross subsidisation does not constitute ad hoc a 
violation it can be used as tool in order to eliminate competition. 
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In shipping, cross subsides can have an appreciable effect on 
the competition levels in both liner and tramp sector. In tramp 
shipping, however, given the difficulty of defining the relevant 
market, one cannot easily obtain evidence of such practice. 
Information also remains insufficient regarding the intention 
(object) of the pool to influence a certain marketplace, given that 
freights are negotiated within short intervals and pools generally 
are price-takers. So part of the chartering contract would be to 
call ports at low freights. This of course is not a cross 
substitution but a kind of rebate given to the customer or, from 
the altera pars of the shipper, a compulsory choice in order to 
break even from losses coming from inactivity. The difference 
between this obligation to rebate (reposed by the shipper) and 
the regular rebates promoted by the carrier is that the latter 
may only have exclusionary effects to potential entrance if 
certain conditions are fulfilled; yet, there has not been a single 
case reported. 
xi) Under EC Competition Law, the efficiency generated cannot be 
limited only to the saving of costs. Although the latter is a 
residual part of competition, it must result from the integration 
of other economic activities. 
xii) Joint selling and joint commercial policy of a pool can 
appreciably have an adverse impact on the parameters of 
competition.  This can be determined by examining the power 
and the influence of the pool manager. In this context the 
legitimacy of the structure of the pool can be determined by 
restriction on membership, non competition clause and price 
fixing. A Pool Manager may, in effect, contribute to a price fixing 
mechanism and its actions need to be investigated regardless of 
the market share held by the pool in a context of geographic 
market.  
xiii) Given the difficulty of defining the relevant market in tramp 
shipping we face an equal difficulty in defying the benefits to the 
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consumer within a market.  I support that the key benefit to the 
consumer is related to this sui generis nature of shipping of 
dynamic and unpredictable changes in the supplied and 
demand equilibrium. This is the element that guarantees 
effective and actual competition in all markets, at a global level. 
Regardless of the presence of concentration in a form of pool, or 
other types of JVs, the result of competitiveness remains the 
same. It is also remarkable that for this trillion dollar industry 
we do not have any reported case of competition aw worldwide.  
xiv) Based on the above, I contend that tramp shipping produces 
benefits not only to the users of transport services, but to other 
sectors of the economy as well. In this context we have the 
following possible types of benefits: i) Benefits to users in the 
relevant market, ii) Benefits to users across markets, iii) 
Benefits to other sectors of economies and iv) Intergenerational 
benefits. 
 
Collateral Findings 
 
 I have investigated the nature of maritime sector and have discovered 
that it is a particular market that operates in dynamic conditions. I 
tend to agree with the argument of ship operation that claims that 
concentration and alliances are defence mechanisms against 
instability. In contrast to the traditional approach of competition law, 
market shares are not indicative of market power. This is manifested 
in jurisdictional approach as a kind of inconsistency; ultimately it has 
been recognised as a feature element by the Maritime Guidelines that 
the Commission interprets market shares, the market conditions on a 
case by case basis.  
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Findings of Wider Application and Appeal 
 
The abolition of liner conferences and the new regulation of liner and 
tramp sector brought up the subject of EU unilateral legislation in 
globalised but non-harmonised business contexts. Liner conferences 
continue to exist in all countries except in the EU, and this 
constitutes an indication that even OECD countries do not view price 
fixing in shipping to be anticompetitive. On the contrary, they 
continue to support their fleets and the argument of the liner 
operators and several authors that price fixing may leave to stability 
and further competitiveness. I tend to agree with this opinion, as I 
believe that liner service does not have the flexibility of tramp 
shipping—to cut cost without compromising quality of service. The 
matter of interconnected but open markets is common also to air 
transport and I support that these markets may not have to be of 
homogenous products, but can be reviewed as a kind of system of 
interdependent markets. Transport serves many other industries that 
each depend on quality of service and availability; these industries 
are, for example, export-imports, trade and tourism.  
 
Limitations and Further Research 
 
Depending on circumstances, it would be desirable to continue this 
exploration of related transport sectors by extending it to include air 
transport, rail transport, and integrated transport networks. Of 
course, the method of approach which has been followed here, can 
apply to other complex dynamic and open sectors such as the 
medical, agricultural, tourism and  e-governance as well. 
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Furthermore, the systemic approach understands economic sectors 
from a wide point of view, notably taking into account such factors as 
the interactions between domestic and international markets. A 
proposal for further research would be the evaluation of the 
applicability of EU competition law principles to foreign jurisdictions 
with a view to revaluate the concepts of protectionism and 
globalisation from a greater perspective.  
 
IV. Limitations 
 
Because of the extent and the complexity of the subject, and the 
limited space available, I considered it appropriate to examine only the 
partial function Joint Ventures. Also, I focused on the ocean-borne 
shipping that includes shipping in EU catchment areas. 
I decided not to involve terminal and port operations, as well as 
matters related to taxation and state aid. 
 
Further Research   
 
This thesis can be the starting point for future research for several 
subjects.  
First of all, one can further develop the matter of relevant market in 
tramp shipping with the scope of defining the nature of open 
boundaries and the connections between neighbouring markets. 
Second, one could investigate the temporal element as decisive 
indicator for dynamic markets. 
Third, one could investigate the intergenerational impact of European 
seamanship.  
Fourth, it will be worth examining the topic of cross subsidies in air 
transport.  
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Fifth, I would like to examine further the issue of economies of scale 
as a barrier to entry or as a factor of efficiency.  
Sixth, the abolition of liner conferences and the new regulation of liner 
and tramp sector brought up the subject of EU unilateral legislation in 
globalised but non harmonised business context. 
Finally, I would like to investigate the correlation between maritime 
transport and tourism by passenger ferries.  
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